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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to investigate the availability of credit and its cost to US agriculture.  
A dynamic dual cost function is employed to investigate and compute credit demand elasticities 
for operating and term credit and their relationship with the demand of other inputs. This allows 
for the analysis and interpretation of the input elasticities, specifically the interest rate 
elasticities. These elasticities are then incorporated into the model that aims to test the 
effectiveness of the counter cyclical lending role of the Farm Credit System (FCS) relative to the 
Commercial Banking (CB) system in the US over the past 80 years.  
We estimate demand elasticities for each of the five cornbelt states including Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and Ohio as well as their aggregate average and find that credit demand 
elasticities are nearly elastic, for both operating and term credit. This implies that farmers are 
sensitive to changes in interest rates. This sensitivity is observed in the cross elasticities 
measures of variable and quasi-fixed assets including farm land. 
 We also investigate the demand/supply relationship between FCS loans and those of the 
CB sector. We incorporate the interest expense elasticities described above to show how farmers 
sensitivity to interest rates affects farm lending. We find that in periods during which elasticity is 
rising, the quantity of FCS loans increases relative to the commercial sector. We find other 
evidence of counter cyclical demand between the two sectors including periods of economic 
distress (GDP falls) which see an increase in FCS loans, and a rise in treasury yields which 
favors commercial banks. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Agriculture is an ever evolving industry in the United States (US) and has become heavily 
capital-intensive over the past 100 years. This dependency on technology has caused an increase 
in the demand for debt financing and farmers, generally speaking, cannot raise equity and are 
consistently limited by the access to credit in order to grow and sustain their business. The 
dependency on loans, coupled with the exposure and sensitivity to macro-economic downturns, 
means that many farms across the US are at the mercy of their credit providers to grow, or even 
continue their business. However, the characteristics of credit demand for US farmers has not 
been studied in detail, even though there is a significant body of literature that leads to a good 
understanding of the agriculture finance market place, and the effect of credit on farmers’ 
decision making. In financial economics, the relationship between credit demand and interest 
rates, specifically, the credit demand elasticities are described at the micro level. At the macro 
level lies the institutions that provide credit. In the US there are both private and public 
institutions for agriculture credit and how they compete, what their roles are, and how each 
responds to changes in demand (i.e. change in elasticity) is an important economic problem. The 
historical relationship between public and private lending institutions is, after 100 years, poorly 
understood.  For example, what might be the most influential factor in the success of agriculture, 
is the component that cannot be predicted or influenced: weather. As the prospect of obtaining 
new loans at a manageable interest rate is contingent on the weather’s cooperation, this became a 
perilous cycle in the early 20th century. When the weather allowed for a successful growing 
season, famers were able to pay off loans in a timely fashion and the positive dynamic between 
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farmers and lenders could continue. However, if in that year, farmers experienced unfortunate 
weather events such as drought or flooding, the output would decrease, and the ability to pay off 
the loans would be more difficult. This issue became the main problem in the early 20th century 
when commercial banking (CB) was the only source of credit for farmers. This volatility in the 
supply of credit meant that a change was required to continue the growth and prosperity of the 
agricultural industry. Thus, the Farm Credit System (FCS) in the US was introduced as a counter 
cyclical lender; to provide credit when farms needed it most.  
 Despite the appeal of the FCS from a producer stand point, there has been doubt from 
parties across the US on the effectiveness it has provided and its fundamental role in present day. 
The American Bankers Association (ABA), which represents commercial banks, has even made 
the statement to call for a referendum to remove the FCS from legislation and open the market to 
commercial lending, …“from the ABA's view, the hope is to get a congressional oversight 
hearing scheduled so that both lawmakers and the public can start to dig deeper and present a 
full view of the FCS' business practices. From there, the ABA would push for the FCS to scale 
back and focus on its core mission. Or, failing that, it would like to see agriculture banks — 
there are hundreds of banks focused primarily on farm country, he said — be granted tax 
advantages similar to the FCS. Or, of course, the FCS could give up its tax breaks. These latter 
moves, he said, would at least level the playing field.” (President of American Bankers 
Association, August 2015). 
 Another impediment for agricultural credit, as Baker (1968) points out, is the cost of 
capital including with credit. He shows in his research that by omitting credit and its costs in the 
production function, creates econometric bias. Farmers use credit predominately for the purchase 
of new inputs, meaning if credit is constrained, either by supply or cost, the growth and success 
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of the farm is in jeopardy. Thus, despite credit elasticities being frequently left out of the 
previous literature, this thesis aims to fill this information gap. Specifically, this research works 
to understand the relationship of credit in the production system, both from a term and operating 
stand point, as well as examining how the availability of credit through a tenuous economic 
relationship between public (FCS) and private (commercial) lending has helped the stability of 
farm credit in the USA.  
 
1.2 Research Problem 
This thesis aims to fill the informational gap surrounding interest rate elasticities in agriculture. 
Turvey, Bogan, and Salazar explain this gap in the related literature by noting the varying results 
in the analysis of agricultural credit elasticities. To summarize, in the absence of robust evidence 
on interest rate sensitivities, policy-makers and Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) are making 
broad generalizations regarding the demand sensitivity for interest rates in agriculture. As shown 
in Table 1.1 the results for each study have varying results. 
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Table 1.1: Elasticity of Demand for Microcredit 
Author(s) Country Studied Credit Market Data Collection Method Results 
Weersink et 
al. (1994) US Rural Farmers USDA survey data 
Elasticity estimates 
between -0.84 and -0.69 
Bell et al. 
(1997) Punjab Rural Farmers World Bank survey data Elasticity estimate of -
0.22 
    
Kochar 
(1997) Indian Rural Farmers 
Govt of India survey 
data 
Low demand for credit. 
Credit demand inelastic 
Gross and 
Souleles 
(2002) 
US Credit Card Holders 
Bankcard issuer acct 
archives 
Short-run elasticity 
estimate of -0.80 
Dehejia et 
al. (2012) Bangladesh 
Micro-
entrepreneurs Credit co-operative data 
Elasticity estimates 
between -1.04 and --
0.73 
Karlan and 
Zinman 
(2008) 
South Africa Working Poor RCT with loan contract data 
Elasticity estimates 
between -0.51 and -0.14 
Karlan and 
Zinman 
(2010) 
South Africa Working Poor RCT with loan contract data - 
Turvey et 
al. (2012) China Rural Farmers Field Survey 
Average elasticity 
estimate of -0.60 
Source: (Bogan, Turvey, Salazar ,2015) 
   
Karlan and Zinman (2008) suggest that it is assumed the poor are insensitive to increases in 
interest rates which follows the results found by Bell et al. (1997) and Kochar (1997). Both of 
these studies, looking at rural farmers in Punjab and India, found that there was relatively 
inelastic demand estimates. However, these results are contradicted by the work of Dehejia et al. 
(2012) which showed that the rural farmers were in fact, sensitive to the interest rates and had 
elastic demand. Despite the research summarized above, there is still an informational gap in the 
literature as these studies have varying results.  
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Thus, the primary aim of this research is to determine the demand relationships for short-
term and long-term credit and their respective interest rates in the production process for US 
agriculture in the US. By including these interest expenses into the production function and using 
the duality processes described in following chapters, the elasticities of the inputs will be 
determined. While determining the credit demand elasticities is of interest generally, it is as 
important to understand how static, or changing, credit demand elasticities affect market demand 
and supply, and even more specifically whether they have differential impacts on the cumulative 
and marginal loan portions of FCS and the CB sector. Consequently, this thesis aims to assess 
the effectiveness of the FCS and the Farm Service Agency (FSA) which is directed more at 
emergency credit and assistance programs, since inception, by incorporating control variables for 
macroeconomic conditions, as well as the elasticities for interest rates and land expense from the 
above model to show the sensitivity of the industry to changes in the cost of capital.  
 
1.3 Purpose and Objectives 
The overall the purpose of this thesis is to estimate credit demand elasticities and their 
relationship between Commercial and Farm Credit System lending. We achieve this by 
following and completing the following objectives: 
1) Determine and identify the relationship between interest rates and long and short-term credit 
demand; 
Justification: in order to achieve this objective, we develop several models assuming separability 
of the inputs. These models include: a static model which assumes that each of the inputs adjust 
completely to their optimal value in each time period, a partial static model that assumes some of 
the inputs adjust in each time period and some inputs are quasi-fixed, and a dynamic model 
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which is a less restrictive version of the Static model as it allows for different adjustment rates 
for various inputs. These models are estimated for each of the five cornbelt states as well as an 
average of the five. In all models, we include both production inputs, such as fertilizer and seed, 
as well as intangible inputs (short and long-term credit). By including these inputs into the 
production function, we aim to examine the relationship between credit and interest rates for 
agriculture in the US cornbelt states over time. 
 
2) To develop measures for the interest rate elasticity in a production function from duality 
principles; 
Justification: By using both the price elasticities, and Allen elasticities of substitution for each of 
the models, the measures of input price sensitivity across the cornbelt states can be evaluated. 
These elasticities are calculated from the three models described in Objective 1. The Dynamic 
elasticities are also broken into long-run and short-run values, where the short-run elasticities are 
interpreted as the first period response of factor demands to changes in factor prices. We 
hypothesize that the short-term interest rate elasticity will be more sensitive in relation to the 
variable inputs, and the long-term interest rate will be more sensitive for the capital inputs. This 
hypothesis is due to the nature of the credit terms for short and long-term interest costs. Once the 
elasticities for the short-run Dynamic model are found they will be incorporated into the 
following model as described below1.  
 
                                                
1 This thesis uses the econometric models and specifications from Vanden Dungen and Weersink 
et al. to estimate the demand for credit as well as developing the elasticities for inputs as 
described in objectives 1 and 2.  
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3) To investigate the differential roles that the Farm Credit System and Commercial Banking 
sectors have on the supply and demand of agricultural credit in the US; 
Justification: In order to identify and evaluate the changes in relative lending between the Farm 
Credit System and the Commercial Banking system, a Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
estimation is created that uses both macroeconomic variables as well as selected elasticities from 
the Dynamic model described in above objective two. From this model, we interpret the 
performance and success of the Farm Credit System in counter cyclicallending, which has been 
under scrutiny from the American Banking Association (ABA) in recent years. In order to be 
complete we also observe the value of loans, the share of loans, and the change in loans by the 
Farm Credit System, the Farm Service Agency (FSA), and the Commercial Banking system.  
 
1.4 Overview of Analytic Framework 
The duality portion of this thesis is analyzed using state level data from the five cornbelt states: 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and Ohio, as well as an aggregate average. These states were 
chosen due to the relative homogeneity of their climate and agricultural practices, which 
alleviates the problems associated with examining national data across the US. This section of 
the thesis incorporates a dual cost translog function to estimate the output compensated demand 
elasticities for the intangible inputs of credit as well as the production inputs. The behaviour of 
the long-term debt is explored using a partial adjustment or disequilibrium model where the 
movement of variable to their equilibrium values is approximated by a system of difference 
equations in a partial adjustment framework. The elasticity measurements are estimated from the 
resulting system of equations. 
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  In order to test the effectiveness of the FCS, national data from the US is utilized. By 
incorporating national data into our model which examines the changes in lending between the 
FCS and the FSA relative to CB, FCS effectiveness can be evaluated for the US.  We aim to test 
the effectiveness of the FCS by comparing the percentage change in relative lending of both the 
FCS and the FSA to the percentage change in relative lending of the Commercial Banks. To 
achieve this objective, we use general macro-economic indicative variables (such as GDP and 
Treasury Yield) as well as the short-run dynamic elasticities for the short term interest, long term 
interest, and land price elasticities from the dynamic model described above. Although the 
elasticities are computed using cornbelt data, they are included to show how sensitivity of 
interest rates affects the lending patterns in agriculture. Thus, in a way that accounts for year-
over-year change to the respective FCS (FSA) or CB loan portfolios, we are able to identify their 
effects on farm lending in the US agricultural sector. 
 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
Following this section, Chapter II will outline the related literature of this study as well as a 
comprehensive outline of the history of both Farm Credit in the US and the FCS and FSA as 
institutions. Chapter III will present the methods and econometric specification, including a 
description of duality theory with the advantages and limitations, and the specific methodology 
for including credit in the production process and the methods to test the effectiveness of the 
FCS and FSA. Chapter IV will show the explicit descriptions of the equations that will be 
estimated and the overview of the data included in both portions of the thesis. The results for the 
Duality portion will be presented and discussed in Chapter V and the results for the FCS 
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effectiveness portion will be analyzed in Chapter VI. Finally, the conclusions and summaries of 
the thesis will be presented in Chapter VII. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to bring context to this research by examining previous work in 
this field as well as providing an explanation of the history of the Farm Credit System (FCS) in 
the US leading up to the present day. By including credit as a component of the production 
decisions, and showing how we identify the effectiveness of the FCS, this chapter aims to fill in 
an informational gap missing from the related literature in this field. 
 To begin, a broad history of the American FCS and agricultural credit in general is 
presented. This presents the background to the research objectives set out in Chapter I; to 
estimate the demand for credit in agriculture by including it in the production decisions, identify 
the interest rate elasticities, and to help to answer the question has the FCS met its mandate as a 
countercyclical lender over the past 80 years? This discussion will be followed by the rationale 
to include credit in the production function and decision making. The explanation is based from 
the research done by Shee and Turvey (2012) in Indian agriculture, however, it sets the stage for 
this thesis. Finally, the effect of the interest rate for credit is examined more in depth, followed 
by a mathematical and intuitive explanation for the results that will be presented in Chapters V 
and VI.  
 
2.2 Agricultural Credit in the US before the Farm Credit System 
As Turvey (2015) explains, the story of agricultural finance is a combination of personal 
initiative, and both direct and indirect involvement by the state, which has led to stable, liquid 
and secure sources of agricultural credit in the developed world. The agricultural credit 
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discussion began in the United States (US) in 1912, when credit reforms in agriculture had found 
widespread support in congress looking to manage agricultural credit. Additional to the issue of 
finding financing for agricultural loans, there were also concerns about the varying interest rates 
across the US. For example, O’Hara (1983) mentions, interest rates in 1914 that were as low as 
5.3% in New Hampshire and as high as 9.7% in New Mexico. Due to these concerns, congress 
took action in 1916 with the formation of Federal Land Banks, America’s first Government 
Sponsored Enterprises (GSE) (Turvey 2015). However, by the beginning of the 20th century, the 
U.S. was missing a financial infrastructure to consolidate the national agricultural economy. 
O’Hara (1983) makes the case that the notion of land banks were not a new concept in the US, 
showing the variety of guaranteed mortgage companies that did not require paid in capital or 
reserves and were not supervised. These companies financed agriculture and boom towns, 
essentially to exploit the investors. However, due to the crop failure of 1884 and the stress of 
1893, these companies mostly dissolved.  
  Historically, Commercial Banks were not permitted to accept and amortize mortgages on 
farm property until 1913, when the Federal Reserve was established. Due to the structure of 
operating credit, which could be provided on lien of crops, this type of operational loan was not 
an issue. Even with the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916, what was at issue was long-term 
mortgage credit, commercial banks were given little chance to address the agricultural finance 
issues. 
 In order to deal with the many issues surrounding agricultural credit the US, in March of 
1913, congress appointed a special commission, often referred to as the American Commission. 
Its purpose was to investigate and study European experiences with cooperative land mortgage 
banks, cooperative rural-credit unions, and similar organizations devoted to promote and better 
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agriculture. By the very nature of credit demands, the American Commission took the view that 
long-term and short-term credit should be segregated. In terms of long-term credit, the 
commission deliberated the methods to establish a land bank with amortized mortgages under 
cooperative principles. Additionally, the Commission recommended that any land mortgage 
bonds be tax exempt to avoid double taxation, as taxation by the state of both the mortgage and 
the real estate on which the mortgage is secured is a form of double taxation (Turvey 2015). The 
Commission also noted that in order for each state to produce its own legislation or charter and 
with each state issuing separate bonds, with different bankruptcy laws, foreclosure rules, 
conveyances, land taxes, and land titling and registration, any form of land banks should be 
through Federal charter or law. 
The final version of the 1916 Federal Farm Loan Act enacted a state-centric model in 
favor of a regional model comprised of seven agricultural districts similar to the Federal Reserve 
Banks. Putnam shows however, that despite the discussions throughout the 1913-1915 period, 
disagreements arose amongst stakeholders, with one group favoring cooperation, another 
favoring direct government loans and another favoring private enterprise (Putnam 1919). To 
‘these seven banks would be overseen by a Federal Farm Loan Board which would be funded by 
the federal government. Farmers could then apply for loans from the land bank in their 
particular region as members of a local farm association that could be formed by any 10 or 
more members. The association would apply for a mortgage through the regional land banks, 
and the land bank would in turn issue bonds to an equivalent amount, including a 5% capital 
contribution by the farmer to the association, and a 5% contribution of the association on loans 
obtained from the Federal Land Banks, Loans could not exceed 50% of appraised land values or 
20% of permanent and insured (e.g. barns) improvements, and with amortization not less than 5 
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and no more than 40 years, at an initial interest rate of 6% and not exceeding 1% more than the 
yields on bond issues’ (Palmer 1916, Thomson 1917, Turvey 2015). Due to the specificity of the 
legislation in stating that mortgages were to be directed to those ‘in the cultivation of the land 
mortgaged,’ these same sharecroppers and tenants that had been working the land for years, 
could finally access credit to buy farmland and become landowners (Turvey 2015). 
The Land Banks under the 1916 law and the Intermediate Credit Banks under the 1923 
law were established to provide agricultural finance on a sustainable basis. By issuing bonds to 
investors, the land banks were able to obtain funds, who then would supply the funds to support 
farm mortgages. In return, and backstopped by a treasury guarantee, the bonds were secured by 
the first mortgages of the farm being lent to. The Intermediate Credit Banks, that provided 
production and marketing credit, raised funds through debentures secured by farmer notes, 
inventories and warehouse receipts. Both of these banks were able to attract good terms on their 
bonds and debentures, about 1% to 1.5% above treasury bills, and could therefore offer low 
interest rate loans with changes occurring in tandem with treasury bills (Turvey 2006).    
All bonds issued by the Federal Land Banks or Joint-Stock Land Banks were exempt 
from federal, state, municipal, and local taxation as they were deemed to be instrumentalities of 
the government of the United States. As anticipated, the main purpose of enacting legislation on 
farm credit was to provide a means by which farmers with limited resources could access credit 
on good terms. The problem arose as there were also a population of farmers who could provide 
security and could therefore obtain loans from Commercial Banks. This system posed some 
issues as the Commercial Banks would have argued their disadvantage and possible crowding 
out of the private sector due to the farm credit bonds being issued tax-free, whereas loans from 
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commercial institutions that were derived from taxable savings and certificates of deposits were 
taxable.  
Disputes began to arise around 1917, as the Farm Mortgage Banks Association of 
America campaigned against the tax-emptions for cooperatives and joint-stock companies as set 
out in the Farm Act of 1916. Until the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, Commercial Banks could 
not make loans to farmers, so that insurance companies (using premiums) and farm mortgage 
brokers (by issuing bonds) were the primary sources of farm credit (O’Hara 1983). Due to these 
disputes, congress proposed the dual path program, meaning the mortgage broker’s ability to 
establish joint-stock land banks, might appease them. This system began to unravel by 1921 with 
a bill to repeal tax-free status in 1920 and another in 1921 to eliminate joint-stock land banks 
entirely. However, as Turvey explains, within the limit set forth, they could behave as a 
commercial bank, against the spirit of the Act, while claiming tax-exemption for the benefits of 
private interests (Turvey, 2015).  
Another issue that plagued the joint-stock banks were the activities they were engaged in. 
By 1930-31 the lending of joint-stock banks was in large decline, and this was largely self-
inflicted due to the lack of public confidence in the bonds after the joint-stock land banks had 
gone into receivership. Other banks began noting that their own bonds were selling below par, 
and used whatever capital they could to repurchase those bonds in order to improve their own 
conditions rather than issuing new loans. This was intensified by 1933, with the repercussions of 
the great depression being felt strongly by the banks. The shortfall in liquidity from commercial 
banks, and also the inability to draw on funds deposited in financial institutions, was forcing 
many farmers to foreclosure. The hardest hit in this time period were the individual creditors and 
the joint-stock land banks (Turvey 2015). The Land Bank system became severely stressed 
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during the depression years when low prices coupled with poor production reduced the ability of 
farmers to pay mortgages. 
To finalize and liquidate the Joint-Stock Land Banks, the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act 
of 1933 prohibited them from issuing tax exempt bonds or from making further mortgages loans 
except to refinance existing loans. The purpose of this Act was to permit an orderly liquidation 
of the Joint-Stock Banks, which involved the Federal Land Banks acquiring their mortgages.  
The enduring question of whether the Farm Credit System is ultimately socially optimal 
inspired the second portion of this thesis. As Turvey reviews, O’Hara (1983) raised this question 
in the context of tax-free bonds generally. She describes the distortion to land prices brought 
about by the relaxation of credit constraints and indirect subsidy on interest rate, as well as what 
is perceived as an implicit guarantee by the federal government. She also claimed it was farm 
mortgages, not other economic factors that drove up land prices between 1917 and 1920-21, and 
the consequent decrease in land prices were due to the over-valuation caused by mortgaging. 
New mortgages, including refinancing, fell from $1,773 million to $482 million for a decrease of 
about 73% between 1921 and 1922. However, as the land prices peaked between 1921 and 1922, 
the weakening conditions of low prices exhibited a steep decline in farmland prices (Turvey 
2015, and O’Hara 1983).  
Although the Land Banks of the early 20th century are no longer in operation, the 
innovations they provided for the FCS today, primarily using the bond markets for agricultural 
credit, proved to be of great economic benefit for a number of reasons. Firstly, the issuance of 
bonds against the value of farm real estate, and aggregated across space, provided a safe medium 
for secondary market investors. Secondly, agricultural land bonds that were secured by real 
assets and diversified across regions and crops/livestock were of low risk and the lower yield on 
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the bonds were transferred positively to the cost of farm mortgages. Finally, although the bonds 
were fixed in terms and duration, the farmer could make additional principal payments in order 
to increase the rate of amortization Turvey 2015). 
 
2.3 The US Farm Credit System  
The structure of the present farm credit system is the result of many discussions during the 
decades leading up to the 1930’s and the amendments following the farm financial crisis of the 
1980’s. Today, it is comprised of Farm Credit Banks, a Bank for Cooperatives (CoBank) and the 
Agricultural Credit Association. This system is founded in the activities of the Farm Credit 
Administration and its roots in the cooperative movement; this distinguishes this system from 
other countries, such as the Canadian Farm Credit Corporation, which was not rooted from a 
cooperative movement. 
During the beginning of the 20th century, the US was battling unprecedented economic growth 
in both its urban and rural economies, with mass immigration into and within the US. The 
political fortunes rested with urban development, which as a political base, often usurped the 
growing needs of rural population (in health, education, transportation, infrastructure, and the 
adoption of technology and access to credit). This created a dire need to increase the economic 
efficiency and productivity of farming, as well as a need to improve human interests by making 
agricultural life more dignified and attractive. Due to the inability of farmers to obtain credit, 
ownership was limited to those with the ability to acquire land. This left, almost with impunity, a 
system of tenancy that provided in one hand few rights to tenant farmers and unheeded 
speculation in land by the owners of capital (Turvey 2006). One of the main goals of this time, 
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was that the strength of rural communities would be built around a population of landowners 
who rather than being absentee, would live and grow the communities.  
The cooperative reform movement was designed to encourage farmers to work together 
as a community of sorts, to better their economic interests and provide competition to squash the 
unscrupulous. While the agricultural sector was operated majorly by tenants whose cropping 
patterns and choices were dictated by the landowner, farms were devoid of any encouragement 
to diversify beyond that which could be marketed. However shallow the profits be, encouraging 
systematic risk taking, and leaching the soil is required for sustained husbandry (Turvey 2006). 
The proposition of the farming cooperative economy system was such that farmers could 
group together as a buying group to compete with input suppliers, or as a selling group to market 
crops to the best interest of the members of the group, rather than an uninterested third party. In 
order to facilitate this system, the role of the state was to facilitate the voluntary emergence of 
the cooperative or association, not to regulate it. The Commission called for the development of 
cooperative banks and credit unions to keep money and financial resources in the community 
rather than urban centers (Turvey 2006).  
To initiate the discussions about a Farm Credit Cooperative, Cornell’s George Warren 
raised the idea that the assurance of an adequate supply of credit could be obtained through 
decentralized cooperative credit associations operating outside of a subsidy regime but within the 
central sphere of government oversight as limited liability corporations. W.I Myers, another 
Cornell professor, was the chief architect and governor of the Farm Credit Administration. In 
1934 he spoke about a 5% contribution to the FCA, that would allow the farmer to become part 
owner of the institution with a voice in its management, and ultimately the ownership the 
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financing and control of the Farm Credit System would be entirely in the hands of its owners 
(Turvey 2006). 
 Due to the public stress and political activism surrounding the years of the great 
depression, the unrest began in 1929 and started to rise. In 1932, the Farm Holiday Association, 
created by the activist Milo Reno, was created. The word ‘Holiday’ was used specifically as a 
euphemism for strike. This organization was formed to strike against the low commodity prices 
and enact some action from the federal government. Reno’s request was to receive a fair price, 
which to him was at least the cost of production. 
 The low commodity prices were also coupled with the increasing number of farm 
bankruptcies. As shown in Figure 2.1 (Turvey 2006), the number of bankruptcies was driven up 
by the post-war depression starting in 1921: 
Figure 2.1: US Bankruptcies from 1900-1939 
 
Beginning in 1921, bankruptcies increased to over 3,000 by 1922, 6,000 in 1923, and nearly 
8,000 from 1924-1926. Due to the credit rationing by commercial lenders and suppliers, farmers 
were constrained so much that a more reliable lending regime was needed (Turvey 2006). Due to 
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the technical advances and expanding farm sizes, farmers needed more credit than prior to and 
including the war years; credit had become paramount to sustainable growth strategies. The 
structure of credit was a contentious issue in agriculture. For those farmers who did borrow from 
commercial banks, the rates were high, credit terms were poor, and more often than not even 
long-standing reputable farmers required a co-signatory.  
In order to begin combating these issues, congress began working on the Emergency 
Farm Mortgage Act of 1933. Ultimately, Myers was asked to work on the Act, and the Farm 
Credit Act of 1933 would eventually establish the Farm Credit Administration (FCA) known 
today. The essential elements of this Act were to freeze foreclosures until the Act could be fully 
implemented, that interest on federal land bank loans would be reduced from 5.5% to 4.5% on all 
new and existing loans, that refinancing of private loans would be done at 4% and with the same 
terms as Land Bank loans, and that the face value of existing mortgages on inflated land values 
would have to be adjusted to reflect realistic market conditions (Turvey 2006). As part of the 
Farm Credit Act, the FCA would issue bonds secured by the value of farm real estate and in 
order to receive loans from the FCA, Meyers required that all land be appraised to ensure fair 
value. 
The long term goal of the FCA according to Myers in an address to the American Farm 
Economics Association in 1937 while he was still Governor of the FCA "is to establish on 
cooperative principles, a complete coordinated credit system for agriculture, operated on a 
business basis, farmer owned and controlled, and designed to meet at all times and at the lowest 
possible cost the sound credit requirements of the farming industry on repayment terms suited to 
its needs. Stated another way, the credit system we are seeking to establish may be thought of as 
a farmer-owned cooperative service organization whose function it is to borrow funds, through 
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the sale of bonds and debentures, for such periods of time as may be required for the farming 
industry; and to make loans to individual farmers and farmers’ cooperative associations with a 
basis for credit on terms best suited to their needs at interest rates representing the cost of 
borrowed funds plus a margin to cover the cost of operation and necessary reserves.” (Myers, 
1937 page 83).  
Due to the Act, the FCA was established as a permanent production credit system for 
agriculture and a system for providing credit on a business bases to farmer’s cooperatives 
marketing and purchasing associations. This allowed for a complete system of credit for 
agriculture that would provide for long term loans to finance the purchase of farms, short term 
loans for general production, and loans to farmers’ cooperative associations (Myers 1934, 
Turvey 2006). 
The Farm Credit Administration had four divisions: The Land Banks and the 
Intermediate Credit Banks were moved from the department of the treasury to provide the 
mechanism by which money would be raised for lending while two divisions for production 
credit and cooperative credit were added. Also, the FCS was divided into 12 regional centers 
across the US, with each center having a Federal Land Bank, an Intermediate Credit Bank, a 
Production Credit Corporation, and a Bank for Cooperatives. This system is shown in Figure 2.2 
(Turvey 2006) and descriptions of the services are below: 
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Figure 2.2: The Farm Credit System in 1933 
 
  
First, the Federal Land Banks direction was to standardize farm mortgages and provide lower 
interest rates, and from time to time, as in the depression, act as an agent of policy. Secondly, the 
Bank for Cooperatives was designed to provide working capital loans to cooperatives that buy 
(commodities etc) from growers or cooperatives that sell (inputs etc.) to growers. Thirdly, the 
Production Credit Corporations were established as an intervening financing institution for local 
retail credit institutions called Production Credit Associations (PCAs). The Production Credit 
Corporations provide the initial startup capital for the PCA. Finally, the PCA provides secured 
loans of variable duration for general agricultural purposes including the financing of planting, 
cultivation and harvesting of crops, the breeding and feeding of livestock, the production of milk 
and other dairy products, the production of poultry and poultry products, and other types of 
agricultural production (Turvey 2006).  
The system of financing production credit in the US is shown in Figure 2.3 (Turvey 2006): 
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Figure 2.3: Financing Production Credit in the United States 
 
 
The system begins with the demand from a farmer. The farmer obtains a loan from the 
Production Credit Association on reasonable terms, and contributes 5% of this loan to paid in 
capital to the association and in turn the farmer would receive dividend paying Class B shares. 
The PCA was enacted with an ‘equity’ investment from the Production Credit Corporation, 
which received dividend paying, non-voting shares in return which was the purpose of the 
Corporation. The funding of PCA loans was done through the 12 regional Intermediate Credit 
Banks set up in the 1923 Act. These banks obtained funds by selling debentures and bonds to 
investors. Thus the system was self-sustaining and did not require the use of deposits (as with a 
commercial bank) to obtain capital (Turvey 2006).  
As the depression came to an end, debates ensued about the future of the FCA. The 
dominant issue in the debates was the future of the FCA and whether it should remain as a stand-
alone administration or be absorbed as an agency of the Department of Agriculture. The 
decisions to integrate the USDA came about with a number of recognitions about cooperative 
finance in general, including the low membership interest in cooperatives. As opposed to the 
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system of the past were appraisals were based on self-fulfillment of market prices, the FCA 
began to appraise all land before a mortgage based on economic progress, cash flows, and 
repayment ability. 
In retrospect, the presence of the FCA showed to be both effective and necessary. 
Without the existence of the FCA, the higher payment requirements for farmers would likely 
have led to greater rates of risk and foreclosures, which would have led to a collapse in land 
prices (Turvey 2006). It can be theorized that the actions of the FCA during the depression 
preserved far more wealth in agriculture than it was given credit for. Due to the guarantees in 
place, lenders would be more temped to loan to the market value rather than the land’s economic 
value which would again, lead to land price speculation. It was also speculated by Myers that the 
FCA incorporation into the Department of Agriculture, allowed it to become a part of the 
political process and thus used in the future as a vehicle of policy (Turvey 2006). As explained 
by Smith and Jensen (1990) the necessity of the FCS was to address adverse selection and 
systematic risk for farmers. In their research, the results suggest that the FCS has behaved 
consistent with this theory, and give further explanation to its importance in agriculture. 
As the second portion of this thesis aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the Farm Credit 
System and the Farm Service Agency against Commercial Banking, it is important to note 
exactly what their roles are and how we define them. The Farm Credit System is defined as a 
borrower-owned, permanent system of agricultural credit and rural credit across America. It is a 
Government Sponsored Enterprise that presently provides more than 40% of the credit in rural 
America (USDA, 2015). The Farm Service Agency is directed more as a lender of last resort for 
emergency credit, administering farm commodity, crop insurance, credit, environmental, and 
emergency assistance programs for agriculture (USDA, 2015). 
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2.4 Using credit in production decisions 
The question then becomes; why do we care about the development of institutions for agriculture 
as described above? The reasons being that any form of industrial and agricultural growth will be 
constrained by liquidity. In the next two sections, 2.4 and 2.5, we develop more fully the role for 
the relationship between credit and agricultural production and credit and longer term assets.   
Without the availability of credit, farmers become constrained to purchase equipment and 
inputs, which inhibits the expected output yields. For example, in Shee and Turvey (2012) and 
among others, they empirically illustrate how an increase in capital from borrowing will increase 
the output of production, giving the economic basis of the demand for credit. To summarize the 
model, the output function is given as: 
!Y =Y P ,x r ,D( )( )     (2.1) 
where Y=output, P=price of output, x=inputs, r=interest rate, and D=debt available. 
Farmers are constrained to create more output and the effects of the availability of credit are 
shown in the equality: 
!
dY = ∂Y
∂P
dP + ∂Y
∂x
∂d
∂r
dr + ∂Y
∂x
∂x
∂D
dD     (2.2) 
where the last term is equal to: 
!
∂Y
∂x
∂x
∂D
∂D
∂i
≈ ∂Y
∂i
       (2.3) 
In the equality, Y dP
P
∂
∂
is the output price effect, Y d dr
x r
∂ ∂
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is the cost effect where r is the input 
cost and Y x dD
x D
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
is the effect of credit on the output. Without debt, or credit, available for the 
production function, the increase in output is restricted to the first two terms: 
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dY = ∂Y
∂P
dP + ∂Y
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∂d
∂r
dr     (2.14) 
By forgoing credit, farmers do not have the opportunity to expand their output as much as 
possible with the use of credit. This results in a less than optimal income and welfare level.  
The relationship between the demand for credit and the interest rates is also important as it holds 
influence on production decisions. For example, when farmers have a limited amount of cash, 
meaning they are short on liquidity, they are constrained to purchase equipment and inputs 
without the availability of credit. As the use of credit creates both a loss from the interest costs as 
well as a loss in liquidity, farmers are assumed to only borrow what they need, and not borrow 
for the sake of borrowing. Thus, there is a complementary relationship between other inputs and 
credit, as farmers use credit to purchase other inputs, not to replace them. 
 
2.5 How interest rates affect farm land values 
In order to understand how the interest rates can affect various inputs, we present a simple long-
term asset value model to depict the value of farmland subject to changes in the cost of capital. 
This model also depicts the elasticities and shows how the interest rate can affect the elasticity of 
input demands.  
To begin, let V be the designation for land value. The value of land should equal the 
present value of the economic rent derived from the land including all operating cash and an 
allowance for farmer’s labor. Thus, the value of the farm land is of the form: 
    (2.5) 
Where t is the number of years, r is cost of capital (interest rate) and A is the asset value in this 
case of land. If T = ∞ , the value of the farm land is then: 
V = At(1+ r)tt=1
T
∑
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    (2.6) 
meaning the land value bid-price is computed as a simple perpetuity. If we break the interest rate 
down into the return on asset (ROA), we see that: 
   (2.7) 
where E is the value of equity, D is the amount of debt, ROE is the return on equity, and i is the 
cost of capital. The value of equity is defined as: 
   (2.8) 
to define the value of the debt to asset ratio, the following simplification is needed: 
   (2.9)  
Thus the value of farm land can also be described as: 
    (2.10) 
In order to find the elasticity of the value of farm land with respect to the value of the cost of 
debt we find that: 
   (2.11) 
which shows that as the interest rates increase, there is a negative effect on the price of land as 
we could expect. The land-price elasticity can be defined as: 
V i
i V
ε ∂=
∂
   (2.12) 
Which can be broken down into: 
V = Ar
r = ROA = EA ROE −
D
A i
E = A − D
E
A =
A − D
A = 1−
D
A = 1−δ
V = A(1−δ )ROE −δ i
∂V
∂i =
−δA
((1−δ )ROE −δ i))2 < 0
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   (2.14) 
This last equation shows that the elasticity of land with respect to credit is a negative value; the 
percentage change in the value of land given a 1% increase in the cost of long-term borrowing is 
negative. Of course we do not know specifically what this value is, however, this study aims to 
investigate this. How we measure elasticities is influenced largely by the availability of debt and 
other inputs. Because the elasticity is going to be responsive to a multitude of factors, we ought 
not to be surprised if we see differences in debt across states and time. 
To further investigate the relationship between the elasticity and the other variables, the 
effects of the return on equity, the cost of capital, and delta are found by taking the partial 
derivative of the elasticity. For example, the effect of delta (where /D Aδ = ), on the elasticity is 
of the form: 
2 0( ( ))
i ROE
ROE i ROE
ε
δ δ
∂ = − <
∂ − +
  (2.15) 
This derivative of the elasticity with respect to debt to asset ratio suggests that the joint elasticity 
between land and interest rates is sensitive to the local credit environment or the global credit 
environment at that time. From the above equation, the effect of an increase in the value of debt 
(described as delta) on the elasticity, holding all else constant, will cause the absolute value of 
the elasticity to decrease. In other words, as the value of delta increases the value of the debt to 
asset ratio increases and the elasticity becomes more inelastic.  
Secondly, the effect of the ROE on elasticity is shown as: 
ε = −iδ(1−δ )ROE −δ i < 0
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   (2.16) 
where the ROE is measuring profits. This measurement of profit is an endogenous relationship 
which is determined by the mix of long and short-run inputs. Though the ROA (which is the 
revenue less costs), a linkage for the duality work is provided. This effect of ROE on elasticity 
shows the dependency between the profits and elasticity, which justifies our model development 
in Chapter III and provides the reasoning for the duality framework we use.  We can see in this 
equality, when the ROE increases (the firm is able to increase profitability), holding all else 
constant, the absolute value of the elasticity becomes smaller. This suggests that an increase in 
the ROE allows for the elasticity to become more inelastic. 
Finally, the effect of interest rate on the elasticity is shown as: 
   (2.17) 
This final derivative shows that as the interest rate increases, the elasticity will again, become 
more inelastic.  
These relationships, 2.15, 2.16, 2.17, provide a conceptual basis for what follows in terms of 
long-run elasticities. Ultimately, in Chapter VI we will provide evidence that these results hold 
true generally. However, the interaction between credit and production is a much more complex 
process with dynamic adjustments that need to be accounted. These topics, the relationships 
between credit, agricultural inputs, and long-term investments, are explored in more detail in 
Chapter III and form the fundamental basis for our short and long term elasticity estimates.  
 
 
 
∂ε
∂ROE = −
(δ −1)δ i
(ROE −δ (i + ROE))2
∂ε
∂i = −
(δ −1)δROE
(ROE −δ (i + ROE))2
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2.6 Summary 
By providing a history of Agricultural credit in the United States as well as an overview of the 
Farm Credit System since inception, this chapter set the stage for understanding why credit is so 
important to the production process. Through the examination of the rise and fall of Land Banks, 
and the eventual implementation of the FCS as a GSE, we can see that the availability for 
agricultural credit has been a continuous debate across the US, and continues in present. 
Following Shee and Turvey (2012), we show how credit availability constrains farmers to 
grow their business, as well as the rationale of credit’s effect on liquidity. Finally, this chapter 
provided a mathematical approach for illustrating the cost of credit on land value. This was 
followed by a discussion of the partial derivatives of interest and its effects from ROE, debt, and 
cost of capital. 
  As the last two sections developed more fully the role for the relationship between credit 
and agricultural production and credit and longer term assets. This chapter provides evidence to 
support our hypothesis for including credit into the production process.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS AND ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
3.1 Introduction 
Fundamental to understanding credit demand in agriculture is the robust estimation of credit 
demand elasticities. As agricultural credit is generally fungible, we have to look at it not only in 
relationship to its own price but in relationship to credit input use and on-farm investment. This 
chapter develops the dynamic duality structure necessary to deal with not only the fungibility of 
credit but on how credit impacts the demand for annual inputs and long-term investment. In 
addition, with respect to Objective 3 which examines the role of the Farm Credit System and 
Commercial Banking, this Chapter will end with a simplified structure to illustrate the potential 
relationship between demand for credit within the Farm Credit System and the demand for credit 
in the Commercial system. 
In order to complete these objectives, this chapter will examine the models and methods 
employed in both sections of this thesis. To complete the three objectives set out in Chapter I, 
this thesis incorporates three dual function models and an econometric specification.  To begin, 
an analysis of the duality model will be discussed, followed by an examination of the theorems 
required for duality. Next, a list of the advantages and limitations of using a dual function model 
will be presented, superseded by the motivation to include credit in the production function for 
agriculture. Finally, an examination of the three dynamic generations will be analyzed and 
discussed. To complete the third objective described in Chapter I, elasticities calculated from the 
Dynamic model will be used as control variables to examine the effectiveness of the Farm Credit 
System in the U.S.  
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3.2 Three Fundamental Dual Functions 
There are three fundamental dual functions in production theory: the profit function, the cost 
function, and the production function. The two main dual functions used in agriculture include 
the cost function, which is used to estimate Hicksian input demands as well as to attain 
information regarding properties of the underlying production function, and the profit function, 
which allows estimation of Marshallian factor demands with output supply responses. An 
important feature of these dual functions that separates them from their primal counterparts, is 
that their dependent variable is derived by optimization. As explained by Young et al, in the 
optimization process, the primal function is referred to as ‘the direct objective function’ and the 
dual function is referred to as the ‘indirect objective function.’ In this process, the indirect 
objective function represents the optimal value of the direct objective function for any value of 
the parameters of the optimization problem. Regularity conditions are imposed on the indirect 
functions in order for the derivations to be consistent with their primal counterparts. 
 
The Dual Profit Function 
The dual profit function is a function of output and input prices ( , ),yP Pπ π=  where π , Py, and 
P show profit, output prices and input prices. This function displays the maximum profit a 
producer can achieve given their technology and price level. It can be derived by maximizing the 
primal profit function with respect to inputs and solving for the factor demand equations. 
Following this derivation, the factor demand equations are substituted back into the primal profit 
function. This function must follow these regularity conditions: 
• it must be continuous with respect to input (factor) and output prices; 
• it must be homogenous of degree one in input and output prices; 
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• it must be non-decreasing in output prices and non-increasing in input prices; and 
• it must be quasi-convex in input and output prices. 
 
The Dual Production Function 
The dual production function is a function of input prices and costs Y=Y(P,C) where Y and show 
output and costs of production respectively. This function gives the maximum output available 
given the technology, input prices, and budget constraint. In order to solve for this function, the 
primal production function must be maximized with respect to inputs and solving for the 
constant-cost input demand functions. Finally, the demand functions must be substituted into the 
primary production functions. The dual production function also has regularity conditions which 
include: 
• it must be continuous with respect to input prices and cost; 
• it must be homogeneous of degree zero in input prices and cost; 
• it must be non-increasing in input prices and non-decreasing in cost; and  
• it must be quasi-convex in input and output prices. 
 
The Dual Cost Function 
In order to express the minimum level of cost in terms of input prices and output level, the dual 
cost function is used. The dual cost function, C=C(P,Y) is derived by minimizing the total factor 
cost subject to an output constraint, solving for the conditional factor demands, and the 
substituting the factor demand expressions into the original total factor cost function. The 
regularity conditions for this function include: 
• it must be continuous with respect to input prices; 
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• it must be homogeneous of degree one in input prices; 
• it must be non-decreasing in input prices and output; and  
• it must be at least quasi-concave in input prices. 
 
3.3 The Envelope Theorem and Three Fundamental Lemmas 
The Envelope Theorem establishes the equality between the indirect objective function and the 
partial derivatives of a direct objective function. Using the Envelope Theorem, only the direct 
effects of a change in an exogenous variable needs to be considered despite the ability of the 
exogenous variable to enter the maximum-value function indirectly as part of the solution to the 
endogenous choice variable (Chiang). This theorem can be used to derive the following lemmas 
of duality, Hotelling’s Lemma and Shephard’s Lemma. 
 Hotelling’s Lemma states that the partial derivatives of the maximum value of the profit 
function yields the firm’s input-demand function and the supply function (Chiang). As described 
by Young et al, the negative partial derivative with respect to inputs price yields the ordinary 
factor demand function: 
   (3.1) 
and the partial derivative with respect to output price yields the output supply function (Young et 
al): 
   (3.2) 
This Lemma is crucial as it gives the comparative static derivatives from the profit function by 
allowing the inputs to adjust to any parameter change (Chiang). 
−∂π (Py ,P)
∂Py
= Xi (Py ,P)
∂π (Py ,P)
∂Py
= Y (Py ,P)
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 Shephard’s Lemma is imperative to the duality model as it incorporates a minimization 
problem for an expenditure function. In this lemma, a consumer’s minimization problem is 
constructed by using a Lagrangian multiplier to find the first order conditions. These conditions 
give the input expenditures as a function of their prices and fixed utility by substituting the first 
order condition values into the Lagrangian multiplier. This will give the expenditure function 
(Chiang). The constant-output (Hicksian) factor demand function is derived as: 
   (3.3) 
As the resulting input demand equation is conditional on the level of output it is also called the 
conditional factor demand. Finally, one of the fundamental aspects of Shepard’s Lemma is that it 
makes it possible to derive the production function from the cost function since the cost function 
contains all the relevant economic aspects of the production technology (KTB).  
 Roy’s Identity is an application of the Envelope Theorem. This identity states that the 
individual consumer’s Marshallian demand function is equal to the negative of the ratio of the 
two partial derivatives of the maximum value function: 
   (3.4) 
These lemmas are essential for the development of the duality models that will be presented at 
the end of this chapter.  
 
3.4 Advantages and Limitations of Dual Approaches 
The duality model has theoretical and empirical advantages and limitations. The most prominent 
advantages of this model include: 
∂C(P,Y )
∂Pi
= Xi (P,Y )
− ∂Y (P,C) / ∂Pi
∂Y (P,C) / ∂C
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= Xi (P,C)
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1. Consistency can be ensured through proper allocation of the dual functions because of the 
restrictions imposed by economic theory. 
2. Duality allows for the empirical analysis of multiple-product firms and industries as well 
as analyses of entire demand or supply systems.  
3. The functional forms used in dual functions impose fewer restrictions and therefore are 
more flexible than many popular production functional forms. 
4. Simple estimation methods, such as generalized least squares, may be employed as 
duality yields explicit reduced forms with prices as independent variables. 
5. Dual approaches are more simple than primal approaches in deriving economic 
relationships.  
On the other hand, the duality approach has limitations as well: 
1. Valid results require identifying both the objective function and constraints in addition to 
selecting the appropriate dual approach, as dual functions contain data on both the nature 
of technology and assumed rational behavioral response. Thus, an unknown constraint or 
ineffective market could weaken the dual approach.  
2. The appropriate dual approach must be chosen given the researchers objective to fit the 
intended policy interpretation.  
3. In order to obtain an efficient duality model, the researcher needs accurate price data that 
exhibits some dispersion. 
4. Dual functions will often present estimates of economic measures, such as elasticities, 
that are very sensitive to data compositions and variable construction procedures.  
It is imperative to consider these advantages and limitations while constructing a dual cost 
function model as they can be influential. 
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3.5 Motivation of credit  
In 1968, Baker illustrated the need for including credit as an input into the production function. 
He explains that the effects of credit, defined as borrowing capacity, are essential to liquidity 
value as increasing loans generates a cost from the loss of liquidity. This loss, which has value, 
combined with the interest charges on loans, can have an impact on the production capabilities of 
a firm (Baker). Thus he explains, credit should be managed as an asset due to its important 
implications for production decisions. 
 As credit is not without the cost of interest, farmers will only borrow credit when they are 
constrained by liquidity to purchase other inputs. Therefore, the demand for the credit will be 
conditional on the demand for other inputs and output. D=D(X,P,r,Y) where (X,P,r,Y) is a vector 
of Hicksian factor demand functions as a function of input prices (P), interest rate (r) and the 
output (Y).  
 Typically, in production it is assumed that credit is used to replace existing inputs or 
upgrade them, for example machinery, or to purchase variable inputs, such as fertilizer. 
Therefore, credit and inputs generally have a complementary relationship, where a price of credit 
increase would lead to a decrease in the demand for inputs. Similarly, when the price of inputs 
increase, the demand for these inputs would decrease, and therefore credit would also decrease. 
The above discussion assumes costs derived from transactions and use of physical inputs thus are 
easily measured in volume and price. However, in this study we add to the mix the cost of debt 
and this requires some specific assumptions. 
 Ultimately, we use a translog cost function with nine variable and quasi-fixed cost shares 
considered. Here we provide a more simple representation of the translog cost function to 
illustrate how interest rates and costs are treated.  
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Consider the following translog cost function for a single output of a single input, and an interest 
charge: 
   (3.5) 
where C=total cost; 
Y=Total inputs; 
P=price of inputs; and  
r= the interest rate on credit. 
From this step, we can use duality to estimate parameters of the underlying production function. 
Thus by treating r as a price of an input, the cost function under duality will be of the translog 
form: 
   (3.6) 
where ln= natural logarithm, and 1 2 3, , ,α γ γ γ  are coefficients to be estimated. 
Differentiating with respect to the price of inputs and interest rate gives: 
  (3.7) 
   (3.8) 
which can be written as: 
 
 
C = C(Y ,P,r)
lnC = lnα + γ 1 lnP + γ 2 ln r +
1
2 γ 3 lnP ln r
∂lnC
∂lnP = γ 1 lnP +
1
2 γ 3 ln r
∂lnC
∂ln r = γ 2 ln r +
1
2 γ 3 lnP
∂lnC
∂lnP =
∂C
∂P
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ P
C
∂lnC
∂ln r =
∂C
∂r
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ r
C
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By using Shepard’s Lemma, we can convert equations 3.7 and 3.8 into cost-share questions, 
using: 
   (3.9) 
   (3.10) 
where *1x  and 
*
2x  are the optimal amounts of x1 and x2 where they show the points of least cost 
combination on the expansion path. In this example, *1x  represents the demand for the input and 
*
2x  represents the optimal amount of credit.  This form assumes that credit is, like other inputs, of 
tangible form. However, while the interest expense is no doubt a deduction from profits or 
addition to costs, it is fungible across input classes. Our assumption must be that it is evenly 
dispersed across all inputs of its class (short term or long term), and thus has some homothetic 
properties in term of separability. For example, assume the cost of purchasing two inputs using 
operating credit: 
   (3.11) 
this can be expanded as: 
   (3.12) 
   (3.13) 
In 3.13 it shows that the loan quantity as input is endogenous to the optimal quantity of inputs. It 
is easily arguable that it satisfies the regularity conditions of homogeneity of degree 1, thus as 
the price of inputs rises or falls, the cost of credit rises or falls in the same proportion. This also 
satisfies general convexity conditions in the sense that as interest rates rise, credit demand will 
fall. 
∂C
∂P = x1
*
∂C
∂r = x2
*
C = x1P1(1+ r)+ x2P2 (1+ r)
C = (x1P1 + rx1P1)+ (x2P2 + rx2P2 )
C = x1P1 + x2P2 + r(x1P1 + x2P2 )
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3.6 Third Generation Dynamic Model 
As described earlier, dynamic models allow for the adjustment of inputs towards their optimal 
level as opposed to forcing a complete and total adjustment. Due to the existence of unobserved 
adjustment costs associated with the variation of inputs and outputs, a period of adjustment is 
essential. As Nadiri and Rosen observe, the quantity of physical capital cannot rapidly adjust 
forgoing significant economic adjustment costs. As well, because of underlying differences in 
inputs, the adjustment rates will differ between inputs. As intuition suggests, land will adjust 
more slowly than seed due to the nature of the inputs. Land is fixed, whereas inputs such as seed 
need to be adjusted for each planting season.  
 This section describes the rationale presented by Berndt, Morrison, and Watkins 
(BM&W) which is summarized by Kimble, Turvey, and Weersink (KTW). They show that a 
third generation dynamic model is the ideal model for this research as it not only yields 
interrelated factor demands, but it also provides a well-defined measure of short, intermediate, 
and long-run price elasticities by explicitly incorporating dynamic optimization. 
 The third generation of dynamic models are based directly on dynamic economic 
optimization and incorporate costs of adjustment for the quasi-fixed factors. This allows for the 
speeds of adjustment of the quasi-fixed factors which are variable and endogenous rather than 
fixed and exogenous. Also, the short-run variable input demand equations can be interpreted as 
utilization equations as they depend on variable input prices and the quantities of quasi-fixed 
inputs and outputs. Finally, the quasi-fixed inputs can adjust in quantity and the rate of utilization 
as the variable inputs adjust from the short to the long run (BM&W). 
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 The theoretical foundations for the third generation model is credited to R. E. Lucas 
(1967a,b), L.J. Lau (1976), D. McFadden (1978), and M.J. Vanden Dungen (1992) . A simple 
explanation of the theory is as follows.  
A production function is defined as: 
   (3.14) 
Where Y is the output, v shows the variable inputs, x represents the quasi-fixed inputs, x, is the 
change in the quasi-fixed input levels, and t is the time variable. If we allow the levels of the 
quasi-fixed inputs to vary (x, ≠ 0), the output will fall due to the requirement of devoting 
resources to changing the stock rather than producing more output. 
 In the short run, firms can be regarded as minimizing normalized variable costs subject to 
the variable input prices, output, quasi-fixed inputs, and changes in the quasi-fixed input levels. 
Consequently, the long run issue facing the firm is to minimize the present value of the future 
stream of costs. 
 The accumulation equations for the quasi-fixed inputs and the short-run demand 
equations for variable inputs (utilization equations) can be obtained once the functional form for 
the normalized restricted cost function is specified. By summarizing the dynamic time path of 
factor demands, the short, intermediate, and long-run price and output elasticities can be derived. 
The short-run elasticities are described when x is fixed, the intermediate elasticities are defined 
when x has partially adjusted by M (the matrix of adjustment coefficients), and the long-run 
elasticities are found when x, =0 and x has fully adjusted to x*. This generation of dynamics also 
allows for testing whether an input is variable or fixed by reviewing whether the elements of M* 
are close to unity.  
 
Y = F(v, x, x, ,t)
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3.7 Model Development  
As discussed in Chapter I, this thesis incorporates three models to examine the demand for 
credit. The first, the Static model, is the most restrictive of the models as it assumes that the 
inputs adjust instantaneously in each period to their equilibrium values. The second, the Partial 
Static model, is slightly less restrictive. This model allows some inputs to be variable and some 
to be quasi-fixed. Finally, the third, the Dynamic model, is the least restrictive model. This 
model allows for an adjustment period or a partial change toward the equilibrium values of 
inputs, as opposed to the static model which forces a complete and total adjustment for each 
input in every period. 
3.7.A Static Model 
The Static model contains eight cost share equations to be estimated. Cost share equations are 
defined as the input expense as a share of total expenditures. These cost shares are included for 
all nine inputs: feed expenditures, operating credit expense, labor expense, crop input expense, 
livestock expenditures, real estate credit expense, land expense, machinery expense, and other 
expenditures. A further explanation of the data and variables will be continued in Chapter IV. 
The static model is the most prohibitive model, and assumes that the elasticities estimated for the 
inputs are long-run values.  
 In the static model, the cost shares are estimated using the seemingly unrelated regression 
method, which is described in detail in Chapter IV. This method is used to account for the 
presumably related standard errors, cross equation restrictions, and the correlation of residual 
errors. This also allows the model to be constrained in order to make the assumption that the 
effect of a variable, x, on the cost share, y, is the same as the effect of variable, y, on cost share, 
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x. For example, the effect of the price of land on the cost share of livestock should be equal to 
the effect of livestock on the cost share of land.  
 Eight cost shares will be estimated in this model as the ‘other’ input cost share will be 
omitted in order to avoid singularity. These cost shares will be estimated of the form: 
   (3.15) 
where the cost shares of each input are functions of the natural log of each inputs price relative to 
the ‘other’ input price, the natural log of the outputs (crops and livestock), and the effect of a 
time trend. In order to show the effect of the types of credit, P7 and P8 , show the price for short 
and long term credit, rstinterest and rltinterest, respectively. This model assumes that each of the inputs 
will adjust to the ideal value in each time period. 
 Once the cost shares are estimated, the elasticities will then be calculated. The methods 
and formulas for estimating the Hicks-Allen elasticities of substitution and price elasticities will 
also be discussed further in Chapter IV.  
3.7.B Partial Static Model 
The Partial Static model contains less restrictions than the Static model. In this model, four cost 
shares are estimated for feed, operating credit, labor share, and crop input share. Cost shares are 
estimated of the form: 
   (3.16) 
Where Z denotes is the quantity of the variables that are quasi-fixed. These variables will adjust 
partially to the equilibrium value due to their restrictive costs associated with adjusting to 
exogenous changes in the period. Specifically, the quasi-fixed variables in the partial static 
model include livestock expenses, long-term credit expense, land expenditures, and machinery 
CSi =α i + γ ij (lnPj / P9
j=1
6
∑ )+ (lnP7 / P9 )+ (lnP8 / P9 )+ βyi lnYy + βitT
y=c,l
∑
CS i=α i + γ ij lnPj
j=1
5
∑ + βki lnZk + βyi lnYy
y=c,l
∑ + βitT
k=6
9
∑
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expenses. The cost shares estimated in the Partial Static model are functions of the natural log of 
each of the input prices for the first fives inputs (including feed price, short-term credit price, 
labor share, crop input share, and ‘other’ input prices), the quantity index for the remaining four 
inputs (including livestock, long-term credit, land expenditures, and machinery expenditures), 
the natural log of the outputs livestock and crop, and the effect of the time trend.  
 The elasticities for this model will be calculated using the same formulas as the static 
model, however, as the elasticities for the four cost shares are dependent on the quasi-fixed 
inputs, they are partial elasticities. This model and its elasticities will also be examined in depth 
in Chapter IV. 
3.7.C Dynamic Model 
The third model presented in this thesis is the least restrictive model. The Dynamic model is 
similar to the static model in that it estimates the same eight cost shares, however, the inputs are 
not required to shift instantaneously to their equilibrium values. The model will be estimated 
from the form:  
!CSt −CSt−1 =M(CSt* −CSt−1)     (3.17) 
where CSt-1 is a lagged cost share, CSt* is a predicted optimal level cost share, and M is the 
adjustment matrix. The adjustment matrix, which will be discussed further in Chapter IV, allows 
each input to adjust to the optimal level at its corresponding pace.  
 The elasticities for the dynamic model are broken in two time-frames. The long-run 
elasticities are calculated from the formula given in the static model. The short-run elasticities 
are calculated using the Allen-Uzawa substitution and price elasticity equations. The Dynamic 
model and its elasticities will also be discussed further in Chapter IV.  
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3.8 Farm Credit System Effectiveness 
By objective 3 set out in Chapter I, we want to also look at the macro credit relationships 
between the FCS and the CB. However, to investigate this relationship without understanding the 
underlying attributes of credit demand would be incomplete. In Chapter IV, we develop these 
ideas more formally, though at this point, it is worth indicating that the differential demands for 
credit which we assume adjust to supply will require understanding the elasticities.  
This section of the thesis is designed to explore the effectiveness of the Farm Credit 
System (FCS) in the US since its inception. Once the three dual functions described above have 
been completed, three of the elasticities will be used as control variables in the econometric 
specification created for Farm Credit. As explained in Chapter II, the FCS was mandated to 
provide credit to farmers in economic downturns, which is examined by comparing the relative 
lending of both the FCS and the Farm Service Agency (FSA) to the lending of the Commercial 
Banking (CB) in the agricultural sector. Relative lending of both the FCS and FSA are calculated 
as the percentage difference in lending for FCS (FSA) minus the percentage difference of CB 
lending. Thus when the FCS (FSA) is increasing its lending relative to CB, the variable should 
become more positive, and when the CB is lending more relative to FCS (FSA), the variable 
should become more negative. As this study aims to investigate the lending behaviour during 
economic downturns, variables to account for macro-economic conditions are included. These 
variables include: farm income, US real GDP, number of farm bankruptcies, US treasury yield, 
number of farms, farm population, short term interest elasticity, long term interest elasticity, and 
land elasticity. The change in relative lending can be shown as: 
   (3.18) 
FCt − FCt−1
FCt−1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
− CBt −CBt−1CBt−1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
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Where FCt= the amount of lending distributed in a given time period, t, from the a farm credit 
organization (including FCS and FSA); 
FCt-1= the amount of lending from a farm credit organization in the previous time period; 
CBt= the amount of lending distributed by the commercial banking system in time t; and 
CBt-1= the amount of lending from the commercial banking system in the previous time period.  
As discussed above, the elasticities of long and short term credit capture not only the direct effect 
of interest rate change, but also change in input and output prices and quantities. If the short term 
elasticities are responsive to contemporaneous economic conditions, the point elasticities will 
rise and fall as conditions change in time. Part of our investigation is to examine the differences 
in Farm Credit and Commercial Bank lending over time, and the interest rate elasticities as 
derived above are important control variables. For example, in Chapter IV we build on the 
relationship:  
   (3.19) 
 The elasticities described above are taken from the Dynamic model described in section 
3.7.C. The elasticities for short-term interest, long-term interest, and land price elasticity are all 
weighted by the average expenditures for each state. The interest elasticity for each state is 
multiplied by the weight of the input expense for the respective state. These weighted elasticities 
are summed to create a weighted average elasticity. We weighted the elasticities in order to 
create an average that would not be influenced by states and their relative expenditures.  The 
weighted elasticities are used to capture the behavioural aspects of lending that would not be 
captured by the other models. For example, the long-term weighted elasticity shows the 
sensitivity of farmers to increases in the interest rate for real estate. 
 
FCt − FCt−1
FCt−1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
− CBt −CBt−1CBt−1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= β0 + β1εcredit + e
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3.9 Summary 
 This Chapter aimed to provide a discussion of the theory and models presented in this thesis. 
Firstly, it included an overview of duality, an evaluation of the three fundamental lemmas, and 
an interpretation of the Envelope Theorem and the three essential lemmas that incorporate the 
theorem. 
 Secondly, this was followed by a listing of the advantages and disadvantages of using a 
dual approach in this research. As listed above, we can see that the advantages of using this 
method outweigh the costs; however, they are still points that need to be addressed and 
considered.  
 Thirdly, the rationale for including credit in the production function is provided. This 
extends from the foundation built by Baker in 1968, which precedes the example of the translog 
cost function for a single output of a single input, and an interest charge. 
 Fourthly, an in depth analysis of the third generation dynamic model is presented, 
including the rational by BM&W, describing one of the key points of the third generation 
dynamic model as being a well-defined measure of short, intermediate, and long-run price 
elasticities by explicitly incorporating dynamic optimization. This section is followed by the 
model development for the duality portion of this thesis. Beginning with the Static model, which 
assumes that each of the inputs adjusts fully to the optimal level in each period, followed by the 
Partial Static model, which allows some of the inputs to be quasi-fixed, and finally the Dynamic 
model, which is a less restrictive form of the Static model. 
 Finally, the methods to identify and analyze the effectiveness of the Farm Credit System 
are presented. This objective is achieved by examining the changes in relative lending between 
Farm Credit and the Commercial Banking systems. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA AND MODELS 
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis incorporates a time-series data set stretching from 1919-2013 with two distinct 
portions. The first section of data includes state level data, specifically examining at data for the 
five corn-belt states: Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Missouri, and Ohio, as well as an average of these 5 
states. This portion is used to examine the dual cost objective which utilizes three models: the 
Static model, Partial Static model and the Dynamic model. The Static model makes the 
assumption that the inputs adjust immediately towards their equilibrium value in each time 
period. This model differs from the Partial Static and the Dynamic models, which assume that 
some inputs only partially adjust in each period. The Partial Static model differs as it assumes 
some of the inputs are quasi-fixed. Similarly, the Dynamic model is also less restrictive than the 
Static model because it allows the quasi-fixed inputs to adjust partially through the use of a 
partial adjustment matrix. The second section includes national data for the US. This data is used 
to identify the effectiveness of the FCS during economic downturns. The variables are required 
to examine the relative lending between the FCS and the FSA compared to the CB system for 
both real estate and non-real estate loans.  
 
4. 2 Data 
The data is collected from the USDA annual statistical summaries, dating back to 1919 for both 
the Duality and Farm Credit System sections of this thesis. The Duality section explores only the 
five corn-belt states in order to keep the data set relatively homogenous. As the states share 
similar agricultural practices and climate, this avoids the problem of aggregating national 
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agricultural data, which would be including many different cropping patterns and environments. 
The Farm Credit portion of this thesis uses national data for the lending patterns of commercial 
banks, the Farm Credit System, and the Farm Service Agency from 1939-2013. Tsigas and 
Hertel (1989) show that using state level panel data helps to avoid multicollinearity and 
simultaneity further than aggregate time-series data, due to the large number of observations. 
Using panel data will help to reduce bias and increase efficiency in the models.  
 
4.2.A Duality Data  
The annual expenditure data was broken into nine categories: total production expenses; crop 
expenses (including seed, fertilizer, and lime plus pesticides purchased); feed purchases; 
livestock and poultry expenses; contracted and hired labor expenses; land expenses (including 
net rent to non-operator landlords plus property taxes); non-real estate interest expense; real 
estate interest expense; machinery expense (including depreciation, repairs, plus fuel purchased); 
and other expenses (including electricity, insurance, and miscellaneous). All of the expenditure 
data was found in the USDA statistical summaries.  
 Output was divided into crops and livestock, measured in quantity indexes for the corn-
belt region (USDA). The indices for hourly wage rates were also measured for the corn-belt 
region and the land values were measured by state as an index of average value per acre of farm 
real estate. Prices for all other inputs were collected at the national level from the USDA, as it 
was not available by state or region for the entire period. 
 Non-real estate interest expense used is the average cost of loans outstanding during the 
year through Production Credit Associations. The real estate interest expense is denoted as the 
average rate on new loans through the Federal Land Bank Associations (USDA). The other 
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prices were collected at the national level from the statistical summaries (USDA). These prices 
paid by farmers for all production include: feed; feeder livestock; seed; fertilizer; pesticides; and 
machinery. These are national rates, as the regional or state rates were also not available. 
 
4.2.B Farm Credit Data  
This section incorporates data at the national level for the years 1939-2013. The dependent 
variables used in this portion are the relative lending of the FCS and the FSA compared to the 
CB system in both real estate lending and non-real estate lending. The independent variables 
include: farm income (in billions), US Real GDP, number of farm failures, US treasury yield on 
a one-year bond, farm population, and three elasticities calculated from the Dynamic Duality 
model that will be presented later in this chapter. The variables and their source are described in 
Table 4.1: 
Table 4.1 Regression Variables for Farm Credit 
 
Variable 
 
Description 
 
Source 
Farm Income Farm Income (billions) USDA 
GDP US Real GDP BEA 
Failures Number of farms that files for bankruptcy in a 
year 
USDA 
Treasury Yield Treasury Yield on a one year bond US Department of the 
Treasury 
Population Farm Population (000s) USDA 
LT Interest 
Elasticity 
Estimated long-term interest elasticity 
weighted by interest expense (absolute value) 
 
ST Interest 
Elasticity 
Estimated short-term interest elasticity 
weighted by interest expense (absolute value) 
 
 
Land Elasticity Estimated land interest elasticity weighted by 
interest expense (absolute value) 
 
 
 The elasticities used are averages of the corn-belt states from the Dynamic Duality model 
described further in this Chapter and include: the average short-term interest elasticity (weighted 
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by state interest expense), average long-term interest elasticity (weighted by state interest 
expense), and the average land elasticity (weighted by state land expense).  
 
4.3 Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
In order to find the estimates, the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model2 must be used 
to account for the restrictions imposed. SUR is described as a generalized version of a linear 
regression model consisting of regression equations that each has its own dependent variable and 
possibly a different set of exogenous explanatory variables (Greene, 2003). In SUR, equations 
are linked only by their errors, which gives the name, seemingly unrelated regressions.   
This estimation model is required to account for the restrictions that specify ij jiβ β= . SUR is 
equivalent to the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model when each equation contains exactly the 
same set of repressor independent variables with identical values (Greene, 2003).  
Prior to estimating the SUR model, the examination must begin with a discussion of 
Zellner’s method. In order to impose the restrictions for symmetry as provided by Shepard’s 
Lemma, Zellner’s method is required. When the V in the estimator is unknown, Zellner proposed 
the construction of a feasible estimator  
!b* = X 'V −1X( )−1 X 'V −1 y    (4.1) 
Firstly, OLS must be applied separately to each equation in the list of the models:  
!
y1 = X1β1 +u1
y2 = X2β2 +u2
ym = Xmβm +um
   (4.2) 
                                                
2 The SUR model is used as each equation is a valid linear regression on its own and can be 
estimated separately, however, since the error terms are assumed to be correlated across 
equations it is seemingly unrelated.  
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which enables obtaining the vectors of sample residuals e1, e2, em where  
!ei = I − Xi Xi'Xi( )−1 Xi '⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥ yi   for i=1,…,m    (4.3) 
Secondly, the diagonal elements of !
σ ij  of Σ
3 are estimated by !sii = ei'ein−ki  and the diagonal 
elements !
sij are estimated by:  
!sij =
ei 'ej
n−ki( )
12 n−kj( )12
    (4.4) 
 where ki denotes the number of columns in Xi. 
Thus an estimated Σˆ  matrix can be computed and substituted into b* to find a feasible estimator. 
This estimator is often referred to as SURE (seemingly unrelated regression equations) or SUR 
(seemingly unrelated regression) estimator, named after the title of Zellner’s original paper. To 
follow Johnston, the gain in efficiency yielded by the Zellner estimator over OLS increases 
directly with the correlation between disturbances form the different equations and decreases as 
the correlation between the different sets of explanatory variables increases paper (Johnston, 
1984).  
Next a more in-depth explanation of SUR is required. To summarize Greene, beginning 
with the linear function 
!yt =Πxt + εt    (4.5) 
and collect all T observations in this format, the system will appear as 
! ′Y =Π ′X + ′E    (4.6) 
                                                
3 In this section, Σ is used to denote a matrix of variances and is not to be interpreted as the 
conventional summation. 
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Where each Π  contains the parameters in the particular equation. Next, the partition of the set of 
dependent variables into two groups of M1 and M2 variables and the set of regressors into two 
sets of K1 and K2 variables is considered. The equation now becomes: 
! y1y2
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
=
Π11 Π12
Π21 Π22
⎡
⎣
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⎥
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x1
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⎟
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t
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t
   (4.7) 
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   (4.8) 
The restricted model with !Π12 =0  is of interest, as it has the effect of excluding x2 from all the 
equations from y1 (Greene, 2003). Greene shows the results obtained from this case are as 
follows. Firstly, the maximum likelihood estimator of !Π11 when !Π12  is equation-by-equation 
least squares regression of the variables y1 on x1 alone. Even with the restriction, the efficient 
estimator of the parameters of the first set of equations is equation-by-equation ordinary least 
squares. Secondly, the effect of the restriction on the likelihood function can be isolated to its 
effect on the smaller set of equations. 
Subsequently, the maximum likelihood estimation of the unrestricted system must be considered. 
The function for this multivariate regression model appears as: 
!lnL= lnt=1T∑ f ( y1t , y2t |x1t ,x2t ) 4   (4.9) 
Where the mean and variance of the marginal distribution are: 
!E y1t |x1t ,x2t⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ =Π11x1t +Π12x2t    (4.10) 
!Var y1t |x1t ,x2t⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = Σ11    (4.11) 
                                                
4 Here the ∑ is now interpreted as the conventional summation. 
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!E y2t | y1t ,x1t ,x2t⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = Π21 − Σ21Σ11−1Π11⎡⎣ ⎤⎦x1t + Π22 − Σ21Σ11−1Π12⎡⎣ ⎤⎦x2t + Σ21Σ11−1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ y1t   
!= Λ21x1t +Λ22x2t +Γy1t    (4.12) 
!Var y2t | y1t ,x1t ,x2t⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = Σ22 − Σ21Σ11−1Σ12 =Ω22    (4.13) 
Greene then shows the objective of the partitioning is to partition the log-likelihood function as: 
!
lnL= ln f y1t , y2t |x1t ,x2t( )
t=1
T
∑
= ln f y1t |x1t ,x2t( )
t=1
T
∑ f y2t | y1t ,x1t ,x2t( )
= ln f y1t |x1t ,x2t( )
t=1
T
∑ + ln f y2t | y1t ,x1t ,x2t( )
t=1
T
∑
   (4.14) 
Finally without the restrictions on the parameters, the log-likelihood can be maximized using its 
two parts separately. As !Π21 ,Π22 ,Σ21  and 22Σ are all free, unrestricted parameters, there are no 
restrictions imposed on !Λ21 ,Λ22 ,Γ ,  or !Ω22 . Thus, in each case, the efficient estimators are 
equation-by-equation OLS. The first part produces estimates of !Π11 ,Π22  and !Σ11  directly. From 
the second, the estimates of !Λ21 ,Λ22 ,Γ ,  and !Ω22  are obtained. The relationships above are 
obtained from the restrictions (Greene, 2003): 
!
Π12 = Λ21 +ΓΠ11
Π22 = Λ22 +ΓΠ12
Σ21 = ΓΣ11
Σ22 =Ω22 +ΓΣ11Γ '
  (4.15) 
Once these restrictions are put in place, the model also calls for the fixation of the state 
dummy variables across the cost shares. The time trend is treated as a fixed effect where the 
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model looks at the effect of the change of time rather than breaking it down into individual 
effects. 
 
4.4 Estimating Equations 
The models used in the duality portion of the thesis are based on the dual cost function which is 
described as the sum of the input prices multiplied by the respective output compensated demand 
for each of the n inputs:  
    (4.16) 
The actual model used is a nonhomothetic5 cost function, which is more general than a 
homothetic function, as the ratios of cost-minimizing inputs demands are dependent on output 
with the former and are independent of the level of output with the latter (Binswager and Kako). 
The translog cost function exhibiting non-neutral technical6 change is of the form: 
 
(4.17) 
where: 
ln= natural logarithm 
                                                
5	A nonhomothetic cost function is more general than a homothetic function because the ratios of 
cost-minimizing input demands are dependent on output and in homothetic functions they are 
dependent on the level of output 
6 This is a non-neutral technical change function as all changes in factor shares are attributed to 
substitution and/or factor augmenting technical change	
C(P,Y ) = PiXi
i=1
n
∑
lnC =α 0 + α i ln(Pi / P9 )+ α y lnYy +α tT +
1
2 γ ij ln(Pi /j=1
8
∑
i=1
8
∑
y=c,l
∑
i=1
8
∑ P9 )ln(Pj / P9 )
+ 12 γ yz lnYy lnYz +
1
2 γ ttT
2 + βyi lnYy ln(Pi / P 9 )+ βit ln(Pi / P9 )T
i=1
8
∑
i=1
8
∑
y=c,l
∑
z=c,l
∑
y=c,l
∑
+ βyt lnYyT
y=c,l
∑
 64 
C=total cost or total production expenses; 
0α = intercept; 
Pi= Price of nine inputs (P1= feed price, P2= operating credit, P3=wage rate, P4=crop input price 
P5=feeder livestock price, P6= long term interest rate, P7= land value P8= machinery price, 
P9=price index of other inputs) 
Yy= quantity index for two outputs (YC= crops YL=livestock); 
T=Time trend; 
, , , , , , , ,i y t ij yz tt yi it ytα α α γ γ γ β β β are coefficients to be estimated. 
This cost function is non decreasing in input and output prices, due to the restrictions 
specified in Chapter III and is also continuous with respect to input prices. The restrictions that 
must hold in this model are set out by Chiang. He states that he cost function must be at least 
quasi-concave in input prices, which requires the function to be twice differentiable. According 
to Young’s Theorem, two functions fxy and fyx will have identical values as long as the two cross 
partial derivatives are both continuous. Thus, the sequential order in which partial derivation is 
undertaken becomes immaterial, because fxy=fyx (Chiang). Young’s Theorem thus states that the 
second cross partial derivatives must be equal which is imposed through the restrictions ij jiγ γ=  
and yz zyγ γ=  for all i, j, y, and z. Lastly, in order for the cost function to be homogenous of 
degree one in input prices, the following restrictions must hold: 
 
which are made more specific as: 
 
9 1 8( ... )i i iγ γ γ= − + +  for i= 1,…,9 
α i = 1, γ ij =
i=1
9
∑
i=1
9
∑ γ ji =
j=1
9
∑ βyi =
i=1
9
∑ βit =
i=1
9
∑ 0
α 9 = 1− (α1 + ...+α 8 )
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9 1 8( ... )y y yβ β β= − + +  for y= c, l 
 
In order to impose these restrictions, each input price index was divided by the price index for 
‘other’ inputs, P9.  
 
4.4.1 Static Model 
The static model contains eight variable cost share equations. In order to estimate the cost-
minimizing input demand equations, Shephard’s Lemma must be employed. This means that the 
cost function (4.16) will be logarithmically differentiated with respect to input prices in order to 
obtain the cost share equations: 
   (4.18) 
for the i=1, …, n and where i i
i
PX C=∑ .  If CSi= PiXi/C, it follows that 1
i
CS =∑  (the cost 
shares must sum to one). 
The eight cost shares that will be estimated are of the form: 
   (4.19) 
Where CSi = Cost share for eight of the nine inputs (CS1=feed share, CS2=operating credit share, 
CS3=labor share, CS4=crop input share, CS5=livestock share, CS6=term credit share, and 
CS8=machinery share) The cost shares are found by dividing the input expenditure by the total 
expenditures. ‘Other inputs’ is not included as an estimated cost share to avoid singularity, 
although it can be retrieved through the restrictions described above. 
β9t = −(β1t + ...+ β8t )
∂lnC
∂lnPi
= PiC i
∂C
∂Pi
= PiXiC = CSi
CSi =α i + γ ij ln(Pj / P9 )+ βyi lnYy + βitT
y=c,l
∑
j=1
8
∑
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 The static model is the most restrictive model in this thesis, as it assumes all inputs are 
variable, meaning in each equilibrium in each time period. This model assumes that the inputs 
fully adjust instantaneously so the estimated elasticities represent the long-run values.  
 The Hicks-Allen partial elasticities of substitution are calculated between inputs I and j 
for a general dual cost function, C, having n inputs. It is of the form: 
2
ij
ij
i j i j
i j
C C C C
C CC C P P
P P
σ ∂= = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂
    (4.20) 
where the subscripts i and j on C refer to the first and second partial derivatives of the cost 
function with respect to the input prices.  
 The estimated Allen partial elasticities of substitution between inputs i and j for the 
translog cost function are set as: 
ij i j
ij
i j
CS CS
CSCS
γ
σ
+
= i,j = 1,…, n, but i ≠ j   (4.21) 
2
2
ij i i
ij
i
CS CS
CS
γ
σ
+ −
= i = 1,…,n                (4.22) 
Finally, the price elasticities are calculated as ij j ijCSε σ=  where CSj is the cost share of the jth 
input. The equations for the price elasticities are formed as: 
ij i j
ij
i
CSCS
CS
γ
ε
+
=   i,j =1,…,n   but  i ≠ j     (4.23) 
2
ij i j
ii
i
CS CS
CS
γ
ε
+ −
=  i = 1,…,n                   (4.24) 
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4.4.2 Partial Static Model 
The partial static model consists of four cost share equations that are derived from a 
nonhomothetic restricted translog cost function of the form: 
 
                                                                                                             (4.25) 
Where VC= total variable cost defined as the sum of feed expense, operating credit expense, 
labor expense, crop input expense, and ‘other’ expense; 
= intercept;  
Pi = price index of the five variable inputs (P1= feed price, P2= operating credit interest rate, P3= 
wage rate, P4= crop input price, and P5= price index of other inputs); 
Zk = quantity of the four-quasi fixed inputs (Z6= quantity of feeder livestock expense, 
Z7=quantity of long term payments, Z8= quantity of land expenditures and Z9= quantity of 
machinery expenditures); 
Yyt and T are defined in (4.17);  
, , , , , , , , , , , ,i k y t ij kl yz tt ki yi yk it ktα α α α γ γ γ γ β β β β β  and ytβ  are coefficients to be estimated.  
As with the static model, the restrictions for the regularity conditions set out in Chapter III are 
also imposed on the Partial Static model. The symmetry conditions require: !γ ij = γ ji ,γ kl = γ lk  and 
!
γ yz = γ zy for all i, j, k, l, y, and z. Homogeneity requires:  
lnVC =α 0 + α i lnPi + α k lnZk
k=6
9
∑ + α y lnYy +α tT + 12 γ ij lnPij=1
5
∑
i=1
5
∑
y=c,l
∑
i=1
5
∑ + 12 γ kl lnZkl=6
9
∑
k=6
9
∑ lnZl
+ 12 γ yz lnYy lnYz +
1
2 γ ttT
2 +
z=c,l
∑
y=c,l
∑ 12 βki lnZkl=6
9
∑
i=1
5
∑ lnPi + βyi lnYy lnPi
i=1
5
∑
y=c,l
∑ + βyk lnYy lnZk
k=6
9
∑
y=c,l
∑
+ βyk lnPiT
i=1
5
∑ + βkt lnZkT +
k=6
9
∑ βyt lnYyT
y=c,l
∑
α 0
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! α i =1, γ ij =i=15∑ γ ji =j=15∑ βki =i=15∑ β yi =i=15∑ βit =i=15∑ 0i=15∑  
which creates the specifications: 
!α5 =1−(α1 + ...+α4 )  
 !γ i5 = −(γ i1 + ...+γ i4 )         for i = 1,…, 5 
 !βk5 = −(βk1 + ...+βk4 ),     for k= 6,….,9 
 !β y5 = −(β yl + ...+β y4 ),     for y= c,l 
 !β5t = −(β1t + ...+βk4 )   
(4.26) 
 
The actual model is comprised of four cost share equations that derived by employing 
Shephard’s lemma on the variable cost function. The model is of the form: 
                      (4.27) 
Where CSi= Cost share for the four variable inputs (CS1= feed share, CS2= operating credit 
share, CS3= labor share, CS4= crop input share). Once again, the ‘other inputs’ cost share is not 
included in order to avoid singularity issues.  
 The quasi-fixed designation given to this model accounts for the partial adjustments of 
the last four inputs. The first four inputs plus ‘other’ inputs will fully adjust to the equilibrium 
levels each period, however, the last four inputs will only partially adjust because of the 
restrictive costs associated with adjusting to exogenous changes in a given period. The 
CS i=α i + γ ij lnPj
j=1
5
∑ + βki lnZk + βyi lnYy
y=c,l
∑ + βitT
k=6
9
∑
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equilibrium values in this model will be found for the variable inputs conditional on the quasi-
fixed inputs.  
 The elasticity estimates are found using the same equations as the static model, however, 
since the variable inputs are calculated conditional on the values of the quasi-fixed inputs, they 
are partial elasticities.  
 
4.4.3 Dynamic Model 
As described earlier, the Dynamic model is less restrictive version of the Static model. Similar to 
the Static model, it is based off the translog cost function (4.17) and uses the same eight cost 
shares. The difference between the models however, is that the static cost shares are represented 
as the long-run optimal values, CSi*. As in the partial static model, the first four inputs are 
variable inputs and the last four are quasi-fixed.  
 This model needed to be adjusted for the non-instantaneous adjustment of the quasi-fixed 
inputs using the partial adjustment model: 
!CSt −CSt−1 =M(CSt* −CSt−1)     (4.28) 
Where CS* is the vector of fully adjusted levels of CS. M is a n x n matrix of adjustment 
coefficients that determine the adjustment rate of CS to the fully adjusted model. As the inputs 
adjust at different rates than others to the optimal levels, their adjustment coefficients mij are 
found. The four inputs that adjust instantaneously will have coefficients that are restricted 
accordingly.  
In order to solve for CSt, equation (4.18) will be adjusted as: 
*
1(1 )t t tCS M CS M CS −= + −        (4.29) 
Where the system of dynamic equations is: 
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!
CS1...
CS8
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
=M
CS1*...
CS8*
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥t
+(I −M)
CS1...
CS8
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
t−1
 
where 
           (4.30) 
As in the other models, the ‘other’ input expense is dropped to avoid singularity. This eliminates 
the last row and column from the adjustment matrix. As the mij coefficients for the variable 
inputs are set to: mii=1 and mij=0 for i ≠j, and ‘other’ inputs are designated variable, there is no 
issue with the estimation of the M matrix. This matrix is assumed to be constant.  
 A necessary condition for this model is that the cost share equations must sum to one. 
This occurs when the changes in the cost shares across the nine inputs equals zero: 
    (4.31) 
where i is the unit vector of dimension 1xn and M is the full n x n matrix. According the Berdnt 
and Savin, this equation is satisfied for autoregressive models if iM=zi, where z is an unknown 
constant. This occurs when one of the columns of the M matrix is set to zero. Therefore, the 
column for feed adjustments, m21,…m81 were set to zero (with m11=1). 
The cost shares for the dynamic model are estimated as: 
4 8
* *
, , , 1 , , 1 , , 1
1, 5,
(1 ) ( ) ( )i t ii i t ii i t ij j t j t ij j t j t
j i j j i j
CS m CS m CS m CS CS m CS CS− − −
= ≠ = ≠
= + − + − + −∑ ∑  (4.32) 
Where  CSit and CSjt are the observed cost shares in each period,  
M =
m11 m12 . m18
m21 . . m28
. . . .
m81 . . m88
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
i(CSt −CSt−1) = iM (CSt* −CSt−1) = 0
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mij and mji are the adjustment coefficients to be estimated  
CSit* and CSjt* are long-run optimal levels of the quasi-fixed factor shares (from the static model) 
and CSi,t-1 and CSj,t-1 are the observed cost shares from the preceding period. 
 
As a result of the mij restrictions, the first four variable cost share equations are the same as the 
static model and the last four quasi-fixed cost shares contain the mij coefficients to be estimated. 
 The long-run elasticities are estimated from the same formula as the static model. The 
short-run Allen Uzawa elasticities of substitution are calculated as: 
1
n
kj jk i j
k
ij
i j
m CS CS
CS CS
γ
σ =
+
=
∑
    i, j = 1,…,n but i ≠ j          (4.33) 
     
2
1
2
n
ik ik i i
k
ii
i
m CS CS
CS
γ
σ =
+ −
=
∑
     i = 1,…,n          (4.34) 
The short-run price elasticities are calculated from the equation: 
 i, j = 1,…,n but i ≠ j        (4.35) 
           i = 1,…, n             (4.36) 
These elasticities are interpreted as the first period response of factor demands to changes in 
factor prices.  
 
 
 
ε ij =
mkjγ jk +CSiCSj
k=1
n
∑
CSi
ε ii =
mikγ ik +CSi2 −CSi
k=1
n
∑
CSi
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4.5 Effectiveness of Farm Credit 
The second portion of the thesis is using an econometric specification to examine the hypothesis: 
is the Farm Credit System effectively meeting its mandate to provide farmers with credit in 
economic downturns? As described in Chapter III, the effectiveness of the FCS will be evaluated 
by comparing the changes in lending between the FCS (FSA) and the CB sector. Using variables 
that are indicative of economic performance to capture the effects of the economy the following 
model is of the form: 
 (4.37) 
Where, CRL= change in relative lending (for the FSA and FCS in real estate and non-real estate 
loans); 
Farm Income= farm income (billions); 
GDP= US real GDP; 
Interest= US treasury yield; 
Population= US farm population; 
Failures= Number of farm bankruptcies in one year (000s); 
= Short term weighted interest elasticity from the dynamic model; 
= Long term weighted interest elasticity from the dynamic model; 
= Land weighted interest elasticity from the dynamic model; 
T= Time, and 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7, , , , , , , ,iα γ β β β β β β β  and 8β  are coefficients to be estimated.  
CRL = FCt − FCt−1FCt−1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
− CBt −CBt−1CBt−1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
=α 0 + γ 1T + β1FarmIncome+ β2GDP +
β3Interest + β4Population + β5Failures + β6εSTcredit + β7εLTcredit + β8εLand + e
εSTcredit
εLTcredit
εLand
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The CRL variable is calculated as the percentage change in lending from the FCS (FSA) minus 
the percentage change in lending from the CB. Thus, in the regression results, when a coefficient 
is positive, it is reflecting an increase in the lending of FCS (FSA) comparatively to the CB. As 
well, when a coefficient is negative, it is reflecting a decrease in the lending of farm credit 
compared to CB. With respect to the long and short run elasticities in Chapter II, we show that 
the elasticities are sensitive to the absolute value of debt to assets, farm income, and interest 
rates. So our measure of elasticity may have certain collinearities with at least two of the 
variables in our regression in theory. However, because these elasticities were derived from the 
dual cost functions, a much more complex computation than what is outline in Chapter II this 
collinearity will be considerably diluted.  
 
4.6 Summary  
This chapter contained a description of the data and presented each of the models to be used in 
this study: the static model, the partial static model, the dynamic model, and the farm credit 
effectiveness model. The dual cost function model parameters will be based on state level data 
for the corn-belt states, looking at the expenditures for inputs and the values of the output. The 
parameters for the farm credit effectiveness model will be based on national data, apart from the 
state level elasticities. These variables were included to indicate macro economic changes that 
may affect the lending of the Farm Credit System.  
 Following the description of the data, the SUR model is discussed and analyzed. This 
model is incorporated as it mitigates the correlated standard errors associated with this research.  
 Subsequent to the SUR discussion, the equations to be estimated are analyzed. The Static, 
Partial Static, and Dynamic models begin with the nonhomothetic cost function which is 
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nondecreasing in input prices and output from the restrictions set in Chapter III. The Static model 
is the most restrictive model, as it assumes all inputs are variable, where they adjust to the 
equilibrium value in each time period. The Partial Static model allows the quasi-fixed inputs to 
partially adjust in each time period and the variable inputs adjust completely in each period. The 
Dynamic model, allows the inputs to each adjust at their own appropriate rate to the equilibrium 
value in each period through the employment of an adjustment matrix. The equations for the 
elasticities of each of the models are presented following the model’s discussion.  
 Finally, the Farm Credit System model is presented. This model looks to answer the 
question: is the Farm Credit System a relative countercyclical lender? In this section, we 
compare the changes in relative lending of the FCS and FSA to the CB by using macro-economic 
variables to capture the conditions of the markets. 
 The results from the four models presented in this chapter will be discussed in Chapters 
V and VI. 
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CHAPTER V 
DUALITY RESULTS 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter contains the results from the first portion of this thesis for the three dual cost models 
presented in earlier chapters. The following sections contain the parameter estimates from the 
three models, Static, Partial Static and Dynamic duality models, for each of the five states and 
the average, as well as the elasticity estimates for both the price and Allen-substitution 
evaluations. The Dynamic duality elasticities will be presented as both short-run and long-run 
values as discussed in Chapters III and IV. 
 The three models were included to more completely and effectively illustrate the 
differences between the dual models, which gave grounds for comparison. Each model was 
estimated as a SUR, discussed in Chapter IV, using the statistical software, Stata. As explained 
previously, SUR is a generalized least squares method where a set of nonlinear equations with 
cross-equation constraints are imposed and estimated with a diagonal covariance matrix of the 
standard errors across equations. 
 The results presented in this model are of the average of the states, thus giving and 
abstract and overview of the results. The individual states are presented in the Appendices as 
they give varying results. However, it should be states that the results from the individual states 
generally are larger and more significant than the average of the states.  
 
5.1 Parameter estimates  
The parameter estimates that will be presented for the Static, Partial Static, and Dynamic models 
for each of the states and the average of the states. Each state is analyzed separately in order to 
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capture the changes between states. As a matter of efficiency, the results for the average of the 
five states will be presented in this chapter, and the remaining results for the individual states are 
in the respective appendices described below. 
 
5.1.1 Static Model  
The consolidated findings of the regression estimates for the static model by state are included in 
Table 5.1. This table includes the number of significant coefficients at the various levels.  
 
Table 5.1: Static Model Consolidated Coefficient Results 
 
Static Model Coefficient Results 
 Illinois Indiana Iowa Missouri Ohio Average  
Number of coefficients 
significant at the 1% level 36 49 51 40 48 41 
Number of coefficients 
significant at the 5% level 7 7 5 5 13 4 
Number of coefficients 
significant at the 10% 
level 
3 1 2 7 5 6 
Number of coefficients 
not significantly different 
than zero 
35 24 23 29 15 30 
Total number of 
coefficients 81 81 81 81 81 81 
Number of significant 
intercepts out of 8 7 6 7 7 4 5 
 
As shown in the table, Indiana and Iowa had the most number of significant coefficients at the 
1% significance level, however, Ohio had the lowest number of coefficients that were not 
statistically different than zero.  
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 The results for the static model estimation for the average of the states is shown below in 
Table 5.2. The standard errors are included in parenthesis. The results for the static model for the 
individual states can be found in Appendices A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, and A.5 for Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Missouri, and Ohio, respectively. In order to obtain the values for the ‘other inputs’, they 
were derived from the symmetry and homogeneity restrictions imposed on the system, as 
described in Chapter IV. The coefficients on the inputs are symmetric between input price 
variables, thus only the bottom half of the price coefficient matrix is provided.  
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Table 5.2: Regression Estimates for the Static Model for the average of the five states 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables (Cost Shares) 
Feed S-T credit Labor Crop Livestock L-T credit Land Machinery 
Input Price  
       feed 0.000663 
       
 
(0.0140) 
       s-t interest -0.0325*** 0.0456*** 
      
 
(0.00721) (0.00690) 
      wage -0.0806*** -0.0392*** -0.108*** 
     
 
(0.0144) (0.00965) (0.0233) 
     crop 0.0477*** 0.00934 0.0178 -0.0921*** 
    
 
(0.0131) (0.00773) (0.0165) (0.0285) 
    livestock -0.0411*** 0.00636 -0.0166* 0.0796*** -0.00417 
   
 
(0.00720) (0.00471) (0.00895) (0.00916) (0.00694) 
   l-t interest -0.0218*** 0.0405*** 0.0124 -0.0222*** 0.0217*** -0.0245** 
  
 
(0.00687) (0.00587) (0.00900) (0.00642) (0.00451) (0.0104) 
  land 0.00945** 0.00627* 0.0313*** -0.00255 -0.0130*** -0.00414 -0.0358*** 
 
 
(0.00399) (0.00353) (0.00536) (0.00347) (0.00243) (0.00575) (0.00766) 
 machinery -0.0844*** -0.0413*** -0.0130 0.0564*** -0.0183*** -0.0124* 0.0139*** -0.00582 
 
(0.0104) (0.00627) (0.0128) (0.0187) (0.00691) (0.00672) (0.00377) (0.0160) 
         Output Quantity 
       crops -0.0314 -0.0284 0.00570 -0.00482 0.00848 0.0371 -0.0427 -0.00450 
 (0.0313) (0.0280) (0.0442) (0.0272) (0.0197) (0.0478) (0.0647) (0.0300) 
livestock 0.0370 -0.170*** -0.160** 0.0901* 0.0230 -0.0131 0.355*** -0.125** 
 
(0.0554) (0.0557) (0.0771) (0.0520) (0.0364) (0.0833) (0.114) (0.0524) 
Time -0.00170* 0.00390*** -0.00240* -0.00220** 0.000961 0.00132 -0.00159 0.000200 
 
(0.00100) (0.000970) (0.00144) (0.000939) (0.000646) (0.00149) (0.00203) (0.000949) 
Intercept 3.558** -6.996*** 5.445** 4.127** -2.050* -2.508 2.077 0.311 
 
(1.721) (1.657) (2.474) (1.638) (1.110) (2.537) (3.449) (1.635) 
 
                
Observations 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
R-squared 0.922 0.754 0.797 0.927 0.857 0.218 0.494 0.849 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
  
 
 
 As seen above, there are many interesting significant coefficients from this model. Five 
of the eight intercepts were at significant least at the 10% level. The time trend shows to be less 
significant, with only four of the eight coefficient significant at the 10% level. It should also be 
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noted from both Table 5.1 and the appendices, the states have varying significance for different 
inputs, which aligns with the explanation of differences in credit elasticities from Chapter II.  
 Generally, the cost share of an input decreases as the price of that input increases, as 
shown by the negative coefficient estimate along the diagonal of the symmetric price matrix. 
This suggests elastic demand of these inputs as the quantity decreases by more than the price 
increase. Specifically, long-term interest and land price shows a more elastic demand, which also 
supports the hypothesis of this research.  
As the quantity of crops increases, all of the cost shares except Labor, Long-term credit, 
and Livestock have negative coefficients. However, it should be noted that these estimates are 
also not statistically different than zero. The quantity of livestock also intuitive results, as the 
cost shares for both feed and livestock increase with an increase in the quantity of livestock. 
 
5.1.2 Partial Static Model 
 The consolidated findings of the Partial Static model by state are included in Table 5.3. This 
table includes the number of coefficients significant at the various levels. Dissimilar to the static 
model, the most statistically significant states in the partial static model are Missouri and Ohio, 
both of which have the most number of coefficient significant at the 1% level and the least 
amount of statistically insignificant coefficients.  
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Table 5.3 Consolidated Partial Static Model Coefficient findings for the States and average 
 
 
 
The parameter estimates for Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Ohio, Missouri, and the average can 
be found in Appendices B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4, and B.5, respectively. As in the static models, the 
standard errors are included in parenthesis and each state is analyzed separately. Also, in order to 
obtain the values for the ‘other inputs’, they were derived from the symmetry and homogeneity 
restrictions imposed on the system, as described in Chapter IV. Once again, the coefficients on 
the inputs are symmetric between input price variables, thus only the bottom half of the price 
coefficient matrix is provided. The regression results from the Partial Static model for the 
average of the states is included in Table 5.4: 
 
 
 
Partial Model Coefficient Results 
 Illinois Indiana Iowa Missouri Ohio Average  
Number of coefficients 
significant at the 1% 
level 
15 16 17 19 19 18 
Number of coefficients 
significant at the 5% 
level 
2 2 2 6 1 5 
Number of coefficients 
significant at the 10% 
level 
3 2 1 2 3 1 
Number of coefficients 
not significantly 
different than zero 
24 24 24 17 21 20 
Total number of 
coefficients 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Number of significant 
intercepts out of 4 2 3 3 2 4 2 
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Table 5.4 Regression Estimates for the Partial Static Model for the average of the five states 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables (Cost Shares) 
Feed S-T credit Labor Crop 
Input Price  
    feed -0.0164 -0.00301 -0.0164 0.0672*** 
 
(0.0143) (0.00679) (0.0214) (0.0185) 
s-t interest -0.00301 0.0349*** 0.00434 0.0400*** 
 
(0.00679) (0.00543) (0.00948) (0.0106) 
wage -0.0490** 0.00434 0.0643** 0.124*** 
 
(0.0214) (0.00948) (0.0284) (0.0257) 
crop 0.0672*** 0.0400*** 0.124*** -0.159*** 
 
(0.0185) (0.0106) (0.0257) (0.0415) 
other -0.171*** -0.0227 -0.108*** -0.289*** 
 
(0.0252) (0.0157) (0.0356) (0.0387) 
Quasi-Fixed 
    livestock 0.0907*** 0.00163 0.0238 -0.0117 
 
(0.0111) (0.00724) (0.0157) (0.0167) 
l-t interest 0.0169** 0.0183*** -0.0344*** 0.0734*** 
 
(0.00834) (0.00537) (0.0119) (0.0122) 
land 0.00107 -0.00772*** -0.0259*** 0.00987* 
 
(0.00357) (0.00221) (0.00500) (0.00530) 
machinery -0.0321** -0.0187** -0.0492** 0.0823*** 
 
(0.0149) (0.00912) (0.0214) (0.0263) 
     Output Quantity 
   crops -0.0226 -0.00423 0.108*** -0.102** 
 (0.0277) (0.0176) (0.0392) (0.0408) 
livestock -0.124* 0.101** 0.178* -0.339*** 
 
(0.0738) (0.0451) (0.104) (0.107) 
Time 0.00435*** -0.00104 -0.000833 0.00583*** 
 
(0.00151) (0.000857) (0.00211) (0.00206) 
Intercept -7.584*** 1.405 0.779 -9.401*** 
 
(2.640) (1.487) (3.691) (3.597) 
     Observations 62 62 62 62 
R-squared 0.931 0.895 0.598 0.881 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
    
As seen above, there again, are many interesting significant coefficients from this model. 
The intercepts were less significant in this model with only two of the four significant at the 1% 
level. The time trend is significant at the 1% level for two of the four cost shares as well. As in 
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the static model, the states have varying significance for different inputs as can be seen from the 
appendices. 
 Feed and crop cost shares decreases as the price of that input increase. This suggests 
elastic demand of these inputs as the quantity decreases by more than the price increase. In the 
partial model, a very interesting result is the effect of the quantity of livestock on the cost shares. 
As the quantity of livestock increases, there is a significant result for each of the inputs. 
Specifically, the cost share for feed and crops decrease with increases of livestock, and the cost 
shares for short term credit and labor increase. This is counter-intuitive as we would expect that 
the cost share of feed would increase with an increase in quantity of livestock. 
As the quantity of crops increases, all of the cost shares except Labor have negative 
coefficients. This is intuitive and aligns with the hypothesis of this research as we would expect 
the cost share of feed, short term credit, and crop inputs to decrease as the quantity of crops 
increases.   
 
5.1.3 Dynamic Model 
The consolidated findings of the Dynamic model by state are shown below in Table 5.5. This 
table, similar 5.1 and 5.3, includes the number of coefficients significant at the various levels. 
Seemingly as an average of the two models, the most statistically significant states were Iowa 
and Missouri with both having the most number of coefficient significant at the 1% level and the 
least amount of statistically insignificant coefficients. It should also be noted that the average is 
the least statistically significant regression, however, for efficiency, it will be the results 
discussed below.  
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Table 5.5 Consolidated Dynamic Model Coefficient findings for the States and average 
 
Dynamic Model Coefficient Results 
 Illinois Indiana Iowa Missouri Ohio Average  
Number of coefficients 
significant at the 1% 
level 
22 22 38 29 26 17 
Number of coefficients 
significant at the 5% 
level 
3 8 4 8 4 14 
Number of coefficients 
significant at the 10% 
level 
3 3 5 8 4 3 
Number of coefficients 
not significantly 
different than zero 
53 48 34 36 47 47 
Total number of 
coefficients 81 81 81 81 81 81 
 
The regression results for the dynamic model coefficient estimates of the same parameters of the 
static model are shown in Appendices C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, and C.5 for Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Ohio, Missouri, and the average, respectively. The regression results for the average of the states 
will be presented below in Table 5.6. As in the past models, the standard errors are included in 
parenthesis. Also, in order to obtain the values for the ‘other inputs’, they were derived from the 
symmetry and homogeneity restrictions imposed on the system, as described in Chapter IV. 
Similar to the static model, the coefficients on the inputs are symmetric between input price 
variables, thus only the bottom half of the price coefficient matrix is provided.  
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Table 5.6 Regression Estimates for Dynamic Model for the average of the five states 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables (Cost Shares) 
Feed S-T credit Labor Crop Livestock L-T credit Land Machinery 
Input Price  
        feed 0.186*** 
       
 
(0.0504) 
       s-t interest -0.0622 -0.532*** 
      
 
(0.0384) (0.0897) 
      wage -0.00238 -0.490*** 0.0257 
     
 
(0.0361) (0.0823) (0.0317) 
     crop -0.0953 -0.00674 -0.0775** 0.622*** 
    
 
(0.0609) (0.0406) (0.0353) (0.0676) 
    livestock 0.0471* 0.469*** -0.0132 0.0540** 0.0356 
   
 
(0.0270) (0.0696) (0.0321) (0.0256) (0.0236) 
   l-t interest -0.124** 0.00610 -0.0180 0.134*** 0.00206 0.205*** 
  
 
(0.0523) (0.0253) (0.0226) (0.0403) (0.0184) (0.0732) 
  land 0.0688** 0.0586** -0.00981 -0.0940*** -0.0522*** -0.0736** 0.0573* 
 
 
(0.0302) (0.0253) (0.0211) (0.0254) (0.0139) (0.0360) (0.0328) 
 machinery -0.147*** 0.00643 0.0105 -0.111*** -0.0379** 0.000249 -0.00118 0.0392 
 
(0.0475) (0.0265) (0.0348) (0.0347) (0.0188) (0.0378) (0.0221) (0.0370) 
         
         Output Quantity 
       crops -0.0332 0.00145 0.0112 0.0106 0.0302** 0.0329 -0.0161 -0.0352 
 (0.0435) (0.0168) (0.0149) (0.0331) (0.0140) (0.0508) (0.0412) (0.0333) 
livestock -0.0284 -1.86e-05 0.000893 -0.00879 0.00832 0.0637*** -0.0383* -0.00141 
 
(0.0203) (0.00825) (0.00755) (0.0154) (0.00694) (0.0247) (0.0203) (0.0148) 
Time 0.000411 2.05e-05 -0.000133 4.17e-05 -0.000591** -0.00125 0.000605 0.000515 
 
(0.000703) (0.000282) (0.000263) (0.000531) (0.000231) (0.000847) (0.000699) (0.000523) 
Intercept -0.540 -0.0314 0.208 -0.101 0.994** 2.071 -0.964 -0.860 
 
(1.196) (0.477) (0.455) (0.901) (0.391) (1.433) (1.182) (0.886) 
 
                
Observations 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 
R-squared 0.302 0.266 0.407 0.585 0.503 0.260 0.129 0.020 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
  
 
The intercepts were the least significant in this model with only one of the eight 
significant at the 5% level. The time trend is also very insignificant in the dynamic model, with 
only one of the eight cost shares showing significance. There are varying significances between 
inputs and cost shares in the different states which can be found in the discussed appendices.  
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 Mostly, the cost share of an input increases as the price of that input increases, as 
indicated by a positive coefficient estimate along the diagonal of the symmetric price matrix in 
Table 5.6. This holds for every input except for short-term credit, which is interesting because it 
suggests there is an elastic demand for short term credit as the quantity decreases by more than 
the price increases.  
 An interesting result from this table is the positive significant coefficient on the increase 
of crop quantity on the cost share of livestock. We would expect that as crop quantity increases, 
the cost share for livestock would decrease, however this is not what is observed. A similarly 
unexpected result is the positive significant coefficient on the quantity of livestock on the cost 
share of long-term credit. This is one of the two significant coefficients for the quantity of 
livestock with the other being the cost share for land, which is intuitive. 
 Another set of perceptive coefficients are the positive relationships of the output of crops 
and the cost shares for both short and long-term credit. These suggest that as the quantity of 
crops increases, there is an increase in the cost share for both types of credit.  
The adjustment matrices for the dynamic model are presented in Appendices D.1, D.2, 
D.3, D.4, and D.5 for Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and Ohio, respectively. These adjustment 
coefficients for the variable inputs were set to zero and one for cross and own adjustment 
coefficients respectively (the first four and the last rows). In order to satisfy the restrictions, set 
out in Chapter IV, the column for feed was set to zero. Twenty-eight coefficients were estimated 
for each state. The list of consolidated number of significant coefficients for each state are 
presented in Table 5.7 
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Table 5.7 Consolidated Dynamic Model Adjustment Coefficient findings for the States and 
average 
 
Dynamic Model Adjustment Matrix Coefficient Results 
     Illinois    Indiana      Iowa Missouri        Ohio Average  
Number of coefficients 
significant at the 1% level 6 7 8 8 3 6 
Number of coefficients 
significant at the 5% level 2 2 6 0 4 4 
Number of coefficients 
significant at the 10% 
level 
7 3 1 2 5 4 
Number of coefficients 
not significantly different 
than zero 
13 16 13 18 16 14 
Total number of 
coefficients 28 28 28 28 28 28 
 
 
Similar to the results from the Static and Dynamic models, Iowa and Missouri have the largest 
number of significant coefficients.  
 As described in Chapter IV, the adjustment coefficients determine the rate of adjustment 
toward the fully adjusted level for the cost shares. This adjustment matrix for the average of the 
states is presented below in Table 5.8. If mii is equal to zero, the inputs do not adjust to the 
equilibrium level. If mii is equal to one, the cost share completely adjusts in each period, which is 
assumed for the variable inputs. The adjustment coefficient for labor is the highest in each state, 
with Iowa having the highest adjustment of 87% each period. As described by Vanden Dungen 
(1992), these results are intuitive as by definition we would not expect a very long adjustment 
period for labor, especially in periods of high unemployment when there would be an abundance 
of labor. 
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Table 5.8 Regression Estimates for the Adjustment Matrix for the average of the states 
 
Adjustment Coefficients 
 
Input (i) 
Input (i) Feed S-t Credit Labor Crop Livestock L-t Credit Land Machinery Other 
Feed 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
S-t Credit 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
Labor 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
Crop 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
Livestock 0 0.00709 
-
0.0515*** 0.0197 -0.0274** -0.0386 0.0162 -0.0470* 0 
 
 (0.0129) (0.0125) (0.0395) (0.0139) (0.0480) (0.0395) (0.0242)  
L-t Credit 0 0.0275 
-
0.0485*** 0.110** 0.0353* 0.227*** -0.121** 0.0236 0 
 
 (0.0184) (0.0178) (0.0562) (0.0198) (0.0682) (0.0562) (0.0344)  
Land 0 -0.0111 0.0122 -0.0306 
-
0.0230*** 
-
0.0961*** 0.0601** -0.0267* 0 
 
 (0.00816) (0.00791) (0.0250) (0.00881) (0.0303) (0.0250) (0.0153)  
Machinery 0 -0.000348 0.0570*** 
-
0.0785* 0.0205 -0.0821 0.0651 0.0192 0 
 
 (0.0155) (0.0150) (0.0474) (0.0167) (0.0575) (0.0474) (0.0290)  
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
In this matrix, Table 5.8, the non-zero off diagonal coefficients reflect that input adjustments are 
not independent. The information on the effect on demand for input i given an adjustment in the 
demand for input j is shown in the coefficient mij. For example, when there is a discrepancy 
between the optimal and actual levels of machinery demanded (excess demand), the demand for 
long-term credit increases by 2.36% (m68=0.0236). This implies that farmers are using long term 
credit to purchase machinery. An interesting coefficient in this matrix, is the positive adjustment 
for long-term credit and land. As m76 =0.0961, this suggests that when there is an excess demand 
for land, the demand for long-term credit increases by 9.6%. This suggests that there is evidence 
that there is overcapitalization in the agricultural sector.  
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5.2 Elasticity Estimates  
The elasticity estimates are provided for the static, partial static, and dynamic models for each of 
the states as well as the average. Both the price and Allen-substitution elasticities are presented 
in these sections for each model and state. As the short-run price elasticities for land, short-term 
interest, and long-term interest are used in the model described in Chapter IV to analyze the 
effectiveness of the Farm Credit System, the main focus of this section will be the short-run 
dynamic elasticities.  
 
5.2.1 Static Model Elasticities 
The price elasticity estimates and Allen elasticities of substitution for the Static model of the 
average of the states are presented in Tables 5.9 and 5.10, respectively. The elasticity results for 
the price elasticities by state can be found in Appendices E.1, E.2, E.3, E.4, and E.5 for Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and Iowa respectively. The Allen-substitution estimates around also 
found in the appendix in F.1, F.2, F.3, F.4, and F.5 for the same respective states.    
 
Table 5.9: Static Model Price Elasticity Estimates for the average of the states 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -0.84 -0.61 -0.50 0.41 -0.24 0.00 0.98 -0.49 
ST credit -0.19 0.11 -0.85 0.30 0.19 1.11 0.40 -0.89 
Labor -0.50 -0.85 -3.38 0.48 -0.34 0.14 0.95 -0.21 
Crop 0.41 0.17 0.32 -2.29 1.22 -0.18 0.21 0.93 
Livestock -1.22 0.25 -0.50 2.75 -1.10 0.88 -0.19 -0.53 
LT credit 0.01 0.31 0.14 -0.07 0.19 -6.94 0.22 0.00 
Land 0.20 0.06 0.19 0.07 -0.02 0.13 -0.90 0.15 
Machinery -0.97 -0.51 -0.12 0.83 -0.20 -0.01 0.43 -0.99 
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As theory would suggest, the diagonal elements, showing the own price elasticity estimates, are 
mostly negative. This means that when the price of an input rises, the demand for that good 
should decrease, ceretis paribus. An interesting result from this table is the largely elastic effect 
of long-term credit on short-term credit. This suggests that when the price of long-term credit 
increases, the demand for short-term credit increases, reflecting a substitutionary relationship   
 According to Table 5.9, the short-term credit input is complementary with labor, feed, 
and machinery. For example, a 1% increase in the price of short-term credit causes a decrease of 
the demand for labor by 0.85% and feed by 0.61%. This follows intuition, as we would assume 
short-term credit would have a complementary relationship with the inputs as it is generally used 
to finance the purchase of these inputs. 
 
Table 5.10 Static Model Allen Elasticity Estimates of Substitution for the average of the states 
  ALLEN ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed 0.12               
ST credit 0.45 -37.66 
     
  
Labor 4.52 -2.08 -1.48 
    
  
Crop -0.70 0.10 -2.07 0.57 
   
  
Livestock -3.27 2.09 14.29 -7.06 8.78 
  
  
LT credit 5.35 23.14 1.48 5.09 1.85 -116.98 
 
  
Land -0.88 0.08 -0.90 -1.27 -0.12 0.54 1.10   
Machinery 0.23 0.19 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 
 
The Allen elasticity estimates presented in Table 5.10 measure the degree of substitutability or 
complementarity between inputs. As this matrix is symmetric, only the bottom half is presented. 
This table shows that short term credit and long term credit have a largely substitutionary 
relationship. It would appear that short-term credit has stronger relationships with the variable 
inputs than long-term credit, which is to be expected.  
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5.2.2 Partial Static Model Elasticities 
The price elasticity estimates and Allen elasticities of substitution for the Partial Static model of 
the average of the states are presented in Tables 5.11 and 5.12, respectively. The elasticity results 
for the price elasticities by state can be found in Appendices G.1, G.2, G.3, G.4, and G.5 for 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and Iowa respectively.  Following the structure of the static 
model, the Allen-substitution estimates around also found in the appendix in H.1, H.2, H.3, H.4, 
and H.5 for the respective states.    
Table 5.11: Partial Static Model Price Elasticity Estimates for the average of the states 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop 
Feed -0.96 0.09 -0.06 0.55 
ST credit 0.01 -0.14 0.16 1.03 
Labor -0.28 0.16 0.51 2.88 
Crop -1.09 1.03 1.90 -3.28 
 
 
As we can see from this table, the elasticity for crop demand is the most elastic, with a 1% 
increase in the price of the crop inputs relating to a 3.28% decrease in the demand for the crop 
inputs. Another interesting point is the positive elasticity for labor which suggests that a 1% 
increase in the wage rate increases the demand for labor by 0.51%. 
 
Table 5.12: Partial Static Model Allen Elasticity of Substitution Estimates for the average of the 
states 
  ALLEN ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop 
Feed -6.70       
ST credit 0.46 999.38 
 
  
Labor -7.00 3.84 13.65   
Crop -17.93 0.04 0.10 -55.87 
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The Allen elasticity estimates provided in the above table are provided for the restricted cost 
function model. Short-term credit has a large own price relationship of substitution, which is not 
was hypothesized. Overall, the partial static model did not perform as well as Static model in 
term of the expected estimated relationships. 
 
5.2.3 Dynamic Model Elasticities 
The elasticities for the dynamic model are calculated for both the short-run and the long-run. The 
difference, as shown in Chapter IV, the long-run estimates do not incorporate the adjustment 
coefficients in the calculations. 
 
Long Run 
Following the structure of the Static and Partial Static results, the long-run price elasticity 
estimates and Allen elasticities of substitution for the Dynamic model of the average of the states 
are presented in Tables 5.13 and 5.14, respectively. The elasticity results for the price elasticities 
by state can be found in Appendices K.1, K.2, K.3, K.4, and K.5 for Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Missouri, and Iowa respectively.  Following the price elasticities, the Allen-substitution 
estimates around also found in the appendix in L.1, L.2, L.3, L.4, and L.5 for the respective 
states. 
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Table 5.13: Dynamic Model Long-Run Price Elasticity Estimates for the average of the states 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed 0.44 -1.31 0.04 -0.57 0.36 -0.70 0.72 -0.92 
ST credit -0.39 -13.55 -11.03 -0.08 11.13 0.30 1.63 0.24 
Labor 0.04 -11.03 -0.36 -1.67 -0.26 -0.07 0.03 0.32 
Crop -0.57 -0.07 -1.10 8.33 0.84 2.14 -1.15 -1.56 
Livestock 1.74 15.76 -0.39 1.89 0.23 0.22 -1.50 -1.18 
LT credit -0.68 0.08 -0.07 0.99 0.05 3.95 -0.25 0.09 
Land 0.45 0.28 0.01 -0.31 -0.18 -0.16 -0.51 0.08 
Machinery -1.80 0.12 0.20 -1.39 -0.46 0.15 0.23 -0.39 
 
 The estimate for short-term credit indicates a very elastic demand, in which a 1% increase in the 
price of short-term interest rate would decrease the demand for short-term credit by 13.5%. A 
counter intuitive result for the long-term credit is also shown in this table. When the interest rate 
for long-term credit increases by 1%, there is an associated 3.95% increase in the demand for 
long-term credit. We can see that by treating the long-term credit as a quasi-fixed input, farmers 
are not as sensitive to long-run interest rates as in the static models. This shows that long-term 
credit is a highly inelastic input for agriculture. 
 In respect to cross-price elasticities, we see that short-term credit is complementary for 
feed, labor, and crop, and long-term credit is complementary for feed, labor, and land. For 
example, a 1% increase in the short-term interest rate would cause: 
1) A 1.31% decrease in the demand for feed; 
2) A 11.03% decrease in the demand for labor; and 
3) A 0.07% decrease in the demand for crop inputs. 
This is the relationship we would expect between variable inputs and short-term credit as it is 
often used to purchase these inputs. 
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The effect of long-term credit is also worth examining. For example, a 1% increase in the long-
term interest rate would cause: 
1) A 0.70% decrease in the demand for feed; 
2) A 0.07% decrease in the demand for labor; and 
3) A 0.16% decrease in the demand for land. 
Just as the short-term credit is complementary with variable inputs, the long-term credit has 
the expected complementary relationship with the capital input of land. This is to be 
expected.  
 
Table 5.14: Dynamic Model Long-Run Allen Elasticity of Substitution Estimates for the average 
of the states 
  ALLEN ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed 3.467               
ST credit -0.015 -15602.155 
     
  
Labor -14.561 -319.221 -7.495 
    
  
Crop -9.550 -1.225 -26.805 150.456 
   
  
Livestock 10.695 487.048 -7.937 22.876 21.620 
  
  
LT credit -4.684 1.848 -1.690 14.337 1.476 3.947 
 
  
Land 2.992 4.406 0.093 -5.050 -6.254 -1.147 -2.142   
Machinery -11.890 3.481 4.178 -18.711 -17.478 1.022 0.938 -4.317 
 
Following the results in Table 5.13, short-term credit has a complementary relationship with 
labor, crop and feed in Table 5.14. These results validate the importance of credit in the cost 
structure of the agricultural sector across the US cornbelt.  
 
Short Run 
Looking at the state results in Appendices I.1 and I.4 for Illinois and Missouri respectively, the 
state level elasticities are far more consistent with theory. This may suggest that the assumed 
 94 
convexity conditions, that is the imposition of symmetry by Roy’s identity gets weaker as 
aggregation increases. In other words, convexity is much stronger at the local or state level and 
this should be taken into consideration when estimating duality models. 
Finally, the results for the short-run Dynamic model follow the same structure as past 
models. These are the most critical elasticity estimates and the ones of most interest to 
economists. In addition, looking at Table 5.1.5, these estimates appear to be consistent in that all 
of the own-price effects are negative as theory predicts. The short run price elasticity estimates 
and Allen elasticities of substitution for the Dynamic model of the average of the states are 
presented in Tables 5.15 and 5.14, respectively. The elasticity results for the price elasticities by 
state can be found in Appendices I.1, I.2, I.3, I.4, and I.5 for Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, 
and Iowa respectively.  Following the price elasticities, the Allen-substitution estimates are also 
found in the appendix in J.1, J.2, J.3, J.4, and J.5 for the respective states. 
 
Table 5.15: Dynamic Model Short-Run Price Elasticity Estimates for the average of the states 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -0.83 0.04 0.29 0.24 0.35 0.20 0.18 0.23 
ST credit 0.03 -0.96 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Labor 0.07 0.00 -0.90 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.08 
Crop 0.02 -0.12 -0.11 -1.04 -0.20 0.03 0.05 -0.03 
Livestock 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 -0.93 0.05 0.04 0.05 
LT credit 0.15 0.14 -0.01 0.15 0.14 -0.85 0.15 0.15 
Land 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.25 -0.75 0.26 
Machinery 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.09 -0.90 
 
Short term credit is complementary in the short run price elasticity with crop inputs. This occurs 
when a 1% increase in the cost of short term interest rates causes a 12% decrease in the demand 
for the crops inputs. This result is perceptive especially because farmers may delay leveraged 
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purchases when they are experiencing a temporary rise in interest rates. In the short run farmers 
also appear to be equally sensitive to short-term interest rates an long-term interest rates, as they 
are fairly similar sizes of elasticities.  
 The elasticity for credit, both short and long term, varies by state as well. For example, in 
the short run, Iowa has the most complementary inputs with long term credit (Appendix I.2). It 
should also be noted that Illinois and Indiana show complementary relationships between short 
term credit and the variable inputs, as we would expect.  
 As we included the elasticities from the dynamic duality model in our Farm Credit 
model, described in Chapter VI, we also found the significance of the elasticities for the credit 
variables in the dynamic portion. After bootstrapping the sample to find the standard errors, we 
tested the credit elasticities at the 90%, 95%, and 99% significance levels. Of both the short and 
long term credit elasticities, Iowa, Ohio, and the Average of the states showed significance at the 
90%, 95%, and 99% levels. The other states were not significant in either credit elasticity.  
 
5.3 Summary  
This chapter contained the estimation results for the duality portion of this thesis. It examined the 
regression results from the Static, Partial Static, and Dynamic models as well as the price and 
Allen substitution elasticities from each model. This chapter specially aimed to satisfy the first 
objective set out in Chapter I, by quantifying the relationship between short and long term credit 
and other inputs across the cornbelt states.  
 As the purpose of this portion of the thesis intended to answer the question of whether or 
not credit should be included as an input in the production process and whether credit has a 
complementary relationship with the other inputs. As in past literature, the results suggest that 
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not only can credit enter the production process as an intangible input, but neglecting to include 
in the production function would create biased results.  
 Firstly, the results for the Static model are presented. These results showed the cost share 
of an input decreases as the price of that input increased, suggesting that these inputs had elastic 
demand for price. Specifically, the long and short term interest had elastic demands, which 
follows objective 2. The results for this model were strong for the average of the states, and even 
stronger for the individual states that are shown in the appendices.  
 Secondly, the Partial Static model is discussed. This model had slightly less impressive 
results with both time and the intercepts were less significant than the Static model. Feed and 
crop shares were the only inputs showing elastic demand, and interestingly, the coefficient for 
the short-term credit was both positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting as the cost of 
credit increases the demand for credit increases as well.  
 Thirdly, the Dynamic model follows. This model showed less significance in the average 
of the states when compared to the individual states. However, the regression of the average of 
the states showed interesting results. For example, the Dynamic model suggests that when the 
quantity of crop output increases, the cost share for livestock increases as well, which is not what 
we would expect. This model also suggests that when the quantity of crops increase, there is an 
increase in the cost share for both types of credit.  
 Fourthly, the adjustment matrices for the Dynamic model are presented. Iowa showed the 
highest adjustment rate of 87% in each period while the average of the states was much lower, 
averaging about 5%. One of the compelling coefficients in this matrix was the positive 
adjustment between long-term credit and land, as it suggests that there is evidence of 
overcapitalization in the agricultural sector.  
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 Fifthly, the elasticities for each model are presented including both the price and Allen-
elasticities of substitution. Generally, across the models the short-term credit is more sensitive to 
the variable inputs, showing a complementary relationship. Similarly, the long-term credit is 
generally more sensitive to the fixed inputs, also exhibiting complementary relationships. This 
follow the hypothesis of credit demand we discuss in earlier chapters. Both the long-run and the 
short-run elasticities are presented for the Dynamic model. The short-run elasticities show 
stronger significance and follow intuition more than the long-run elasticities, as we expected. 
Due to the nature of short-run elasticities, we include these in the Farm Credit effectiveness 
portion in Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTER VI  
FARM CREDIT RESULTS 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter examines the results from the Farm Credit effectiveness portion of this thesis. First, 
the elasticities used from the Dynamic portion will be analyzed, followed by the regression 
results. The results are broken into the relative lending for the FCS and FSA in both real estate 
and non-real estate lending. In order to capture the differences of lending in different time 
periods, the regressions are broken in four categories: 1939-2013 with dummy variables for the 
years of World War II (1939-1945) and the farm crisis period (1970-1987), the years leading up 
to the farm crisis (1939-1969), the farm crisis period (1970-1987), and the years following the 
farm crisis (1988-2013). These results are calculated for the U.S. at the national level and are set 
out to complete the final objective described in Chapter 1. 
 
6.2 Elasticities 
The elasticities used in the econometric specification for Farm Credit are obtained through the 
Dynamic Duality portion described in Chapter VI. These input elasticities are calculated for each 
of the five corn-belt states and then weighted by their state’s respective input expense share. 
These weighted elasticities are summed; exhibiting the weighted average for the corn-belt 
region. These elasticities are included in this portion to attempt to give a numerical value to some 
behavioral aspects that would otherwise be left out. For example, the long term interest elasticity 
shows how sensitive farmers are to the interest rates they will receive on their real estate loans. 
Each elasticity is presented in absolute value so an increase means the elasticity value is 
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becoming more elastic and a decrease in the value shows the elasticity is becoming more 
inelastic.  
 These elasticities are very important for understanding and interpreting the lending 
patterns between the FCS and FSA and CB. They give a numerical value to the sensitivity of 
farmers to changes in both interest rates and land prices; this is not captured in other variables in 
this model. By including these elasticities, we better understand how changes in the interest rates 
and land prices affect where farmers receive loans. For example, if the short-term weighted 
interest elasticity coefficient increases for FCS, this is interpreted as an increase in the elasticity 
of the interest rate (becoming more sensitive) suggests that the FCS would lend more relative to 
CB. Without these elasticities included in our model, we would not be able to explain how 
interest rates affect lending patterns.  
 As shown in Figure 6.1, the short-term weighted interest elasticity varies across the time 
period. This graph depicts the change in elasticity occurring around the farm crisis that is 
described in Chapter II.  
Figure 6.1. Short Term Weighted Elasticities (from 1945-2013) for the corn-belt states 
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In the years leading up to 1979, there is a decrease in the elasticity of interest rates. In other 
words, during this time period, farmers were the least sensitive to the interest rates on short term 
operating credit. However, following the beginning of the farm crisis in 1980, interest elasticities 
for short term credit become more elastic. In recent years the elasticities are becoming more 
stable than in the past. 
 Figure 6.2 shows the long term weighted interest elasticities for agriculture in the corn-
belt states.   
Figure 6.2. Long Term Weighted Elasticities (from 1945-2013) for the corn-belt states 
 
Even though theory dictates that as the debt to asset ratio increases, the demand for credit 
becomes more elastic, Figure 6.2 shows that the actual change in elasticity is very small, going 
from approximately -0.97 to approximately-0.90 at the height of the financial crisis in 1982.  The 
distinct portion of this graph is evident shortly after the farm crisis occurred. Around 1980, 
farmers were the least sensitive to the long term interest rates, however, immediately following 
the farm crisis was an increase in elasticity. As with short-term lending, there has been much less 
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 The third elasticity included in this study is for the weighted land expense. It is shown in 
Figure 6.3: 
Figure 6.3. Land Weighted Elasticities (from 1945-2013) for the corn-belt states 
 
In this graph, the land price elasticity varies slightly from -0.75 to -0.9. Again, the most inelastic 
portion occurs in the years leading up to the farm crisis, and the most elastic values occur in the 
years following the farm crisis.  
 
6.3 Farm Credit Effectiveness 
The results from the reduced form Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) SUR regression are presented 
in this chapter. Each time period incorporates the variables described in Table 4.1 from Chapter 
VI. Each regression uses SUR to compare the relative lending of the FCS and FSA to CB for 
both real estate and non-real estate lending. 
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6.3.A The entire period 
Table 6.1 shows the results of the regression for 1939-2013 including the dummies for the war 
and farm crisis years.  
 
Table 6.1: Regression results for 1939-2013 
  Dependent Variables 
 
Debt in real 
estate FCS 
Debt in real 
estate FSA 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FCS 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FSA 
Independent 
Variables 
      
1939-1945 -10.20 -23.39* -5.004 -30.82*** 
 (8.463) (13.33) (7.795) (11.06) 
1970-1987 -5.472* 0.0943 3.626 -4.420 
 (3.227) (5.084) (2.972) (4.218) 
Farm Income 3.87E-05 0.00023 -6.24E-05 -3.00E-06 
 
-0.000113 -0.000177 -0.000104 -0.000147 
GDP -0.718 0.45 0.174 0.164 
 
-0.813 -1.28 -0.749 -1.062 
Interest -1.337*** -1.11 -0.0962 0.816 
 
-0.491 -0.773 -0.452 -0.642 
Population -0.00117* -0.00300*** 6.90E-05 -1.14E-05 
 
-0.000611 -0.000963 -0.000563 -0.000799 
Failures -0.000243 -0.00985*** 0.00385** 0.00254 
 
-0.00176 -0.00277 -0.00162 -0.0023 
Number of Farms 0.00933 0.0293*** 0.00016 0.000454 
 
-0.0057 -0.00898 -0.00525 -0.00745 
ST interest 
elasticity 14.62 -16.08 1.525 30.05** 
 
-10.25 -16.15 -9.439 -13.4 
LT interest 
elasticity -739.8*** -1,256*** -53.67 211.2 
 
-137.6 -216.7 -126.7 -179.8 
Land elasticity 29.62 -228.4*** -4.138 -158.0** 
 
-51.96 -81.87 -47.86 -67.92 
Constant 660.3*** 1,349*** 46.7 -100.5 
 
-138.2 -217.7 -127.3 -180.6 
     Observations 73 73 73 73 
R-squared 0.54 0.519 0.319 0.202 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In this table, it shows that farm income is not a significant variable for either FCS or FSA 
lending, however the number of farm population is significant. When the number of famers 
increases by 1000 in a time period, we see a decrease in the relative lending for the FCS against 
the CB in real estate loans. The treasury yield is also significant in this section for FCS real 
estate lending at the 1% level. The negative coefficient attached to this variable suggest that 
when treasury yields increase, the CB system lends more in real estate loans relative to the FCS. 
The negative coefficient for the treasury yield is intuitive as the FCS is funded by bonds, which 
as treasury yields increase, would make the price of lending for FCS more expensive. For this 
time period, the long-term elasticities for interest are also significant for FCS and FSA real estate 
lending. When the long-term interest elasticity increases, we see a large decrease in FCS and 
FSA lending in real estate relative to the CB system. In this regression, the short-term interest 
elasticity has a less prominent effect on the relative lending. For FSA in non-real estate lending, 
the long term elasticity is positively significant at the 5% level, which suggests that when the 
long term interest becomes more elastic, FSA is lending relatively more.  
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6.3.B Before the Crisis: 1939-1969 
Table 6.2 displays the regression results for the years leading up to the farm crisis. 
Table 6.2: Regression results before the farm crisis: 1939-1969 
  Dependent Variables 
 
Debt in real 
estate FCS 
Debt in real 
estate FSA 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FCS 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FSA 
Independent 
Variables 
      
Farm Income 0.00271** -0.00543*** 2.77e-05 -0.00129 
 
(0.00125) (0.00170) (0.00130) (0.00101) 
GDP 28.00*** 4.432 29.29*** 11.56 
 
(9.478) (12.88) (9.819) (7.608) 
Interest 1.929 -5.520 -11.68*** 0.297 
 
(3.518) (4.780) (3.645) (2.824) 
Population -0.000267 -0.00392** -8.94e-05 -0.000307 
 
(0.00117) (0.00159) (0.00121) (0.000938) 
Failures 0.00794 -0.0187** 0.0133* -0.0143*** 
 
(0.00686) (0.00932) (0.00711) (0.00551) 
Number of Farms 0.0161 0.0544*** 0.0208 0.0121 
 
(0.0134) (0.0182) (0.0139) (0.0108) 
ST interest elasticity 85.64*** -142.9*** -41.46* 6.176 
 
(24.32) (33.05) (25.20) (19.52) 
LT interest elasticity 3,116** -6,162*** -2,227* -622.3 
 
(1,262) (1,715) (1,307) (1,013) 
Land elasticity 127.6 38.66 51.72 0.661 
 
(92.83) (126.1) (96.17) (74.52) 
Constant -3,425*** 5,984*** 2,011 526.6 
 
(1,259) (1,711) (1,304) (1,011) 
     Observations 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.768 0.771 0.488 0.661 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
In this table, the coefficient on Farm Income contradicts the hypothesis that the FCS provides 
countercyclical lending. In this time period, the coefficient on farm income suggests that there is 
not countercyclical lending from the FCS and it is positively significant at the 5% level for FCS. 
This suggests that when farm income increases, the FCS increases its lending compared to CB. 
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However, this hypothesis of countercyclical lending that was contradicted by the FCS lending in 
fact holds for the FSA, whose role was a lender of last resort. The coefficient for farm income on 
FSA is negatively significant at the 1% level, which suggests when the farm income increases, 
the FSA lends less in non-real estate relative to the CB. The short term elasticity measure is 1% 
significant for both the FCS and FSA for real estate lending, however, the FCS non-real estate 
lending is also positive in the opposite direction.  The short-term elasticity measure is positive 
for real estate lending, suggesting when the price of interest is becoming more elastic, the FSA 
lends more relative to CB in real estate, however, the more interest becomes elastic, the less the 
FSA lends compared to CB. Table 6.3 also shows that when the interest rates for long term 
lending become more elastic by one, there is a 1% significance to the FCS lending increase 
relative to CB by three thousand percentage points. However, the more elastic long-term interest 
rates becomes, it shows a decrease in the lending from the FSA compared to CB.  
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6.3.C The Farm Crisis: 1970-1987 
The results for the years of the farm credit results are reported in Table 6.3.  
Table 6.3: Regression results for the farm crisis: 1970-1987 
  Dependent Variables 
 
Debt in real 
estate FCS 
Debt in real 
estate FSA 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FCS 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FSA 
Independent 
Variables 
      
Farm Income -0.000394** -0.000213 -0.000392* 0.000747 
 
(0.000191) (0.000370) (0.000208) (0.000672) 
GDP -29.87*** -34.64** -32.63*** -6.390 
 
(7.227) (14.03) (7.877) (25.47) 
Interest -1.233*** -0.0905 0.280 1.967 
 
(0.376) (0.729) (0.409) (1.324) 
Population -0.104 0.283 -0.282*** 0.131 
 
(0.0914) (0.177) (0.0997) (0.322) 
Failures 0.0154*** 0.0170** 0.0155*** 0.0158 
 
(0.00445) (0.00865) (0.00485) (0.0157) 
Number of Farms 0.0627 -0.534* 0.320** -0.141 
 
(0.144) (0.280) (0.157) (0.509) 
ST interest elasticity 390.7 -930.5 1,042*** -539.7 
 
(365.1) (708.8) (398.0) (1,287) 
LT interest elasticity -1,091* 1,207 -1,713*** 1,615 
 
(558.0) (1,083) (608.2) (1,967) 
Land elasticity 31.21 168.1 -22.08 49.29 
 
(91.62) (177.8) (99.85) (322.9) 
Constant 805.6*** 656.5 464.8* -916.1 
 
(225.1) (437.0) (245.3) (793.5) 
     Observations 18 18 18 18 
R-squared 0.952 0.743 0.848 0.408 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
Due to the low number of observations, it must be established that the results need to be treated 
with great caution. In order to be complete in the results, this time period must be included, 
however, making assumption based on these years is ill-advised. When the farm income 
increases in this time period, there is a decrease in the lending of FCS in both real estate and non-
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real estate (5% and 10% respectively). This supports the hypothesis of FCS lending in 
countercyclical business periods.  During the crisis years, we see that the more farm failures that 
occurred, it was significantly associated to an increase in lending from the FCS and the FSA, 
which also supports the countercyclical lending hypothesis. The GDP follows a similar pattern; 
when the GDP is increasing (suggesting economic improvements) the FCS and FSA lend less 
relative to CB in real estate at 1% and 5% significance levels. When there is an increase in the 
short-term interest elasticity for non-real estate, it suggests an increase in FCS lending by over 
1000 percentage points. Another considerable result of this regression is the 1% significance of 
long term interest elasticity. This result suggests that the FCS non-real estate lending decreases 
by more than a thousand percentage points when the long-term interest elasticity increases by 1.  
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6.3.D The years following the farm crisis: 1988-2013 
Finally, Table 6.4 shows the results for the years following the farm credit crisis.  
Table 6.4: Regression Results following the farm crisis 1988-2013 
  Dependent Variables 
 
Debt in real 
estate FCS 
Debt in real 
estate FSA 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FCS 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FSA 
Independent 
Variables 
      
Farm Income 1.17e-05 2.01e-05 -4.27e-05 -0.000142* 
 
(0.000131) (0.000191) (8.89e-05) (7.82e-05) 
GDP -6.418** -2.644 2.180 1.098 
 
(3.047) (4.463) (2.072) (1.824) 
Interest -0.193 -0.0447 -1.294** 0.558 
 
(0.912) (1.335) (0.620) (0.546) 
Population 0.0641 0.0746 -0.0342 -0.0267 
 
(0.0529) (0.0774) (0.0360) (0.0317) 
Failures 0.0122** 0.00722 -0.00168 -0.00158 
 
(0.00567) (0.00830) (0.00385) (0.00339) 
Number of Farms 0.0760 0.0206 -0.0423 -0.0236 
 
(0.0539) (0.0790) (0.0367) (0.0323) 
ST interest elasticity -360.2 -18.39 31.34 741.9*** 
 
(365.6) (535.4) (248.6) (218.8) 
LT interest elasticity 1,510* 728.4 -666.7 -933.2* 
 
(835.6) (1,224) (568.2) (500.2) 
Land elasticity -6.595 -353.8 -21.67 -264.1** 
 
(195.6) (286.5) (133.0) (117.1) 
Constant -1,228* -465.6 725.6 450.3 
 
(667.7) (977.9) (454.1) (399.7) 
     Observations 25 25 25 25 
R-squared 0.423 0.361 0.277 0.570 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
In these results we do not find evidence of a countercyclical role for FCS or FSA, but the general 
trend during this entire period shows both increasing farm income and steady treasury yield 
rates. Due to the consistency of the past years it is unclear if this is an appropriate period to test 
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the hypothesis for FCS lending counter cyclically.  There is only weak evidence to suggest that 
the FCS has a countercyclical lending role. 
As the coefficient on short-term non-real estate lending for FSA suggests (at 1% significance), 
when farmers become more sensitive to interest expenses, they move towards FSA lending and 
away from CB, which suggests countercyclical lending. In these results, the land elasticity also 
has a 5% significance in non-real estate lending for FSA. This suggests that when land price 
elasticity increases by 1 (becoming more elastic) the FSA decreases its lending by 264 
percentage points relative to CB.  
 
6.4 Alternative Measures and Robustness Checks 
In order to test alternative relationships and possible contradictions we also ran a number of 
additional regressions with a similar independent variable structure but with alternative 
dependent variables. These dependent variables included: the absolute value of lending, the share 
of lending, and the change in lending from the previous time period for each of the entities. As in 
the changes in relative lending regressions, the estimates are broken into sections to reflect the 
time period. The regressions that show the value of lending for 1939-2013, 1939-1969, 1970-
1987, and 1988-203 can be found in Appendices N.1, N.2, N.3, and N.4, respectively. The 
regression estimates for the share of lending for the same time periods can be found in O.1, O.2, 
O.3, and O.4, respectively. Finally, the regression estimates for the change of lending between 
years are also broken into the previous time periods and can be found in Appendices P.1, P.2, 
P.3, and P.4, respectively. 
 In each of these robustness checks we found nothing to contradict the story presented in 
this chapter. For example, in Appendix P.2 the changes in relative lending leading up to the farm 
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crisis shows similar results as the changes in relative lending for 1939-1969, shown in Table 
6.3.B. In both results, the short-term interest elasticity is positive and significant at the 1% level 
for real estate loans from the FCS. Another example is shown in Appendix N.4, the absolute 
value of lending for the years after the farm crisis shows similar results to the changes in relative 
lending for 1988-2013, shown in Table 6.5. Specifically, the long-term interest rate is positively 
significant at the 10% level for both results in real estate debt of the FCS. 
   
6.5 Summary  
This chapter examines the results found in the Farm Credit portion of this thesis by aiming to 
achieve objective 3 set out in Chapter 1. As described above, many factors suggest that the Farm 
Credit system is lending countercyclical to the economy. This would support the hypothesis that 
they are meeting their mandate to provide credit for farmers during economic downturns. 
 First, a discussion of the elasticities taken from the Dynamic model described in earlier 
chapters is presented. We explain that the long-term interest elasticities shows how sensitive 
farmers are to the interest rates they will receive on their real estate loans and the short-term 
interest elasticities explain the same relationship with operating credit interest rates. 
 Secondly, the results from the reduce form OLS SUR regression model are presented. 
These results are broken into specific time periods in order to capture the economic changes that 
occurred during the farm crisis, and examine the lending patterns, before, during, and after the 
crisis. The changes in relative lending for the entire period generally suggest that the FCS and 
FSA are lending countercyclically. For example, when the number of farm failures increases, the 
FCS lends more relative to the CB in real estate loans. The elasticities from the Dynamic model 
are also shown to be significant, particularly, when the short-term interest elasticity becomes 
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more elastic, the CB lends more relatively. The results from the changes in relative lending in the 
years leading up to the crisis show similar patterns. The short-term interest rate elasticity 
displays the same effect as described above, and when the long-term elasticities become more 
elastic, the FCS increases their lending relative to the CB. The years of the farm credit crisis and 
the years following the crisis need to be interpreted with caution as described in the sections. The 
changes in relative lending for the crisis years, need to be taken with caution due to the low 
number of observations. Similarly, in the years following the crisis, the changes in relative 
lending do not show the same significance as the entire time period nor the years leading up to 
the crisis, perhaps due to the stability of the market and consistently low interest rates.  
 Generally, in each time period we see evidence of countercyclical lending by the FCS 
and the FSA compared to the CB, which is what we aimed to achieve in Objective 3.   
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
This study aimed to estimate the demand for credit and its relationships with other inputs as well 
as estimating the effectiveness of the Farm Credit System in the US. In order to estimate the 
demand for credit, a dual cost function approach was used to estimate its relationships with 
agricultural inputs. Our estimates for the three models, Static model, Partial Static model, and 
Dynamic model, are based on pooled data from five US corn-belt states; Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Missouri, and Ohio. These estimates were then used to calculate both the price and Allen-
elasticities of substitution for each input in each model. To analyze the effectiveness and success 
of the Farm Credit System, we created an econometric specification that incorporated both 
macro-economic indicative variables, but three of the elasticities from the Dynamic model 
described earlier. 
 This chapter will summarize and conclude this study and is organized as follows. Firstly, 
the motivation for this study and its objectives will be presented. Second, a summarized 
description of the findings of this thesis will be presented. This will be followed by the 
suggestions for future research and the contributions of this research to the field of agricultural 
economics. 
 
7.2 Motivation for study 
Despite being an essential portion of the production process, credit is generally left out of 
production functions. The interest rates are a nontrivial portion of the costs to farmers, but little 
literature is available which discusses their impacts in production functions for agriculture. As 
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farm debt levels rose in the years leading up to the farm credit crisis and the interest rates 
increasing into the 1980’s, credit became one of the more dominant input costs for farmers. Due 
to the increase in technology and movement towards capitalization, credit is an essential input 
for farmers. However, it is not only the cost of credit, but its availability to farmers is also a 
contentious issue in agriculture. Following the backlash from the American Bankers Association, 
the system of Farm Credit developed in the 1930’s, is and always has been, a hot button topic in 
agriculture. There is much debate about the effectiveness and necessity of the FCS in congress, 
as it has not been shown explicitly that it has met the goals and objectives set out in 1934. If 
credit availability and cost is indeed a great concern for farmers, then the effectiveness of the 
FCS and the cost of credit, would change the traditional results of a production function that omit 
credit as an input. 
 Thus this study was driven by the following issues 
1. credit should not be omitted as an input for the production process of agriculture as it is 
an important cost; 
2. the implications of excluding credit in supply/demand analysis; 
3. the availability of credit from the FCS and CB to farmers; and 
4. the usefulness and value the FCS brings to US agriculture. 
 
Hence this thesis aims to resolve this neglect by addressing each of the issues in the objectives 
described below. 
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7.3 Objectives and Findings 
The overall purpose of this thesis is to estimate credit demand elasticities and their relationship 
between Commercial and Farm Credit System lending. We achieve this by following and 
completing the following objectives: 
 
1) Determine and identify the relationship between interest rates and credit demand; 
Findings: The first objective was satisfied by obtaining the estimates for the three models, the 
Static model, the Partial Static model, and the Dynamic model. Firstly, the results for the Static 
model showed the cost share of an input decreases as the price of that input increased, suggesting 
that these inputs had elastic demand for price. Specifically, the long and short term interest had 
elastic demands, which follows objective 2. The results for this model showed significance for 
the average of the states, and even significance for the individual states that are shown in the 
appendices.  
 Secondly, the Partial Static model had slightly less impressive results with both time and 
the intercepts were less statistically significant than the Static model. Feed and crop shares were 
the only inputs showing elastic demand, and interestingly, the coefficient for the short-term 
credit was both positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting as the cost of credit increases 
the demand for credit increases as well. This proposes that credit is an inelastic demand in 
agriculture. 
 Thirdly, the Dynamic model showed less statistical significance in the average of the 
states when compared to the individual states. However, the regression of the average of the 
states showed interesting results. For example, the Dynamic model suggests that when the 
quantity of crop output increases, the cost share for livestock increases as well, which is not what 
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we would expect. This model also suggests that when the quantity of crops increase, there is an 
increase in the cost share for both types of credit, meaning when output is increased it is also 
associated to an increase in the cost of the credit. 
 Finally, the adjustment matrices for the Dynamic model were estimated. The state of 
Iowa had the highest adjustment rate of 87% in each period while the average of the states was 
much lower, averaging about 5%. One of the compelling coefficients in this matrix was the 
positive adjustment between long-term credit and land, as it suggests that there is evidence of 
overcapitalization in the agricultural sector. 
 
2) To develop measures for the interest rate elasticity in a production function from duality 
principles; 
Findings: The second objective was satisfied by obtaining the price and Allen-elasticities of 
substitution for the three models. Generally, across the models the short-term credit is more 
sensitive to the variable inputs, showing a complementary relationship. Similarly, long-term 
credit is generally more sensitive to fixed inputs and also exhibits complementary relationships 
with fixed inputs. As both the long-run and the short-run elasticities are presented for the 
Dynamic model, the short-run elasticities showed stronger statistical significance than the long-
run elasticities, as we expected 
 
3) To investigate the differential roles that the Farm Credit System and Commercial Banking 
sectors have on the supply and demand of agricultural credit in the US; 
Findings: The third and final objective was to investigate the differential roles that the FCS and 
CB sectors have on the supply and demand of US agricultural credit. The changes in relative 
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lending for the entire period generally suggest that the FCS and FSA are lending 
countercyclically. For example, when the number of farm failures increases, the FCS lends more 
relative to the CB in real estate loans. The elasticities from the Dynamic model are also shown to 
be significant, particularly, when the short-term interest elasticity becomes more elastic, the CB 
lends more relatively. The results from the changes in relative lending in the years leading up to 
the crisis show similar patterns. The short-term interest rate elasticity displays the same effect as 
described above, and when the long-term elasticities become more elastic, the FCS increases 
their lending relative to the CB In the years following the crisis, which can be characterized by 
low and stable interest rates, there was weaker evidence suggesting countercyclical lending. 
However, generally in each time period we see some evidence of countercyclical lending by the 
FCS and the FSA compared to the CB, which is what we aimed to achieve. 
 
7.4 Suggestions for future research 
Due to the unique nature of this study, a variety of future research should be conducted on this 
topic to confirm or contradict these findings. For example, similar research might be done in 
other areas of US agriculture outside of the cornbelt, or even in other countries. It would also be 
interesting to examine this research topic using less aggregated data to examine the effects of 
county or even individual level, data. With a larger number of observations, this would likely 
improve the results in terms of confidence. Another interesting application of this study would be 
to examine the availability and cost of credit in developing countries. As the US has policies and 
legal systems in place to protect the world of credit, it would be noteworthy to examine these 
models in areas of the world where credit is much more expensive and risky to obtain. 
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7.5 Contributions of this research  
This study is unique in that it is the first of its kind in almost 20 years. As some research has 
been done in the past to include credit as an input and use a dynamic model, this is the first study 
to examine the cost of credit to farmers are the state level. Our results show that credit is in fact, 
an important input for production, and its cost, interest rate, is not a trivial cost. This study also 
contributes to the related literature by providing an examination of the effectiveness of the FCS. 
Our results suggest that the FCS has been a countercyclical lender in agriculture, particularly in 
times of volatile interest rates. This study, with the intention of examining the effectiveness of 
the FCS, illustrates that although in times of stable and low interest rates the FCS does not show 
strong signs of countercyclical lending, during the more volatile interest rate periods, the FCS 
seemed to perform its role as a countercyclical lender. Perhaps though, one attribute of the FCS 
and FSA that cannot be quantified in a regression table is described by Kanbur, as he states on 
the matter of Laissez Faire, “the important thing for government is not to do things which 
individuals are doing already, and to do them a little better or a little worse; but to do those 
things at present are not done at all” (page 291, cf Kanbur 2015).  
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APPENDICIES 
 
Appendix A.1 Regression Estimates for the Static Model for Illinois  
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables (Cost Shares) 
Feed S-T credit Labor Crop Livestock L-T credit Land Machinery 
Input Price  
       
  
feed -0.0208 
       
 
(0.0173) 
       s-t interest -0.0384*** 0.0432*** 
      
 
(0.00716) (0.00628) 
      
wage -0.111*** 
-
0.0527*** -0.132*** 
     
 
(0.0130) (0.00738) (0.0173) 
     crop -0.0457*** 0.00635 -0.0188 0.131*** 
    
 
(0.0150) (0.00757) (0.0161) (0.0288) 
    livestock 0.0141 0.0123** 0.0271*** -0.0105 0.0594*** 
   
 
(0.0100) (0.00579) (0.00953) (0.0111) (0.0113) 
   l-t interest -0.0230*** 0.00758** -0.00868 -0.00495 -0.0175*** 0.0122*** 
  
 
(0.00613) (0.00346) (0.00591) (0.00690) (0.00508) (0.00415) 
  
land 0.00417 -0.000958 0.0110*** 0.00903** 0.00100 
-
0.00754*** -0.0108* 
 
 
(0.00437) (0.00344) (0.00409) (0.00388) (0.00349) (0.00224) (0.00638) 
 machinery 0.0745*** 0.0715*** 0.0932*** -0.0828*** 0.0131 0.0330*** 0.000269 0.0264 
 
(0.0131) (0.00758) (0.0129) (0.0179) (0.0101) (0.00643) (0.00488) (0.0185) 
         Output Quantity 
       crops 0.00365 -0.00199 0.0102* 0.0144*** -0.00406 0.00103 -0.00912 -0.00419 
 (0.00607) (0.00512) (0.00596) (0.00535) (0.00487) (0.00321) (0.00957) (0.00692) 
livestock -0.0230 0.0448*** -0.0532*** -0.00155 0.00293 0.0170* -0.00288 0.0399** 
 
(0.0173) (0.0142) (0.0168) (0.0155) (0.0140) (0.00950) (0.0261) (0.0197) 
Time 
-
0.00404*** 0.000260 
-
0.00435*** 0.00377*** 
-
0.00169*** 0.000465* 0.00122* 2.25e-05 
 
(0.000516) (0.000396) (0.000538) (0.000558) (0.000405) (0.000263) (0.000720) (0.000575) 
Intercept 8.476*** -1.119 9.352*** -7.474*** 3.475*** -1.162** -2.004* -0.454 
 
(0.915) (0.688) (0.971) (1.030) (0.716) (0.460) (1.218) (1.012) 
        
  
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 
R-squared 0.915 0.458 0.867 0.963 0.931 0.886 0.107 0.847 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A.2 Regression Estimates for the Static Model for Indiana  
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables (Cost Shares) 
Feed S-T credit Labor Crop Livestock L-T credit Land Machinery 
Input Price  
        feed 0.0197 
       
 
(0.0179) 
       s-t interest -0.0357*** 0.0401*** 
      
 
(0.00771) (0.00734) 
      
wage -0.0725*** 
-
0.0397*** -0.187*** 
     
 
(0.0154) (0.00996) (0.0249) 
     crop -0.00881 0.00729 0.00164 0.0867*** 
    
 
(0.0135) (0.00771) (0.0173) (0.0260) 
    livestock -0.0152* -0.00618 -0.0131 -0.00527 0.0259*** 
   
 
(0.00894) (0.00507) (0.0106) (0.00928) (0.00906) 
   l-t interest -0.0293*** 0.0187*** -0.0111 -0.0196*** -0.0137*** 0.0225*** 
  
 
(0.00614) (0.00345) (0.00697) (0.00656) (0.00410) (0.00373) 
  
land 0.000726 0.000395 0.0140*** 0.00702* 0.00361 
-
0.00549*** -0.0164*** 
 
 
(0.00465) (0.00371) (0.00480) (0.00362) (0.00272) (0.00201) (0.00541) 
 machinery 0.0631*** 0.0801*** 0.117*** -0.0706*** 0.0239*** 0.0296*** -0.00267 0.0240 
 
(0.0135) (0.00882) (0.0156) (0.0168) (0.00866) (0.00611) (0.00544) (0.0206) 
         Output Quantity 
       crops 0.00769 0.0178 0.0146 0.0573*** -0.0134 -0.00390 -0.0182 0.00585 
 (0.0136) (0.0114) (0.0154) (0.0115) (0.00846) (0.00643) (0.0156) (0.0164) 
livestock 0.00747 0.0119 -0.0424* -0.0450*** 0.0220* 0.0270*** -0.0455* 0.00951 
 
(0.0204) (0.0187) (0.0228) (0.0162) (0.0120) (0.00896) (0.0247) (0.0252) 
Time 
-
0.00370*** -0.00101* 
-
0.00376*** 0.00189*** 
-
0.00151*** 0.000230 0.00361*** -0.000170 
 
(0.000754) (0.000575) (0.000889) (0.000726) (0.000448) (0.000332) (0.000813) (0.000851) 
Intercept 7.373*** 1.561 7.960*** -3.705*** 2.959*** -0.797 -6.073*** 0.243 
 
(1.405) (1.054) (1.667) (1.367) (0.833) (0.614) (1.458) (1.563) 
 
                
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 
R-squared 0.893 0.501 0.840 0.956 0.888 0.904 0.368 0.858 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A.3 Regression Estimates for the Static Model for Iowa 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables (Cost Shares) 
Feed S-T credit Labor Crop Livestock L-T credit Land Machinery 
Input Price  
        feed 0.0552*** 
       
 
(0.0170) 
       
s-t interest 
-
0.0281*** 0.0456*** 
      
 
(0.00768) (0.00696) 
      
wage 
-
0.0890*** 
-
0.0551*** -0.160*** 
     
 
(0.0152) (0.00944) (0.0248) 
     
crop 
-
0.0415*** 0.00404 -0.0499*** 0.101*** 
    
 
(0.0133) (0.00746) (0.0193) (0.0307) 
    livestock 0.0334*** 0.0390*** 0.0431*** -0.0207* 0.121*** 
   
 
(0.0123) (0.00819) (0.0137) (0.0110) (0.0182) 
   
l-t interest 
-
0.0346*** 0.0179*** -0.0188*** 0.00476 0.000697 0.0131*** 
  
 
(0.00514) (0.00322) (0.00634) (0.00661) (0.00539) (0.00308) 
  
land -0.00130 
-
0.0107*** 0.0106** 0.00868*** -0.000362 
-
0.00910*** -0.0107** 
 
 
(0.00530) (0.00380) (0.00497) (0.00335) (0.00612) (0.00215) (0.00485) 
 machinery 0.0482*** 0.0348*** 0.105*** -0.0546*** -0.0663*** 0.0198*** 0.00462 0.0656*** 
 
(0.0127) (0.00768) (0.0153) (0.0179) (0.0121) (0.00515) (0.00448) (0.0177) 
         Output Quantity 
       crops 0.0238* 0.0116 0.0306** 0.0288*** -0.0519*** 0.00361 0.0138 -0.0114 
 (0.0123) (0.00992) (0.0127) (0.00850) (0.0148) (0.00543) (0.0110) (0.0108) 
livestock -0.0398 0.0130 -0.0486** -0.0239 0.0309 0.00895 
-
0.0595*** 0.0755*** 
 
(0.0243) (0.0199) (0.0245) (0.0156) (0.0293) (0.0106) (0.0224) (0.0214) 
Time 
-
0.00188** 0.000913 
-
0.00469*** 0.00158** 0.00279*** 0.000598* 0.00129* 
-
0.00330*** 
 
(0.000815) (0.000598) (0.000941) (0.000803) (0.000887) (0.000356) (0.000697) (0.000753) 
Intercept 4.265*** -2.199** 9.727*** -3.078** -5.143*** -1.367** -1.655 5.677*** 
 
(1.461) (1.061) (1.718) (1.499) (1.567) (0.636) (1.225) (1.355) 
 
                
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 
R-squared 0.827 0.615 0.854 0.954 0.812 0.827 0.240 0.836 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A.4 Regression Estimates for the Static Model for Missouri 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables (Cost Shares) 
Feed S-T credit Labor Crop Livestock L-T credit Land Machinery 
Input Price  
        feed 0.0356 
       
 
(0.0233) 
       s-t interest -0.0162* 0.0432*** 
      
 
(0.00913) (0.00738) 
      wage -0.0660*** -0.0297*** -0.127*** 
     
 
(0.0154) (0.00837) (0.0200) 
     
crop 0.0153 0.0163** 
-
0.0661*** 0.132*** 
    
 
(0.0133) (0.00726) (0.0145) (0.0242) 
    livestock -0.0116 0.00408 -0.00577 0.00163 0.0777*** 
   
 
(0.0100) (0.00531) (0.00889) (0.00842) (0.00802) 
   
l-t interest -0.0118* 0.0254*** 
-
0.0182*** 0.00462 
-
0.0171*** 0.0166*** 
  
 
(0.00668) (0.00353) (0.00587) (0.00537) (0.00379) (0.00338) 
  
land -0.000922 
-
0.00912*** 0.0213*** -0.00289 0.0144*** 
-
0.0112*** 
-
0.0201*** 
 
 
(0.00549) (0.00297) (0.00391) (0.00319) (0.00261) (0.00207) (0.00307) 
 
machinery 0.0375** 0.0400*** 0.0862*** -0.104*** 0.00348 0.0349*** 
-
0.00990** 0.0567*** 
 
(0.0162) (0.00885) (0.0137) (0.0152) (0.00918) (0.00559) (0.00467) (0.0198) 
         Output Quantity 
       crops 0.0658 0.0188 0.0508 -0.0159 -0.0426* 0.0447** -0.0324 -0.134*** 
 (0.0452) (0.0283) (0.0366) (0.0271) (0.0233) (0.0193) (0.0297) (0.0446) 
livestock 0.153* -0.0681 -0.210*** 0.0300 -0.185*** -0.0632* 0.348*** 0.104 
 
(0.0853) (0.0593) (0.0679) (0.0528) (0.0456) (0.0353) (0.0520) (0.0871) 
Time 
-
0.00501*** 0.00195* 
-
0.00256** 0.00446*** 0.00149* 0.00141** 
-
0.00190** 0.00130 
 
(0.00148) (0.00103) (0.00124) (0.000968) (0.000797) (0.000638) (0.000956) (0.00155) 
Intercept 9.222*** -3.687** 5.897*** -8.797*** -1.885 -2.706** 2.563 -2.302 
 
(2.531) (1.769) (2.151) (1.682) (1.366) (1.091) (1.631) (2.656) 
 
                
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 
R-squared 0.754 0.723 0.880 0.921 0.906 0.876 0.614 0.739 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A.5 Regression Estimates for the Static Model for Ohio 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables (Cost Shares) 
Feed S-T credit Labor Crop Livestock L-T credit Land Machinery 
Input Price  
        feed 0.0333** 
       
 
(0.0137) 
       s-t interest -0.0520*** 0.0369*** 
      
 
(0.00624) (0.00781) 
      
wage -0.0547*** 
-
0.0455*** -0.126*** 
     
 
(0.0118) (0.00860) (0.0187) 
     crop -0.0412*** 0.0273*** -0.0179 0.166*** 
    
 
(0.0150) (0.00797) (0.0168) (0.0323) 
    livestock -0.0193** 0.000735 -0.0505*** -0.0108 0.0167* 
   
 
(0.00824) (0.00508) (0.00926) (0.0111) (0.00969) 
   
l-t interest -0.0249*** 0.0122*** -0.00269 
-
0.0198*** -0.00176 0.0176*** 
  
 
(0.00523) (0.00312) (0.00588) (0.00744) (0.00406) (0.00359) 
  
land 0.00789** -0.00323 0.0152*** 0.00316 -0.00103 
-
0.00487*** -0.0132*** 
 
 
(0.00310) (0.00330) (0.00407) (0.00326) (0.00245) (0.00145) (0.00394) 
 machinery 0.0802*** 0.0716*** 0.130*** -0.106*** 0.0289*** 0.0146** -0.00862* 0.0423* 
 
(0.0127) (0.00999) (0.0154) (0.0196) (0.0103) (0.00613) (0.00523) (0.0252) 
         Output Quantity 
       crops -0.0320*** 0.0296** -0.0310** 0.0616*** -0.00979 -0.000156 0.0275** 0.0349* 
 (0.0112) (0.0120) (0.0152) (0.0124) (0.00904) (0.00565) (0.0138) (0.0189) 
livestock 0.0543*** -0.0243 -0.00757 -0.0227 -0.0319** 0.0177** -0.0767*** 0.00171 
 
(0.0188) (0.0228) (0.0270) (0.0193) (0.0149) (0.00848) (0.0237) (0.0338) 
Time 
-
0.00358*** -0.000490 
-
0.00312*** 0.00162** 3.09e-05 2.28e-05 0.00218*** -0.000846 
 
(0.000534) (0.000551) (0.000739) (0.000682) (0.000409) (0.000255) (0.000648) (0.000891) 
Intercept 7.029*** 0.889 6.856*** -3.555*** 0.572 -0.302 -3.491*** 1.369 
 
(0.977) (0.977) (1.347) (1.265) (0.744) (0.466) (1.156) (1.603) 
 
                
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 
R-squared 0.923 0.259 0.799 0.914 0.846 0.885 0.497 0.793 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix B.1 Regression Estimates for the Partial Static Model for Illinois 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables (Cost Shares) 
Feed S-T credit Labor Crop 
Input Price  
    feed -0.0170 -0.000529 0.00818 0.107*** 
 
(0.0210) (0.00831) (0.0221) (0.0220) 
s-t interest -0.000529 0.0241*** -0.00877 0.0368*** 
 
(0.00831) (0.00624) (0.0120) (0.0124) 
wage 0.00818 -0.00877 -0.0235 0.108*** 
 
(0.0221) (0.0120) (0.0432) (0.0322) 
crop 0.107*** 0.0368*** 0.108*** -0.219*** 
 
(0.0220) (0.0124) (0.0322) (0.0494) 
other -0.152*** -0.0343** -0.0828* -0.278*** 
 
(0.0347) (0.0167) (0.0490) (0.0411) 
Quasi-Fixed 
    livestock 0.0533*** -0.00392 0.0113 -0.0130 
 
(0.0166) (0.00816) (0.0247) (0.0188) 
l-t interest -0.0148 0.0183*** -0.0306* 0.0496*** 
 
(0.0113) (0.00554) (0.0170) (0.0132) 
land -0.00105 -0.00470** -0.0170*** 0.00889* 
 
(0.00437) (0.00208) (0.00626) (0.00490) 
machinery -0.0260 -0.0154 -0.0367 0.132*** 
 
(0.0196) (0.00996) (0.0281) (0.0300) 
     Output Quantity 
   crops -0.00415 -0.00337 -0.00334 -0.000277 
 (0.00576) (0.00281) (0.00861) (0.00657) 
livestock 0.0241 0.0186** 0.0642** 0.0581*** 
 
(0.0185) (0.00907) (0.0276) (0.0209) 
Time -0.000298 0.000964*** 0.00387*** -0.00103 
 
(0.000748) (0.000374) (0.00126) (0.00106) 
Intercept 0.580 -2.203*** -7.931*** 1.560 
 
(1.420) (0.714) (2.419) (2.041) 
     Observations 62 62 62 62 
R-squared 0.915 0.871 0.341 0.876 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Appendix B.2 Regression Estimates for the Partial Static Model for Indiana 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables (Cost Shares) 
Feed S-T credit Labor Crop 
Input Price  
    feed -0.00822 -0.00601 -0.0510*** 0.0538*** 
 
(0.0166) (0.00684) (0.0169) (0.0206) 
s-t interest -0.00601 0.0282*** 0.00571 0.0237* 
 
(0.00684) (0.00558) (0.0104) (0.0124) 
wage -0.0510*** 0.00571 0.0396 0.175*** 
 
(0.0169) (0.0104) (0.0332) (0.0315) 
crop 0.0538*** 0.0237* 0.175*** -0.259*** 
 
(0.0206) (0.0124) (0.0315) (0.0501) 
other 0.000895 -0.0310** -0.186*** -0.342*** 
 
(0.0252) (0.0138) (0.0361) (0.0389) 
Quasi-Fixed 
   livestock 0.0167 0.00227 0.0608*** -0.00350 
 
(0.0119) (0.00672) (0.0179) (0.0180) 
l-t interest 0.000771 0.0268*** -0.0132 0.0200 
 
(0.00912) (0.00492) (0.0138) (0.0142) 
land 0.000321 -0.00455** -0.0186*** 0.0142*** 
 
(0.00340) (0.00186) (0.00492) (0.00512) 
machinery -0.0126 -0.0189** -0.0790*** 0.172*** 
 
(0.0158) (0.00931) (0.0235) (0.0313) 
     Output Quantity 
   crops -0.0302*** -0.00117 0.00422 0.0362** 
 (0.0114) (0.00632) (0.0171) (0.0176) 
livestock 0.0215 -0.00196 0.0136 0.121*** 
 
(0.0176) (0.00994) (0.0270) (0.0267) 
Time 0.000362 0.000453 0.00450*** -0.00407*** 
 
(0.000754) (0.000424) (0.00124) (0.00135) 
Intercept -0.523 -1.023 -8.718*** 6.641** 
 
(1.429) (0.811) (2.390) (2.585) 
     Observations 62 62 62 62 
R-squared 0.871 0.913 0.659 0.910 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix B.3 Regression Estimates for the Partial Static Model for Iowa 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables (Cost Shares) 
Feed S-T credit Labor Crop 
Input Price  
    feed 0.0336 -0.000552 -0.0758*** 0.0760*** 
 
(0.0221) (0.00832) (0.0197) (0.0189) 
s-t interest -0.000552 0.0451*** 0.00179 0.00725 
 
(0.00832) (0.00641) (0.0112) (0.0118) 
wage -0.0758*** 0.00179 0.0301 0.192*** 
 
(0.0197) (0.0112) (0.0311) (0.0265) 
crop 0.0760*** 0.00725 0.192*** -0.250*** 
 
(0.0189) (0.0118) (0.0265) (0.0437) 
other -0.343*** -0.00799 -0.0418 -0.150*** 
 
(0.0355) (0.0169) (0.0381) (0.0341) 
Quasi-Fixed 
    livestock 0.111*** -0.00272 0.0486** -0.0902*** 
 
(0.0186) (0.00950) (0.0213) (0.0168) 
l-t interest 0.0433*** 0.0204*** -0.0141 -0.0102 
 
(0.0124) (0.00601) (0.0141) (0.0116) 
land -0.00437 -0.00668** -0.0182*** 0.0133*** 
 
(0.00546) (0.00265) (0.00607) (0.00511) 
machinery -0.0325* -0.00798 -0.0996*** 0.193*** 
 
(0.0196) (0.0106) (0.0236) (0.0268) 
     Output Quantity 
   crops -0.0546*** -0.00395 0.0184 0.0140 
 (0.0111) (0.00556) (0.0128) (0.0108) 
livestock 0.117*** 0.00551 -0.0784*** 0.102*** 
 
(0.0238) (0.0120) (0.0271) (0.0212) 
Time 0.00649*** 0.000273 0.00241* -0.00788*** 
 
(0.00104) (0.000516) (0.00128) (0.00122) 
Intercept -13.05*** -0.809 -3.730 14.17*** 
 
(1.889) (0.947) (2.359) (2.294) 
     Observations 62 62 62 62 
R-squared 0.931 0.890 0.323 0.899 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Appendix B.4 Regression Estimates for the Partial Static Model for Missouri 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables (Cost Shares) 
Feed S-T credit Labor Crop 
Input Price  
    feed -0.0316** 0.0111* 0.00438 0.114*** 
 
(0.0141) (0.00662) (0.0134) (0.0214) 
s-t interest 0.0111* 0.0422*** 0.0183*** 0.0264** 
 
(0.00662) (0.00517) (0.00674) (0.0111) 
wage -0.0167 0.0183*** -0.0409** 0.128*** 
 
(0.0180) (0.00674) (0.0168) (0.0204) 
crop 0.114*** 0.0264** 0.128*** -0.299*** 
 
(0.0214) (0.0111) (0.0204) (0.0465) 
other -0.125*** -0.0334** -0.153*** -0.223*** 
 
(0.0216) (0.0154) (0.0241) (0.0421) 
Quasi-Fixed 
    livestock 0.0950*** 0.00115 0.0267** -0.0450** 
 
(0.00963) (0.00712) (0.0107) (0.0188) 
l-t interest -0.0281*** 0.0160*** 0.00672 0.0575*** 
 
(0.00724) (0.00522) (0.00799) (0.0134) 
land 0.00420 -0.0104*** -0.0206*** 0.000817 
 
(0.00270) (0.00192) (0.00303) (0.00517) 
machinery -0.0191 -0.0151 -0.0717*** 0.155*** 
 
(0.0153) (0.00944) (0.0154) (0.0305) 
     Output Quantity 
   crops -0.00840 0.0102 0.0586** -0.0540 
 (0.0239) (0.0173) (0.0265) (0.0457) 
livestock -0.0910 0.0730* -0.0931 -0.316*** 
 
(0.0633) (0.0440) (0.0696) (0.118) 
Time 0.000835 -0.000915 0.00720*** 0.00580*** 
 
(0.00131) (0.000816) (0.00137) (0.00220) 
Intercept -1.124 1.197 -13.60*** -9.447** 
 
(2.292) (1.407) (2.372) (3.790) 
     Observations 62 62 62 62 
R-squared 0.940 0.904 0.830 0.862 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Appendix B.5 Regression Estimates for the Partial Static Model for Ohio 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables (Cost Shares) 
Feed S-T credit Labor Crop 
Input Price  
    feed 0.0198 0.000331 -0.112*** 0.0434* 
 
(0.0154) (0.00615) (0.0144) (0.0243) 
s-t interest 0.000331 0.0323*** -0.00623 0.0407*** 
 
(0.00615) (0.00491) (0.00888) (0.0130) 
wage -0.112*** -0.00623 0.0111 0.208*** 
 
(0.0144) (0.00888) (0.0287) (0.0304) 
crop 0.0434* 0.0407*** 0.208*** -0.373*** 
 
(0.0243) (0.0130) (0.0304) (0.0640) 
other 0.0255 -0.0349*** -0.121*** -0.284*** 
 
(0.0218) (0.0132) (0.0356) (0.0460) 
Quasi-Fixed 
    livestock 0.0178 0.00671 0.0326* -0.00746 
 
(0.0109) (0.00689) (0.0189) (0.0228) 
l-t interest 0.0235*** 0.0254*** -0.0164 -0.0128 
 
(0.00754) (0.00461) (0.0126) (0.0155) 
land -0.00814** -0.00693*** -0.0221*** 0.0211*** 
 
(0.00357) (0.00222) (0.00599) (0.00746) 
machinery -0.0107 -0.0292*** -0.0892*** 0.206*** 
 
(0.0162) (0.00929) (0.0235) (0.0390) 
     Output Quantity 
   crops -0.0342*** -0.00309 0.0745*** 0.0846*** 
 (0.0106) (0.00637) (0.0174) (0.0213) 
livestock -0.0418** -0.0105 -0.0216 0.183*** 
 
(0.0186) (0.0118) (0.0329) (0.0391) 
Time 0.00281*** 0.00112*** 0.00330*** -0.00745*** 
 
(0.000551) (0.000333) (0.000914) (0.00127) 
Intercept -4.525*** -2.198*** -6.608*** 11.96*** 
 
(1.041) (0.629) (1.761) (2.384) 
     Observations 62 62 62 62 
R-squared 0.886 0.878 0.647 0.878 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Appendix C.1 Regression Estimates for Dynamic Model for Illinois 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables (Cost Shares) 
Feed S-T credit Labor Crop Livestock L-T credit Land Machinery 
Input Price  
        feed 0.0337 
       
 
(0.0310) 
       s-t interest -0.0785 -0.0785 
      
 
(0.0483) (0.0483) 
      wage 0.958*** 0.0348 -0.0330 
     
 
(0.0157) (0.0590) (0.0260) 
     crop -0.346*** -0.0609 0.256*** 0.154** 
    
 
(0.0653) (0.0409) (0.0639) (0.0598) 
    livestock -0.0884 0.00622 0.0239 -0.111* 0.325*** 
   
 
(0.0546) (0.0353) (0.0516) (0.0675) (0.0744) 
   l-t interest 0.0522 0.279*** -0.0411 -0.0158 -0.0367 -0.00575 
  
 
(0.0325) (0.0733) (0.0375) (0.0324) (0.0254) (0.0195) 
  land -0.102** 0.00208 0.0544 -0.153*** 0.0787* -0.0183 0.454*** 
 
 
(0.0440) (0.0227) (0.0382) (0.0493) (0.0437) (0.0174) (0.0862) 
 machinery 0.106*** 0.0467*** -0.111*** 0.0670** 0.0336 -0.0455*** -0.0117 0.154*** 
 
(0.0297) (0.0169) (0.0288) (0.0298) (0.0265) (0.0103) (0.0464) (0.0459) 
         
         Output Quantity 
       crops 0.0166* 0.00395 -0.0171** -0.00496 0.00444 -0.00859** 0.0212 -0.0135 
 (0.00935) (0.00439) (0.00783) (0.0101) (0.00887) (0.00377) (0.0186) (0.0156) 
livestock 0.00145 0.000797 -0.00193 0.00760* -0.00226 0.00211 -0.00268 0.00671 
 
(0.00353) (0.00153) (0.00292) (0.00391) (0.00329) (0.00129) (0.00754) (0.00627) 
Time -0.000262 -0.000141* 0.000181 0.000426 0.000149 -0.000125* 0.000820** -0.000380 
 
(0.000182) (8.12e-05) (0.000149) (0.000355) (0.000168) (6.89e-05) (0.000372) (0.000295) 
Intercept 0.266 0.224 -0.0995 -0.870 -0.308 0.329** -1.826*** 0.875 
 
(0.365) (0.173) (0.304) (0.715) (0.337) (0.147) (0.700) (0.543) 
 
                
Observations 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
R-squared 0.874 0.080 0.852 0.306 0.397 0.474 0.323 0.235 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix C.2 Regression Estimates for Dynamic Model for Indiana 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables (Cost Shares) 
Feed S-T credit Labor Crop Livestock L-T credit Land Machinery 
Input Price  
        feed 0.0625 
       
 
(0.0760) 
       s-t interest -0.0823** -0.0823** 
      
 
(0.0359) (0.0359) 
      wage 0.730*** -0.0423 -0.0171 
     
 
(0.0504) (0.0331) (0.0939) 
     crop -0.190*** 0.00438 -0.0856 0.343*** 
    
 
(0.0709) (0.0426) (0.0687) (0.0664) 
    livestock -0.0854 0.0523 0.216*** -0.0399 0.481*** 
   
 
(0.0648) (0.0466) (0.0613) (0.0676) (0.0912) 
   l-t interest 0.205*** 0.622*** -0.0833** 0.113*** 0.0507 -0.0358 
  
 
(0.0396) (0.0870) (0.0378) (0.0389) (0.0403) (0.0358) 
  land -0.126** -0.00896 -0.113* -0.223*** 0.0695* 0.0486* 0.326*** 
 
 
(0.0562) (0.0216) (0.0667) (0.0464) (0.0404) (0.0254) (0.0772) 
 machinery 0.0168 0.0656*** -0.0435 0.00222 -0.0275 -0.0340** -0.0580 0.203*** 
 
(0.0341) (0.0177) (0.0545) (0.0266) (0.0199) (0.0133) (0.0368) (0.0409) 
         
         Output Quantity 
       crops 0.0586*** 0.00201 -0.0324* -0.0186 0.00985 -0.0136** -0.00194 -0.0273 
 (0.0152) (0.00494) (0.0173) (0.0123) (0.00959) (0.00643) (0.0191) (0.0199) 
livestock -0.0104 0.000326 0.00706 0.0303*** -0.00383 0.00301 -0.00394 0.0153 
 
(0.00984) (0.00344) (0.0117) (0.00780) (0.00581) (0.00410) (0.0117) (0.0126) 
Time -0.000719** -8.64e-05 0.000135 0.000188 0.000161 0.000152 0.000840** -0.000635 
 
(0.000353) (0.000109) (0.000394) (0.000304) (0.000204) (0.000140) (0.000423) (0.000435) 
Intercept 0.747 0.160 0.0674 -0.511 -0.403 -0.155 -1.562** 1.463* 
 
(0.653) (0.186) (0.705) (0.552) (0.355) (0.242) (0.750) (0.782) 
 
                
Observations 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
R-squared 0.700 0.476 0.639 0.505 0.507 0.275 0.385 0.312 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix C.3 Regression Estimates for Dynamic Model for Iowa 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables (Cost Shares) 
Feed S-T credit Labor Crop Livestock L-T credit Land Machinery 
Input Price  
        feed -0.0190 
       
 
(0.0357) 
       s-t interest -0.237*** -0.113 
      
 
(0.0426) (0.0909) 
      wage 0.861*** 0.131*** 0.0947*** 
     
 
(0.0376) (0.0374) (0.0294) 
     crop -0.460*** -0.242*** 0.354*** 0.193*** 
    
 
(0.0705) (0.0555) (0.0633) (0.0549) 
    livestock -0.152** -0.148*** -0.0345 -0.218*** 0.585*** 
   
 
(0.0598) (0.0308) (0.0602) (0.0495) (0.0708) 
   l-t interest 0.168*** 0.156* -0.161*** -0.0186 -0.0558** 0.0729** 
  
 
(0.0373) (0.0818) (0.0315) (0.0446) (0.0277) (0.0315) 
  land -0.244*** -0.0744*** 0.0800 -0.226*** 0.0267 -0.00739 0.0840* 
 
 
(0.0478) (0.0280) (0.0561) (0.0494) (0.0393) (0.0280) (0.0472) 
 machinery 0.124*** 0.0671*** -0.0892* 0.124*** -0.0383 -0.0891*** -0.0395 0.163*** 
 
(0.0422) (0.0245) (0.0465) (0.0321) (0.0388) (0.0196) (0.0370) (0.0544) 
         
         Output Quantity 
       crops 0.0182 0.0127** 0.00750 -0.00458 0.00975 0.00233 -0.00742 -0.0244 
 (0.0156) (0.00617) (0.0174) (0.0111) (0.0161) (0.00711) (0.0173) (0.0200) 
livestock 0.00440 0.00112 -0.0185** 0.0151** -0.0183** -0.000398 0.00740 0.0178* 
 
(0.00863) (0.00337) (0.00938) (0.00632) (0.00888) (0.00384) (0.00911) (0.0107) 
Time -0.000780** -0.000457*** 0.000719* -0.000313 0.000660* 4.08e-05 -0.000101 -0.000767* 
 
(0.000348) (0.000131) (0.000395) (0.000245) (0.000350) (0.000155) (0.000366) (0.000448) 
Intercept 1.193** 0.696*** -1.268* 0.474 -1.182** -0.125 0.205 1.649** 
 
(0.602) (0.223) (0.671) (0.427) (0.598) (0.261) (0.620) (0.759) 
 
                
Observations 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
R-squared 0.655 0.227 0.699 0.435 0.716 -0.134 0.134 0.225 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix C.4 Regression Estimates for Dynamic Model for Missouri 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables (Cost Shares) 
Feed S-T credit Labor Crop Livestock L-T credit Land Machinery 
Input Price  
        feed 0.0778 
       
 
(0.0504) 
       s-t interest -0.0942*** -0.451*** 
      
 
(0.0309) (0.0694) 
      wage 0.743*** -0.0998*** 0.0500 
     
 
(0.0477) (0.0325) (0.0603) 
     crop -0.316*** -0.111* 0.102* 0.234*** 
    
 
(0.0520) (0.0582) (0.0606) (0.0570) 
    livestock 0.0770 0.0491 -0.128** -0.0946 0.583*** 
   
 
(0.0510) (0.0450) (0.0556) (0.0661) (0.0774) 
   l-t interest -0.0171 0.452*** 0.0473** -0.0490 -0.0706*** 0.0214 
  
 
(0.0208) (0.0590) (0.0227) (0.0316) (0.0249) (0.0175) 
  land -0.183*** -0.105*** -0.153** -0.287*** 0.106** -0.0223 0.251*** 
 
 
(0.0587) (0.0354) (0.0625) (0.0598) (0.0518) (0.0233) (0.0715) 
 machinery 0.142*** 0.102*** -0.0355 0.121*** -0.00561 -0.0209* -0.0626* 0.110*** 
 
(0.0395) (0.0233) (0.0432) (0.0296) (0.0282) (0.0119) (0.0367) (0.0427) 
         
         Output Quantity 
       crops -0.0126 0.0143 -0.0527 -0.0325 0.0390 -0.00372 0.0785** -0.140** 
 (0.0586) (0.0182) (0.0583) (0.0314) (0.0296) (0.0125) (0.0386) (0.0653) 
livestock -0.0406 0.0262*** 0.0658** -0.0153 0.000855 0.00768 0.0220 -0.00523 
 
(0.0303) (0.00908) (0.0305) (0.0161) (0.0149) (0.00670) (0.0185) (0.0314) 
Time 0.000612 -0.000616** -0.000576 0.00108** -0.000444 -0.000119 -0.00118* 0.00155 
 
(0.00101) (0.000272) (0.000943) (0.000500) (0.000479) (0.000194) (0.000622) (0.00111) 
Intercept -0.955 1.069** 1.075 -1.906** 0.713 0.214 1.915* -2.421 
 
(1.716) (0.457) (1.591) (0.848) (0.807) (0.327) (1.046) (1.863) 
 
                
Observations 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
R-squared 0.559 0.389 0.511 0.436 0.601 0.590 0.579 0.186 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix C.5 Regression Estimates for Dynamic Model for Ohio 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables (Cost Shares) 
Feed S-T credit Labor Crop Livestock L-T credit Land Machinery 
Input Price  
        feed 0.139*** 
       
 
(0.0470) 
       s-t interest 0.0597 -0.723*** 
      
 
(0.0380) (0.0962) 
      wage 0.635*** -0.145*** -0.0386 
     
 
(0.0507) (0.0383) (0.0864) 
     crop -0.123* 0.0103 -0.310*** 0.203*** 
    
 
(0.0748) (0.0356) (0.0741) (0.0649) 
    livestock -0.0883 0.0532 0.366*** -0.186*** 0.251*** 
   
 
(0.0623) (0.0485) (0.0653) (0.0576) (0.0832) 
   l-t interest 0.155*** 0.689*** 0.0418 0.147*** 0.0541 -0.0621 
  
 
(0.0385) (0.0737) (0.0394) (0.0352) (0.0414) (0.0412) 
  land -0.108** 0.00534 -0.102* -0.149*** -0.0165 0.0521** 0.207*** 
 
 
(0.0505) (0.0191) (0.0583) (0.0535) (0.0342) (0.0219) (0.0664) 
 machinery 0.0201 0.0436*** -0.0130 -0.0231 0.0208 -0.00905 -0.0440 0.181*** 
 
(0.0262) (0.0142) (0.0403) (0.0273) (0.0162) (0.0120) (0.0284) (0.0404) 
         
         Output Quantity 
       crops 0.0635*** -0.00266 -0.0293* 0.0176 0.0135 -0.0123** -0.00266 0.00604 
 (0.0135) (0.00477) (0.0161) (0.0132) (0.00859) (0.00611) (0.0152) (0.0236) 
livestock -0.0191** 0.00268 0.0106 0.00723 -0.00441 0.00290 0.00982 0.00862 
 
(0.00748) (0.00272) (0.00835) (0.00765) (0.00471) (0.00336) (0.00866) (0.0133) 
Time -0.000614** -4.78e-05 0.000150 -4.93e-05 -8.73e-05 0.000117 -4.41e-05 -0.000959** 
 
(0.000263) (9.09e-05) (0.000306) (0.000263) (0.000161) (0.000118) (0.000304) (0.000461) 
Intercept 0.609 0.110 -0.0499 -0.240 0.0504 -0.0981 -0.00853 1.738** 
 
(0.440) (0.142) (0.504) (0.459) (0.266) (0.190) (0.515) (0.778) 
 
                
Observations 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
R-squared 0.767 0.409 0.747 0.538 0.748 0.148 0.315 0.260 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix D.1 Regression Estimates for Dynamic Adjustment Matrix for Illinois 
 
Adjustment Coefficients 
 
Input (i) 
Input (i) Feed S-t Credit Labor Crop Livestock 
L-t 
Credit Land Machinery Other 
Feed 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
S-t Credit 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
Labor 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
Crop 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
Livestock 0 -0.00269 
-
0.633*** -0.129 0.392*** -0.0543 0.265 0.0611 0 
 
 (0.0290) (0.157) (0.0922) (0.0798) (0.0368) (0.194) (0.149)  
L-t Credit 0 0.0152** 
-
0.0815** 0.0380* -0.00216 -0.00494 -0.0452 0.115*** 0 
 
 (0.00665) (0.0360) (0.0212) (0.0183) (0.00845) (0.0445) (0.0342)  
Land 0 0.00839 -0.0633 -0.124*** 0.0350 0.0265** 0.213*** -0.118** 0 
 
 (0.00968) (0.0524) (0.0308) (0.0267) (0.0123) (0.0649) (0.0498)  
Machinery 0 -0.00609 0.0515 0.0685*** -0.0189 
-
0.0212** 
-
0.152*** 0.0965*** 0 
 
 (0.00720) (0.0389) (0.0229) (0.0198) (0.00915) (0.0482) (0.0371)  
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix D.2 Regression Estimates for Dynamic Adjustment Matrix for Indiana 
 
 
Adjustment Coefficients 
 
Input (i) 
Input (i) Feed S-t Credit Labor Crop Livestock 
L-t 
Credit Land Machinery Other 
Feed 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
S-t Credit 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
Labor 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
Crop 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
Livestock 0 -0.00269 
-
0.633*** -0.129 0.392*** -0.0543 0.265 0.0611 0 
 
 
(0.0290) (0.157) (0.0922) (0.0798) (0.0368) (0.194) (0.149)  
L-t Credit 0 0.0152** 
-
0.0815** 0.0380* -0.00216 -0.00494 -0.0452 0.115*** 0 
 
 
(0.00665) (0.0360) (0.0212) (0.0183) (0.00845) (0.0445) (0.0342)  
Land 0 0.00839 -0.0633 -0.124*** 0.0350 0.0265** 0.213*** -0.118** 0 
 
 (0.00968) (0.0524) (0.0308) (0.0267) (0.0123) (0.0649) (0.0498)  
Machinery 0 -0.00609 0.0515 0.0685*** -0.0189 
-
0.0212** 
-
0.152*** 0.0965*** 0 
 
 (0.00720) (0.0389) (0.0229) (0.0198) (0.00915) (0.0482) (0.0371)  
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix D.3 Regression Estimates for Dynamic Adjustment Matrix for Iowa 
 
Adjustment Coefficients 
 
Input (i) 
Input (i) Feed S-t Credit Labor Crop Livestock L-t Credit Land Machinery Other 
Feed 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
S-t Credit 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
Labor 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
Crop 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
Livestock 0 -0.0704*** 
-
0.348*** -0.228*** 0.802*** 
-
0.0646*** 0.0386 -0.152 0 
 
 (0.0237) (0.122) (0.0499) (0.0707) (0.0197) (0.0767) (0.0935)  
L-t Credit 0 0.00537 -0.0309 0.0466*** -0.0239 -0.0112* 
-
0.0450** 0.0619** 0 
 
 (0.00688) (0.0353) (0.0145) (0.0205) (0.00571) (0.0223) (0.0271)  
Land 0 0.0216 -0.0121 -0.106*** 0.0824* 0.0392*** 0.120** -0.140** 0 
 
 (0.0146) (0.0751) (0.0308) (0.0436) (0.0121) (0.0473) (0.0576)  
Machinery 0 -0.00274 0.0136 0.0560** -0.0568* 
-
0.0275*** 
-
0.0749** 0.113** 0 
 
 (0.0115) (0.0592) (0.0243) (0.0344) (0.00957) (0.0373) (0.0455)  
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix D.4 Regression Estimates for Dynamic Adjustment Matrix for Missouri 
 
Adjustment Coefficients 
 
Input (i) 
Input (i) Feed S-t Credit Labor Crop Livestock L-t Credit Land Machinery Other 
Feed 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
S-t Credit 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
Labor 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
Crop 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
Livestock 0 0.0218 -0.248 -0.00465 0.561*** -0.0552 0.0386 -0.0802 0 
 
 (0.0517) (0.207) (0.107) (0.0858) (0.0481) (0.138) (0.207)  
L-t Credit 0 0.0198 0.0105 0.0912** 
-
0.0756*** 0.00208 -0.121** 0.0452 0 
 
 (0.0177) (0.0709) (0.0365) (0.0293) (0.0165) (0.0471) (0.0709)  
Land 0 0.0241 -0.315*** -0.119** 0.140*** -0.00777 0.358*** 0.144 0 
 
 (0.0282) (0.113) (0.0583) (0.0468) (0.0263) (0.0752) (0.113)  
Machinery 0 -0.00785 0.0921*** 0.0225 
-
0.0346*** 0.000130 
-
0.0984*** -0.0360 0 
 
 (0.00779) (0.0312) (0.0161) (0.0129) (0.00724) (0.0207) (0.0312)  
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix D.5 Regression Estimates for Dynamic Adjustment Matrix for Ohio 
 
Adjustment Coefficients 
 
Input (i) 
Input (i) Feed S-t Credit Labor Crop Livestock L-t Credit Land Machinery Other 
Feed 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
S-t Credit 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
Labor 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
Crop 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         
Livestock 0 -0.0753** 1.094*** 
-
0.655*** 0.685*** 0.0243 -0.305** -0.931*** 0 
 
 (0.0337) (0.164) (0.132) (0.0902) (0.0433) (0.138) (0.204)  
L-t Credit 0 0.0343** -0.0467 0.135** 0.0205 -0.00637 -0.126* 0.223** 0 
 
 (0.0159) (0.0773) (0.0624) (0.0425) (0.0204) (0.0649) (0.0960)  
Land 0 -0.00165 -0.0667 -0.134** -0.0149 0.0237 0.193*** -0.0319 0 
 
 (0.0138) (0.0671) (0.0542) (0.0369) (0.0177) (0.0563) (0.0833)  
Machinery 0 -0.000406 0.0225 0.0298* 0.00660 -0.00786 -0.0550*** 0.0138 0 
 
 (0.00417) (0.0203) (0.0164) (0.0112) (0.00537) (0.0170) (0.0252)  
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix E.1Static Model Price Elasticity Estimates for Illinois  
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livestock LT credit Land  Machinery 
Feed -1.13 -1.64 -1.23 -0.35 0.23 -0.22 0.25 1.11 
ST credit -0.41 1.00 -1.18 0.47 0.62 0.39 0.16 3.50 
Labor -1.23 -1.18 -3.99 -0.25 0.69 -0.26 0.45 2.40 
Crop -0.35 0.08 -0.08 0.14 -0.01 0.00 0.27 -0.36 
Livestock 0.53 0.40 0.86 -0.13 0.83 -0.48 0.23 0.64 
LT credit -0.72 0.31 -0.26 0.00 -0.56 -10.77 -0.07 1.44 
Land 0.13 0.03 0.11 0.23 0.07 0.00 -0.86 0.25 
Machinery 0.42 0.34 0.45 -0.17 0.12 0.18 0.20 -0.64 
 
 
Appendix E.2 Static Model Price Elasticity Estimates for Indiana 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livestock LT credit Land  Machinery 
Feed -0.71 -1.66 -0.43 0.12 -0.06 -0.16 0.14 0.69 
ST credit -0.21 1.07 -0.77 0.55 -0.27 0.99 0.15 4.34 
Labor -0.43 -0.77 -4.71 0.21 -0.22 -0.29 0.42 2.62 
Crop 0.12 0.08 0.07 -0.25 0.01 -0.09 0.18 -0.20 
Livestock -0.24 -0.13 -0.28 0.04 -0.27 -0.32 0.23 0.89 
LT credit -0.75 0.62 -0.29 -0.43 -0.38 0.34 -0.04 1.19 
Land 0.17 0.04 0.17 0.23 0.08 0.00 -0.99 0.24 
Machinery 0.41 0.35 0.53 -0.10 0.14 0.16 0.12 -0.64 
 
 
Appendix E.3 Static Model Price Elasticity Estimates for Iowa 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livestock LT credit Land  Machinery 
Feed -0.49 -0.71 -0.49 -0.13 0.34 -0.17 0.15 0.50 
ST credit -0.13 0.48 -1.76 0.25 1.37 0.60 -0.18 1.31 
Labor -0.49 -1.76 -6.18 -1.51 1.55 -0.62 0.51 3.64 
Crop -0.13 0.08 -0.48 0.18 -0.08 0.09 0.25 -0.36 
Livestock 0.46 0.36 0.40 -0.05 0.15 0.04 0.16 -0.34 
LT credit -1.03 0.66 -0.62 0.29 0.16 -13.25 -0.16 0.90 
Land 0.17 -0.03 0.11 0.18 0.14 -0.02 -0.91 0.24 
Machinery 0.42 0.21 0.56 -0.15 -0.19 0.14 0.18 -0.46 
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Appendix E.4 Static Model Price Elasticity Estimates for Missouri 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livestock LT credit Land  Machinery 
Feed -0.61 -0.99 -0.31 0.22 -0.01 -0.02 0.35 0.48 
ST credit -0.05 2.19 -0.58 1.33 0.35 1.90 -0.56 3.19 
Labor -0.31 -0.58 -3.58 -1.23 -0.07 -0.50 0.55 2.07 
Crop 0.22 0.17 -0.47 0.20 0.07 0.08 0.08 -0.56 
Livestock -0.19 0.17 -0.13 0.19 1.59 -0.52 0.58 0.39 
LT credit -0.17 0.82 -0.50 0.28 -0.47 -7.98 -0.24 1.35 
Land 0.18 -0.05 0.28 0.11 0.20 -0.07 -1.10 0.17 
Machinery 0.33 0.19 0.39 -0.25 0.07 0.18 0.07 -0.51 
 
 
Appendix E.5 Static Model Price Elasticity Estimates for Ohio 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livestock LT credit Land  Machinery 
Feed -0.61 -2.49 -0.30 -0.13 -0.10 -0.14 0.17 0.85 
ST credit -0.33 0.90 -0.63 1.55 0.08 0.66 -0.05 3.93 
Labor -0.30 -0.63 -2.75 -0.10 -0.70 -0.01 0.33 2.18 
Crop -0.13 0.22 -0.05 0.32 -0.04 -0.10 0.14 -0.44 
Livestock -0.60 0.06 -1.88 -0.26 -0.31 -0.03 0.07 1.41 
LT credit -0.68 0.44 -0.01 -0.50 -0.02 -8.61 -0.05 0.78 
Land 0.23 0.00 0.22 0.19 0.03 -0.01 -1.01 0.21 
Machinery 0.44 0.29 0.55 -0.22 0.14 0.09 0.08 -0.55 
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Appendix F.1 Static Model Allen Elasticity Estimates of Substitution for Illinois 
  ALLEN ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -13.79 
      
  
ST credit -0.02 654.80 
     
  
Labor -30.67 -39.22 -97.93 
    
  
Crop -2.06 3.99 -1.77 2.97 
   
  
Livestock 7.18 13.74 20.96 -0.50 61.36 
  
  
LT credit -6.61 17.28 -5.31 -0.73 -11.93 -10.77 
 
  
Land 1.25 0.77 2.29 1.34 1.15 -0.37 -4.40   
Machinery 4.69 17.51 9.79 -1.57 2.78 5.84 1.01 -2.72 
 
Appendix F.2 Static Model Allen Elasticity Estimates of Substitution for Indiana 
  ALLEN ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -4.81 
      
  
ST credit -0.01 243.98 
     
  
Labor -9.36 -28.21 -100.88 
    
  
Crop 0.65 4.74 1.20 -0.95 
   
  
Livestock -1.97 -5.17 -6.42 0.23 -4.20 
  
  
LT credit -4.51 40.07 -5.32 -3.78 -8.11 0.34 
 
  
Land 1.04 1.19 3.14 1.39 1.72 -0.39 -7.93   
Machinery 2.72 21.67 10.16 -0.94 3.58 4.63 0.91 -2.60 
 
Appendix F.3 Static Model Allen Elasticity Estimates of Substitution for Iowa 
  ALLEN ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -2.90               
ST credit -0.01 311.21 
     
  
Labor -17.31 -52.58 -215.19 
    
  
Crop -1.39 2.47 -14.69 4.64 
   
  
Livestock 2.79 9.92 13.07 -0.58 2.54 
  
  
LT credit -5.60 25.85 -18.51 3.18 1.18 -13.25 
 
  
Land 0.95 -1.19 3.21 1.58 0.98 -1.03 -5.80   
Machinery 2.44 6.22 17.61 -1.71 -1.83 4.34 1.14 -2.27 
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Appendix F.4 Static Model Allen Elasticity Estimates of Substitution for Missouri 
  ALLEN ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -3.37               
ST credit 0.00 5929.85 
     
  
Labor -6.86 -20.51 -79.19 
    
  
Crop 1.64 16.86 -9.11 2.78 
   
  
Livestock -1.18 5.68 -3.54 1.38 105.62 
  
  
LT credit -0.85 81.49 -9.14 2.33 -11.06 -7.98 
 
  
Land 0.95 -13.95 5.14 0.73 5.60 -2.78 -12.04   
Machinery 1.77 19.39 7.48 -2.32 1.40 5.14 0.57 -1.92 
 
 
Appendix F.5 Static Model Allen Elasticity Estimates of Substitution for Ohio 
  ALLEN ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -4.28               
ST credit -0.01 166.63 
     
  
Labor -4.84 -24.81 -42.17 
    
  
Crop -0.85 14.52 -0.66 3.49 
   
  
Livestock -4.60 2.10 -29.72 -1.43 -4.07 
  
  
LT credit -4.34 26.54 -0.21 -4.07 -0.99 -8.61 
 
  
Land 1.50 -1.19 2.97 1.24 0.66 -0.68 -10.00   
Machinery 2.98 17.77 7.53 -1.83 5.10 2.78 0.68 -2.01 
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Appendix G.1 Partial Static Model Price Elasticity Estimates for Illinois 
 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop 
Feed -1.09 0.08 0.15 1.42 
ST credit 0.03 0.13 -0.34 1.85 
Labor 0.15 -0.34 -1.49 2.67 
Crop -1.57 1.85 0.84 -2.42 
 
 
Appendix G.2 Partial Static Model Price Elasticity Estimates for Indiana 
 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop 
Feed -0.90 -0.15 -0.29 0.55 
ST credit -0.01 0.47 0.35 1.38 
Labor -0.29 0.35 -0.14 3.71 
Crop 0.19 1.38 1.21 -2.53 
 
 
Appendix G.3 Partial Static Model Price Elasticity Estimates for Iowa 
 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop 
Feed -0.62 0.16 -0.41 0.58 
ST credit 0.03 0.46 0.10 0.35 
Labor -0.41 0.10 0.02 6.39 
Crop -1.94 0.35 2.05 -3.49 
 
Appendix G.4 Partial Static Model Price Elasticity Estimates for Missouri 
 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop 
Feed -0.98 1.00 0.08 0.77 
ST credit 0.10 2.12 1.39 2.06 
Labor -0.03 1.39 -1.79 2.80 
Crop -0.55 2.06 1.09 -3.27 
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Appendix G.5 Partial Static Model Price Elasticity Estimates for Ohio 
 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop 
Feed -0.71 0.17 -0.70 0.47 
ST credit 0.03 0.67 -0.24 2.23 
Labor -0.70 -0.24 -0.76 3.19 
Crop 0.34 2.23 1.52 -3.43 
 
 
Appendix H.1 Partial Static Model Allen Elasticity of Substitution Estimates for Illinois 
 
  ALLEN ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop 
Feed -13.20 
  
  
ST credit 0.79 345.65 
 
  
Labor 3.33 -5.69 -35.54   
Crop -9.19 0.04 0.06 -21.79 
 
Appendix H.2 Partial Static Model Allen Elasticity of Substitution Estimates for Indiana 
 
  ALLEN ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop 
Feed -6.22       
ST credit -0.68 156.77 
 
  
Labor -6.28 5.20 -1.87   
Crop 1.04 0.03 0.10 -19.45 
 
Appendix H.3 Partial Static Model Allen Elasticity of Substitution Estimates for Iowa 
 
  ALLEN ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop 
Feed -3.73       
ST credit 0.90 307.46 
 
  
Labor -14.60 2.74 2.90   
Crop -18.78 0.01 0.11 -44.35 
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Appendix H.4 Partial Static Model Allen Elasticity of Substitution Estimates for Missouri 
 
  ALLEN ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop 
Feed -5.54       
ST credit 4.38 5790.92 
 
  
Labor -0.99 14.25 -38.93   
Crop -4.21 0.03 0.08 -29.33 
 
 
Appendix H.5 Partial Static Model Allen Elasticity of Substitution Estimates for Ohio 
 
  ALLEN ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop 
Feed -6.70       
ST credit 0.46 999.38 
 
  
Labor -7.00 3.84 13.65   
Crop -17.93 0.04 0.10 -55.87 
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Appendix K.1 Dynamic Model Long-Run Price Elasticity Estimates for Illinois 
 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -0.50 -3.46 11.11 -3.81 -0.95 0.64 -0.98 1.47 
ST credit -0.87 -16.28 0.84 -2.59 0.35 12.72 0.29 2.37 
Labor 11.11 0.84 -1.71 6.08 0.62 -1.43 1.45 -2.31 
Crop -3.81 -0.41 1.92 0.30 -0.74 -0.07 -0.92 0.74 
Livestock -2.52 0.22 0.76 -3.12 8.72 -1.05 2.54 1.25 
LT credit 1.99 10.08 -1.43 -0.39 -1.26 -46.43 -0.46 -1.39 
Land -0.41 0.04 0.33 -0.60 0.47 -0.05 1.52 0.19 
Machinery 0.56 0.23 -0.41 0.46 0.21 -0.15 0.15 -0.10 
 
 
 
Appendix K.2 Dynamic Model Long-Run Price Elasticity Estimates for Indiana 
 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -0.41 -4.03 5.03 -1.11 -0.53 1.44 -0.72 0.38 
ST credit -0.53 -38.41 -0.82 0.40 2.71 31.69 -0.32 3.60 
Labor 5.03 -0.82 -1.28 -1.55 4.40 -2.54 -2.14 -0.61 
Crop -1.11 0.06 -0.50 1.44 -0.21 0.79 -1.33 0.28 
Livestock -2.09 1.41 5.75 -0.87 11.72 1.38 1.97 -0.46 
LT credit 6.57 19.47 -2.54 3.71 1.63 -78.90 1.65 -0.80 
Land -0.83 -0.04 -0.83 -1.57 0.59 0.42 1.69 -0.19 
Machinery 0.23 0.30 -0.11 0.19 -0.06 -0.09 -0.10 0.08 
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Appendix K.3 Dynamic Model Long-Run Price Elasticity Estimates for Iowa 
 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -0.94 -7.31 5.23 -2.65 -0.78 1.05 -1.31 0.96 
ST credit -1.39 -4.53 4.31 -7.52 -4.53 4.96 -2.19 2.33 
Labor 5.23 4.31 2.13 11.67 -0.99 -5.59 2.77 -2.70 
Crop -2.65 -2.49 3.74 1.14 -2.14 -0.16 -2.20 1.51 
Livestock -1.09 -1.20 -0.25 -1.70 4.03 -0.43 0.38 -0.11 
LT credit 6.06 5.50 -5.59 -0.53 -1.81 81.52 -0.10 -2.91 
Land -1.37 -0.44 0.55 -1.31 0.31 -0.01 -0.31 -0.04 
Machinery 0.79 0.37 -0.40 0.74 -0.05 -0.40 -0.04 0.02 
 
 
 
Appendix K.4 Dynamic Model Long-Run Price Elasticity Estimates for Missouri 
 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -0.38 -6.68 4.16 -1.60 0.48 -0.05 -0.90 1.06 
ST credit -0.48 -33.84 -2.04 -7.95 3.63 33.00 -7.55 7.71 
Labor 4.16 -2.04 0.10 2.26 -2.61 1.51 -3.07 -0.46 
Crop -1.60 -0.85 0.88 1.03 -0.71 -0.35 -2.21 1.25 
Livestock 2.71 1.65 -4.13 -2.95 18.12 -2.27 3.57 0.09 
LT credit -0.33 13.92 1.51 -1.36 -2.12 -1.70 -0.58 -0.37 
Land -1.70 -1.04 -1.52 -2.82 1.15 -0.19 1.70 -0.37 
Machinery 0.73 0.43 -0.08 0.60 0.03 -0.04 -0.13 -0.31 
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Appendix K.5 Dynamic Model Long-Run Price Elasticity Estimates for Ohio 
 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed 0.12 3.18 4.52 -0.70 -0.58 1.12 -0.64 0.43 
ST credit 0.45 -37.66 -2.08 0.69 2.74 35.00 0.38 2.51 
Labor 4.52 -2.08 -1.48 -4.34 5.36 1.48 -1.37 0.10 
Crop -0.70 0.10 -2.07 0.57 -1.25 1.06 -0.92 0.13 
Livestock -3.27 2.09 14.29 -7.06 8.78 2.14 -0.53 1.10 
LT credit 5.35 23.14 1.48 5.09 1.85 -116.98 1.86 -0.01 
Land -0.88 0.08 -0.90 -1.27 -0.12 0.54 1.10 -0.13 
Machinery 0.23 0.19 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 
 
 
 
Appendix L.1 Dynamic Model Long-Run Allen Elasticity of Substitution Estimates for Illinois 
 
  ALLEN ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -5.29               
ST credit -0.03 -5499.09 
     
  
Labor -97.73 27.56 -41.01 
    
  
Crop -22.19 -27.68 38.78 4.60 
   
  
Livestock -37.72 7.44 18.60 -14.85 464.04 
  
  
LT credit 18.26 600.07 -28.89 -4.52 -26.11 -46.43 
 
  
Land -5.02 1.50 7.38 -4.72 13.11 -2.32 8.04   
Machinery 6.25 11.78 -9.46 3.08 5.56 -5.67 0.75 -0.30 
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Appendix L.2 Dynamic Model Long-Run Allen Elasticity of Substitution Estimates for Indiana 
 
  ALLEN ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -2.66               
ST credit -0.02 -5443.30 
     
  
Labor -26.14 -30.12 -26.64 
    
  
Crop -6.62 3.25 -9.28 12.77 
   
  
Livestock -15.67 53.23 123.27 -4.80 367.50 
  
  
LT credit 39.55 1300.50 -46.43 28.58 34.71 -78.90 
 
  
Land -5.52 -3.41 -16.31 -11.47 14.88 13.30 14.64   
Machinery 1.46 17.93 -2.40 1.06 -1.97 -3.17 -0.88 0.51 
 
 
 
 
Appendix L.3 Dynamic Model Long-Run Allen Elasticity of Substitution Estimates for Iowa 
 
  ALLEN ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -5.76               
ST credit -0.06 -877.52 
     
  
Labor -93.64 128.38 77.01 
    
  
Crop -25.53 -86.96 112.33 17.49 
   
  
Livestock -7.13 -32.86 -8.66 -15.63 40.51 
  
  
LT credit 33.05 217.55 -166.09 -7.51 -13.02 81.52 
 
  
Land -8.27 -14.21 17.65 -14.09 2.40 -0.65 -1.90   
Machinery 4.70 11.07 -13.11 7.16 -0.64 -14.01 -0.24 0.24 
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Appendix L.4 Dynamic Model Long-Run Allen Elasticity of Substitution Estimates for Missouri 
 
  ALLEN ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -2.01               
ST credit -0.02 -62729.21 
     
  
Labor -36.63 -71.28 3.58 
    
  
Crop -12.18 -107.02 16.61 10.38 
   
  
Livestock 15.49 57.36 -99.60 -20.96 998.64 
  
  
LT credit -1.68 1433.37 27.35 -13.13 -48.79 -1.70 
 
  
Land -8.94 -171.11 -28.72 -25.98 34.88 -6.53 24.50   
Machinery 3.93 47.91 -1.67 4.86 0.35 -1.48 -1.74 -1.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix L.5 Dynamic Model Long-Run Allen Elasticity of Substitution Estimates for Ohio 
 
  ALLEN ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed 1.16               
ST credit 0.01 -4289.44 
     
  
Labor -12.14 -81.24 -22.31 
    
  
Crop -4.52 6.10 -27.74 5.60 
   
  
Livestock -24.61 80.58 223.61 -40.83 469.31 
  
  
LT credit 34.23 1443.44 19.79 38.63 62.29 -116.98 
 
  
Land -5.83 4.63 -12.24 -10.31 -4.51 19.01 13.37   
Machinery 1.50 11.21 0.35 0.38 3.95 -0.10 -0.64 -0.03 
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Appendix I.1 Dynamic Model Short-Run Price Elasticity Estimates for Illinois 
 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -1.01 -0.09 -0.20 0.01 -0.29 -0.37 0.04 0.05 
ST credit 0.02 -1.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 
Labor -0.11 -0.07 -1.28 -0.05 -0.38 -0.47 -0.04 -0.01 
Crop 0.22 0.32 0.25 -0.80 0.27 0.29 0.20 0.19 
Livestock 0.10 0.19 0.13 0.08 -0.86 0.16 0.08 0.08 
LT credit 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.04 -0.96 0.04 0.04 
Land 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.17 -0.80 0.20 
Machinery 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.25 -0.75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix I.2 Dynamic Model Short-Run Price Elasticity Estimates for Indiana 
 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -0.88 -0.05 0.02 0.11 -0.02 -0.06 0.11 0.13 
ST credit 0.03 -1.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 
Labor 0.01 -0.04 -1.08 0.01 -0.13 -0.16 -0.02 0.03 
Crop 0.20 0.35 0.25 -0.80 0.27 0.29 0.21 0.19 
Livestock 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.06 -0.92 0.09 0.06 0.05 
LT credit 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.05 -0.95 0.04 0.04 
Land 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.10 -0.87 0.13 
Machinery 0.27 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.27 -0.73 
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Appendix I.3 Dynamic Model Short-Run Price Elasticity Estimates for Iowa 
 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -0.87 -0.03 -0.16 0.07 0.09 -0.19 0.11 0.12 
ST credit 0.03 -0.99 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 
Labor -0.05 -0.02 -1.46 -0.12 -0.09 -0.50 -0.06 -0.03 
Crop 0.13 0.18 0.19 -0.86 0.14 0.19 0.13 0.13 
Livestock 0.19 0.40 0.41 0.23 -0.79 0.43 0.19 0.18 
LT credit 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.04 -0.97 0.04 0.04 
Land 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 -0.84 0.16 
Machinery 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.21 -0.79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix I.4 Dynamic Model Short-Run Price Elasticity Estimates for Missouri 
 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -0.84 -0.05 0.10 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.17 
ST credit 0.04 -0.96 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Labor 0.01 -0.10 -1.11 -0.01 -0.21 -0.19 -0.05 0.03 
Crop 0.14 0.19 0.15 -0.85 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 
Livestock 0.09 0.49 0.18 0.10 -0.75 0.24 0.11 0.07 
LT credit 0.05 0.15 0.03 0.06 0.09 -0.91 0.06 0.05 
Land 0.10 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.06 -0.91 0.10 
Machinery 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.28 -0.72 
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Appendix I.5 Dynamic Model Short-Run Price Elasticity Estimates for Ohio 
 
  PRICE ELASTICITY (Eij) 
Input (i) 
Price (j) 
Feed ST credit Labor Crop Livest LT credit Land  Mach 
Feed -0.87 -0.03 0.08 0.12 -0.06 -0.03 0.10 0.13 
ST credit 0.02 -1.04 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.02 
Labor 0.04 -0.02 -0.99 0.04 -0.11 -0.09 -0.02 0.06 
Crop 0.20 0.45 0.25 -0.80 0.38 0.35 0.22 0.18 
Livestock 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.03 -1.01 0.00 0.03 0.03 
LT credit 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.96 0.04 0.04 
Land 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.09 -0.89 0.11 
Machinery 0.30 0.38 0.32 0.30 0.36 0.35 0.31 -0.70 
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Appendix M.1 Regression Estimates the changes in relative lending for all years 
 
       Dependent Variables 
 
Debt in real 
estate FCS 
Debt in real 
estate FSA 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FCS 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FSA 
Independent 
Variables 
      
Farm Income 5.98e-05 0.000251* 3.16e-06 -1.71e-06 
 
(9.23e-05) (0.000144) (9.06e-05) (0.000132) 
GDP -0.727 0.442 0.523 0.427 
 
(0.666) (1.037) (0.654) (0.954) 
Interest -0.650 -0.424 -0.436 -0.226 
 
(0.402) (0.627) (0.395) (0.576) 
Population -6.63e-05 -0.00189** -0.000726 -0.000781 
 
(0.000501) (0.000780) (0.000492) (0.000718) 
Failures 0.000635 -0.00898*** 0.00122 -0.00191 
 
(0.00144) (0.00225) (0.00142) (0.00207) 
Number of Farms 0.00189 0.0219*** 0.00940** 0.00941 
 
(0.00467) (0.00727) (0.00459) (0.00669) 
ST interest 
elasticity -1.371 -32.08** -32.84*** -15.81 
 
(8.401) (13.08) (8.248) (12.03) 
LT interest 
elasticity -568.2*** -1,085*** -525.1*** -729.8*** 
 
(112.8) (175.6) (110.7) (161.5) 
Land elasticity 32.63 -225.4*** 40.61 -80.50 
 
(42.60) (66.32) (41.82) (61.00) 
Constant 512.9*** 1,201*** 466.0*** 759.6*** 
 
(113.3) (176.4) (111.2) (162.2) 
     Observations 73 73 73 73 
R-squared 0.642 0.553 0.630 0.534 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix M.2 Regression Estimates the changes in relative lending before 1970 
 
  Dependent Variables 
 
Debt in real 
estate FCS 
Debt in real estate 
FSA 
Debt in non-real 
estate FCS 
Debt in non-real 
estate FSA Independent 
Variables 
      
Farm Income 0.00271** -0.00543*** 2.77e-05 -0.00129 
 
(0.00125) (0.00170) (0.00130) (0.00101) 
GDP 28.00*** 4.432 29.29*** 11.56 
 
(9.478) (12.88) (9.819) (7.608) 
Interest 1.929 -5.520 -11.68*** 0.297 
 
(3.518) (4.780) (3.645) (2.824) 
Population -0.000267 -0.00392** -8.94e-05 -0.000307 
 
(0.00117) (0.00159) (0.00121) (0.000938) 
Failures 0.00794 -0.0187** 0.0133* -0.0143*** 
 
(0.00686) (0.00932) (0.00711) (0.00551) 
Number of Farms 0.0161 0.0544*** 0.0208 0.0121 
 
(0.0134) (0.0182) (0.0139) (0.0108) 
ST interest elasticity 85.64*** -142.9*** -41.46* 6.176 
 
(24.32) (33.05) (25.20) (19.52) 
LT interest elasticity 3,116** -6,162*** -2,227* -622.3 
 
(1,262) (1,715) (1,307) (1,013) 
Land elasticity 127.6 38.66 51.72 0.661 
 
(92.83) (126.1) (96.17) (74.52) 
Constant -3,425*** 5,984*** 2,011 526.6 
 
(1,259) (1,711) (1,304) (1,011) 
     Observations 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.768 0.771 0.488 0.661 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix M.3 Regression Estimates the changes in relative lending from 1970-1987 
 
  Dependent Variables 
 
Debt in real 
estate FCS 
Debt in real estate 
FSA 
Debt in non-real 
estate FCS 
Debt in non-real 
estate FSA Independent 
Variables 
      
Farm Income -0.000188 -6.35e-06 -0.000383** 0.000209 
 
(0.000165) (0.000373) (0.000189) (0.000490) 
GDP -14.53** -19.30 -29.66*** 22.70 
 
(6.245) (14.16) (7.146) (18.59) 
Interest -0.295 0.848 0.0276 1.060 
 
(0.325) (0.736) (0.371) (0.966) 
Population -0.197** 0.190 -0.283*** 0.0804 
 
(0.0790) (0.179) (0.0904) (0.235) 
Failures 0.00826** 0.00982 0.00726* 0.000964 
 
(0.00385) (0.00873) (0.00440) (0.0115) 
Number of Farms 0.257** -0.340 0.324** 0.0953 
 
(0.125) (0.283) (0.143) (0.371) 
ST interest elasticity 939.9*** -381.3 1,303*** -1,014 
 
(315.5) (715.3) (361.1) (939.2) 
LT interest elasticity -1,843*** 454.5 -2,906*** 655.0 
 
(482.1) (1,093) (551.8) (1,435) 
Land elasticity -81.02 55.83 -30.93 -286.0 
 
(79.16) (179.5) (90.59) (235.6) 
Constant 652.7*** 503.6 1,326*** 105.4 
 
(194.5) (441.0) (222.6) (579.0) 
     Observations 18 18 18 18 
R-squared 0.951 0.583 0.956 0.771 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix M.4 Regression Estimates the changes in relative lending after 1987 
  Dependent Variables 
 
Debt in real 
estate FCS 
Debt in real 
estate FSA 
Debt in non-real 
estate FCS 
Debt in non-real 
estate FSA Independent 
Variables 
      
Farm Income 9.37e-05 0.000102 5.90e-05 -0.000175* 
 
(0.000108) (0.000187) (8.16e-05) (8.91e-05) 
GDP -5.546** -1.772 1.297 0.508 
 
(2.520) (4.364) (1.902) (2.078) 
Interest -0.633 -0.484 -1.695*** -0.732 
 
(0.754) (1.305) (0.569) (0.622) 
Population 0.0396 0.0501 -0.0332 0.0303 
 
(0.0437) (0.0757) (0.0330) (0.0361) 
Failures 0.00802* 0.00304 -0.00281 -0.00231 
 
(0.00469) (0.00812) (0.00354) (0.00387) 
Number of Farms 0.0661 0.0107 -0.0242 -0.0716* 
 
(0.0446) (0.0772) (0.0337) (0.0368) 
ST interest elasticity -304.4 37.37 -298.3 908.1*** 
 
(302.3) (523.5) (228.2) (249.3) 
LT interest elasticity 1,010 227.8 -342.8 -1,444** 
 
(691.1) (1,197) (521.6) (569.9) 
Land elasticity -69.37 -416.6 23.61 -43.02 
 
(161.8) (280.1) (122.1) (133.4) 
Constant -722.9 39.27 674.3 638.3 
 
(552.2) (956.1) (416.8) (455.4) 
     Observations 25 25 25 25 
R-squared 0.467 0.407 0.388 0.724 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix N.1 Regression Estimates for the value of lending for all years 
  Dependent Variables 
 
Debt in real 
estate FCS 
Debt in real estate 
FSA 
Debt in non-real 
estate FCS 
Debt in non-real 
estate FSA Independent 
Variables 
      
Farm Income 245.6*** 28.19*** 84.90** 20.23 
 
(72.68) (6.667) (41.32) (13.16) 
GDP 4.382e+06*** -244,644*** 2.747e+06*** -131,480 
 
(543,032) (49,814) (308,737) (98,321) 
Interest 923,946*** 188,313*** 519,538*** 487,375*** 
 
(329,942) (30,267) (187,586) (59,739) 
Population -1,016** 65.76* -452.1* 64.63 
 
(406.1) (37.26) (230.9) (73.53) 
Failures 7,585*** 451.5*** 2,720*** 1,186*** 
 
(1,155) (105.9) (656.6) (209.1) 
Number of Farms 11,720*** -1,083*** 4,776** -53.01 
 
(3,767) (345.5) (2,141) (682.0) 
ST interest elasticity -1.713e+06 -1.523e+06*** 3.277e+06 -4.650e+06*** 
 
(6.352e+06) (582,709) (3.611e+06) (1.150e+06) 
LT interest elasticity 3.025e+08*** -9.562e+07*** 2.846e+08*** -1.895e+08*** 
 
(9.090e+07) (8.339e+06) (5.168e+07) (1.646e+07) 
Land elasticity 1.651e+08*** 7.205e+06** 9.243e+07*** 1.389e+07** 
 
(3.491e+07) (3.202e+06) (1.985e+07) (6.320e+06) 
Constant -4.890e+08*** 9.181e+07*** -3.832e+08*** 1.735e+08*** 
 
(9.105e+07) (8.352e+06) (5.176e+07) (1.648e+07) 
     Observations 75 75 75 75 
R-squared 0.945 0.970 0.938 0.960 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix N.2 Regression Estimates for the value of lending for before 1970 
  Dependent Variables 
 
Debt in real 
estate FCS 
Debt in real 
estate FSA 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FCS 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FSA 
Independent 
Variables 
      
Farm Income -29.71 -20.68 -14.31 0.838 
 
(26.23) (17.08) (29.03) (3.527) 
GDP 604,287*** 164,032 273,683 198,965*** 
 
(158,673) (103,348) (175,624) (21,341) 
Interest 243,615*** 21,973 149,034* -24,177** 
 
(76,918) (50,098) (85,135) (10,345) 
Population 89.41*** -26.46* 13.71 -5.040 
 
(23.54) (15.33) (26.05) (3.166) 
Failures 106.0 1.206 23.51 42.88*** 
 
(90.15) (58.72) (99.78) (12.12) 
Number of Farms -1,320*** -37.32 -715.0*** 38.28 
 
(223.9) (145.9) (247.9) (30.12) 
ST interest 
elasticity -298,663 -866,820** -1.285e+06** 7,798 
 
(528,565) (344,268) (585,031) (71,090) 
LT interest 
elasticity 
-
1.182e+08*** 
-
7.193e+07*** 
-
1.176e+08*** 
-
7.768e+06** 
 
(2.720e+07) (1.771e+07) (3.010e+07) (3.658e+06) 
Land elasticity -2.032e+06 3.065e+06*** 2.354e+06 566,482** 
 
(1.769e+06) (1.152e+06) (1.958e+06) (237,951) 
Constant 1.205e+08*** 6.882e+07*** 1.161e+08*** 6.824e+06* 
 
(2.672e+07) (1.740e+07) (2.957e+07) (3.594e+06) 
     Observations 31 31 31 31 
R-squared 0.993 0.982 0.988 0.989 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix N.3 Regression Estimates for the value of lending for 1970-1987 
  Dependent Variables 
 
Debt in real 
estate FCS 
Debt in real 
estate FSA 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FCS 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FSA 
Independent 
Variables 
      
Farm Income -71.22* 44.01** 1.082 98.74*** 
 
(38.64) (19.94) (39.04) (28.69) 
GDP -4.773e+06*** 1.586e+06** 229,738 4.148e+06*** 
 
(1.465e+06) (756,023) (1.480e+06) (1.088e+06) 
Interest 463,699*** 131,791*** 242,744*** 349,723*** 
 
(76,142) (39,302) (76,946) (56,534) 
Population -134,180*** -4,335 -78,604*** -35,956*** 
 
(18,530) (9,565) (18,726) (13,758) 
Failures 2,340*** -37.90 -924.7 842.6 
 
(902.7) (465.9) (912.2) (670.2) 
Number of Farms 173,121*** 12,996 109,114*** 72,367*** 
 
(29,239) (15,092) (29,548) (21,709) 
ST interest 
elasticity 
-
2.624e+08*** 
-
8.000e+07** -1.390e+08* -1.051e+08* 
 
(7.400e+07) (3.820e+07) (7.478e+07) (5.495e+07) 
LT interest 
elasticity -2.530e+08** 475,300 1.589e+07 -2.556e+07 
 
(1.131e+08) (5.837e+07) (1.143e+08) (8.397e+07) 
Land elasticity -3.793e+07** -9.929e+06 -2.303e+07 -2.584e+07* 
 
(1.857e+07) (9.584e+06) (1.876e+07) (1.379e+07) 
Constant 3.574e+08*** 5.459e+07** 6.634e+06 5.007e+06 
 
(4.562e+07) (2.355e+07) (4.610e+07) (3.387e+07) 
     Observations 18 18 18 18 
R-squared 0.998 0.985 0.984 0.994 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix N.4 Regression Estimates for the value of lending for after 1987 
  Dependent Variables 
 Debt in real estate 
FCS 
Debt in real 
estate FSA 
Debt in non-
real estate FCS 
Debt in non-real 
estate FSA Independent Variables 
          
Farm Income 120.3 5.797 20.38 -3.775 
 
(88.03) (6.622) (48.50) (6.736) 
GDP 6.210e+06*** -377,200*** 4.546e+06*** -824,639*** 
 
(1.893e+06) (142,435) (1.043e+06) (144,875) 
Interest -1.346e+06** 43,735 -954,899*** 87,408* 
 
(620,294) (46,662) (341,722) (47,461) 
Population -53,715 711.6 -41,456** 3,198 
 
(35,287) (2,654) (19,440) (2,700) 
Failures 7,877** 968.5*** 2,100 1,576*** 
 
(3,896) (293.1) (2,147) (298.1) 
Number of Farms -1,219 -2,417 -10,036 3,502 
 
(30,119) (2,266) (16,592) (2,304) 
ST interest elasticity 1.039e+08 2.178e+07 -4.275e+07 4.136e+07*** 
 
(1.885e+08) (1.418e+07) (1.038e+08) (1.442e+07) 
LT interest elasticity -4.201e+08 -7.013e+07* -2.320e+08 -1.353e+08*** 
 
(5.104e+08) (3.839e+07) (2.812e+08) (3.905e+07) 
Land elasticity 4.358e+07 -982,589 5.457e+07 3.754e+06 
 
(1.329e+08) (9.999e+06) (7.323e+07) (1.017e+07) 
Constant 2.751e+08 5.684e+07* 2.498e+08 8.668e+07** 
 
(4.495e+08) (3.381e+07) (2.476e+08) (3.439e+07) 
     Observations 26 26 26 26 
R-squared 0.956 0.959 0.959 0.986 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix O.1 Regression Estimates for the share of lending for all years 
  Dependent Variables 
 
Debt in real 
estate FCS 
Debt in real 
estate FSA 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FCS 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FSA 
Independent 
Variables 
      
Farm Income -2.33e-05 5.65e-05** -8.48e-06 5.88e-05* 
 
(5.35e-05) (2.50e-05) (3.52e-05) (3.15e-05) 
GDP 0.271 -1.923*** 1.277*** -0.886*** 
 
(0.386) (0.181) (0.254) (0.228) 
Interest 0.856*** -0.107 0.0732 0.648*** 
 
(0.233) (0.109) (0.153) (0.138) 
Population 6.82e-05 
-
0.000970*** 
-
0.000643*** -2.86e-05 
 
(0.000287) (0.000134) (0.000189) (0.000169) 
Failures 0.00341*** -0.000251 0.000984* 0.00160*** 
 
(0.000835) (0.000391) (0.000550) (0.000493) 
Number of Farms -0.00137 0.00330*** 0.00135 0.00186 
 
(0.00266) (0.00125) (0.00175) (0.00157) 
ST interest 
elasticity 12.24*** -4.223** 5.655* -0.410 
 
(4.488) (2.100) (2.953) (2.648) 
LT interest 
elasticity 208.5*** -153.7*** 399.6*** -376.8*** 
 
(65.39) (30.60) (43.02) (38.58) 
Land elasticity 69.79*** 19.29* 57.34*** 1.855 
 
(24.69) (11.55) (16.24) (14.57) 
Constant -224.6*** 156.1*** -422.4*** 361.6*** 
 
(65.67) (30.73) (43.21) (38.75) 
     Observations 74 74 74 74 
R-squared 0.820 0.903 0.925 0.901 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix O.2 Regression Estimates for the share of lending before 1970 
  Dependent Variables 
 
Debt in real 
estate FCS 
Debt in real 
estate FSA 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FCS 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FSA 
Independent 
Variables 
      
Farm Income -0.000307 -8.83e-05 0.000125 2.30e-05 
 
(0.000423) (0.000299) (0.000161) (0.000234) 
GDP 8.991*** 2.485 -2.525*** 3.405** 
 
(2.557) (1.809) (0.975) (1.419) 
Interest 0.221 -1.732** 0.0624 -0.0929 
 
(1.239) (0.877) (0.473) (0.688) 
Population 0.00101*** 
-
0.000749*** 0.000459*** -0.000507** 
 
(0.000379) (0.000268) (0.000145) (0.000210) 
Failures 0.00126 -0.00116 -0.000315 0.00151* 
 
(0.00145) (0.00103) (0.000554) (0.000806) 
Number of Farms -0.00645* 0.00314 -0.0111*** 0.00819*** 
 
(0.00361) (0.00255) (0.00138) (0.00200) 
ST interest 
elasticity 41.39*** -2.117 -1.673 5.977 
 
(8.516) (6.026) (3.247) (4.726) 
LT interest 
elasticity 901.6** -281.3 -157.0 50.84 
 
(438.2) (310.0) (167.1) (243.1) 
Land elasticity -46.37 108.9*** 38.26*** 38.95** 
 
(28.51) (20.17) (10.87) (15.82) 
Constant -839.3* 194.6 188.7 -120.5 
 
(430.5) (304.6) (164.2) (238.9) 
     Observations 31 31 31 31 
R-squared 0.960 0.937 0.987 0.937 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix O.3 Regression Estimates for the share of lending from 1970-1987 
  Dependent Variables 
 Debt in real 
estate FCS 
Debt in real 
estate FSA 
Debt in non-
real estate FCS 
Debt in non-
real estate FSA 
Independent Variables 
          
Farm Income -9.32e-05*** 0.000121*** -4.15e-05 0.000237*** 
 
(3.28e-05) (4.10e-05) (3.51e-05) (4.97e-05) 
GDP -6.991*** 4.895*** -4.212*** 11.59*** 
 
(1.242) (1.553) (1.331) (1.886) 
Interest 0.0237 0.158* 0.0600 0.402*** 
 
(0.0646) (0.0807) (0.0692) (0.0980) 
Population -0.145*** 0.0541*** -0.0535*** -0.0694*** 
 
(0.0157) (0.0196) (0.0168) (0.0239) 
Failures 0.000796 -0.00109 -0.00166** 0.00106 
 
(0.000766) (0.000957) (0.000821) (0.00116) 
Number of Farms 0.175*** -0.0449 0.0671** 0.151*** 
 
(0.0248) (0.0310) (0.0266) (0.0376) 
ST interest elasticity -4.156 -155.6** 83.17 -3.354 
 
(62.76) (78.44) (67.27) (95.29) 
LT interest elasticity -310.4*** 173.1 -157.6 -79.47 
 
(95.91) (119.9) (102.8) (145.6) 
Land elasticity -37.41** -2.647 -24.98 -59.63** 
 
(15.75) (19.68) (16.88) (23.91) 
Constant 233.2*** 0.446 67.56 -192.7*** 
 
(38.69) (48.36) (41.47) (58.74) 
     Observations 18 18 18 18 
R-squared 0.993 0.885 0.987 0.992 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix O.4 Regression Estimates for the share of lending after 1987 
  Dependent Variables 
 Debt in real estate 
FCS 
Debt in real 
estate FSA 
Debt in non-real 
estate FCS 
Debt in non-real 
estate FSA Independent Variables 
          
Farm Income 4.87e-05** 5.25e-06 6.42e-06 -7.71e-06 
 
(2.21e-05) (8.69e-06) (2.58e-05) (1.08e-05) 
GDP -1.387*** -1.829*** 2.766*** -2.210*** 
 
(0.515) (0.203) (0.602) (0.253) 
Interest -0.168 0.119** -0.491*** 0.235*** 
 
(0.154) (0.0606) (0.180) (0.0757) 
Population -0.0151* -0.00210 -0.0218** 0.00668 
 
(0.00894) (0.00352) (0.0104) (0.00439) 
Failures 0.00219** 0.00114*** -2.83e-05 0.00290*** 
 
(0.000959) (0.000377) (0.00112) (0.000470) 
Number of Farms 0.0449*** 0.000925 0.00251 0.00954** 
 
(0.00912) (0.00359) (0.0106) (0.00448) 
ST interest elasticity -75.82 55.69** -61.35 105.4*** 
 
(61.83) (24.32) (72.18) (30.34) 
LT interest elasticity 183.0 -128.3** -32.36 -276.5*** 
 
(141.3) (55.59) (165.0) (69.36) 
Land elasticity 24.99 -5.833 42.45 0.579 
 
(33.08) (13.01) (38.62) (16.23) 
Constant -130.6 98.71** 71.29 161.7*** 
 
(112.9) (44.42) (131.9) (55.42) 
     Observations 25 25 25 25 
R-squared 0.920 0.992 0.972 0.994 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix P.1 Regression Estimates for the change in lending for all years 
  Dependent Variables 
 
Debt in real 
estate FCS 
Debt in real 
estate FSA 
Debt in non-real 
estate FCS 
Debt in non-real 
estate FSA Independent 
Variables 
      
Farm Income -2.33e-05 5.65e-05** -8.48e-06 5.88e-05* 
 
(5.35e-05) (2.50e-05) (3.52e-05) (3.15e-05) 
GDP 0.271 -1.923*** 1.277*** -0.886*** 
 
(0.386) (0.181) (0.254) (0.228) 
Interest 0.856*** -0.107 0.0732 0.648*** 
 
(0.233) (0.109) (0.153) (0.138) 
Population 6.82e-05 -0.000970*** -0.000643*** -2.86e-05 
 
(0.000287) (0.000134) (0.000189) (0.000169) 
Failures 0.00341*** -0.000251 0.000984* 0.00160*** 
 
(0.000835) (0.000391) (0.000550) (0.000493) 
Number of Farms -0.00137 0.00330*** 0.00135 0.00186 
 
(0.00266) (0.00125) (0.00175) (0.00157) 
ST interest elasticity 12.24*** -4.223** 5.655* -0.410 
 
(4.488) (2.100) (2.953) (2.648) 
LT interest elasticity 208.5*** -153.7*** 399.6*** -376.8*** 
 
(65.39) (30.60) (43.02) (38.58) 
Land elasticity 69.79*** 19.29* 57.34*** 1.855 
 
(24.69) (11.55) (16.24) (14.57) 
Constant -224.6*** 156.1*** -422.4*** 361.6*** 
 
(65.67) (30.73) (43.21) (38.75) 
     Observations 74 74 74 74 
R-squared 0.820 0.903 0.925 0.901 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix P.2 Regression Estimates for the change in lending before 1970 
  Dependent Variables 
 
Debt in real 
estate FCS 
Debt in real 
estate FSA 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FCS 
Debt in non-
real estate 
FSA 
Independent 
Variables 
      
Farm Income -0.000307 -8.83e-05 0.000125 2.30e-05 
 
(0.000423) (0.000299) (0.000161) (0.000234) 
GDP 8.991*** 2.485 -2.525*** 3.405** 
 
(2.557) (1.809) (0.975) (1.419) 
Interest 0.221 -1.732** 0.0624 -0.0929 
 
(1.239) (0.877) (0.473) (0.688) 
Population 0.00101*** 
-
0.000749*** 0.000459*** -0.000507** 
 
(0.000379) (0.000268) (0.000145) (0.000210) 
Failures 0.00126 -0.00116 -0.000315 0.00151* 
 
(0.00145) (0.00103) (0.000554) (0.000806) 
Number of Farms -0.00645* 0.00314 -0.0111*** 0.00819*** 
 
(0.00361) (0.00255) (0.00138) (0.00200) 
ST interest 
elasticity 41.39*** -2.117 -1.673 5.977 
 
(8.516) (6.026) (3.247) (4.726) 
LT interest 
elasticity 901.6** -281.3 -157.0 50.84 
 
(438.2) (310.0) (167.1) (243.1) 
Land elasticity -46.37 108.9*** 38.26*** 38.95** 
 
(28.51) (20.17) (10.87) (15.82) 
Constant -839.3* 194.6 188.7 -120.5 
 
(430.5) (304.6) (164.2) (238.9) 
     Observations 31 31 31 31 
R-squared 0.960 0.937 0.987 0.937 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix P.3 Regression Estimates for the change in lending from 1970-1987 
  Dependent Variables 
 
Debt in real estate 
FCS 
Debt in real estate 
FSA 
Debt in non-real 
estate FCS 
Debt in non-real 
estate FSA Independent 
Variables 
      
Farm Income -9.32e-05*** 0.000121*** -4.15e-05 0.000237*** 
 
(3.28e-05) (4.10e-05) (3.51e-05) (4.97e-05) 
GDP -6.991*** 4.895*** -4.212*** 11.59*** 
 
(1.242) (1.553) (1.331) (1.886) 
Interest 0.0237 0.158* 0.0600 0.402*** 
 
(0.0646) (0.0807) (0.0692) (0.0980) 
Population -0.145*** 0.0541*** -0.0535*** -0.0694*** 
 
(0.0157) (0.0196) (0.0168) (0.0239) 
Failures 0.000796 -0.00109 -0.00166** 0.00106 
 
(0.000766) (0.000957) (0.000821) (0.00116) 
Number of Farms 0.175*** -0.0449 0.0671** 0.151*** 
 
(0.0248) (0.0310) (0.0266) (0.0376) 
ST interest elasticity -4.156 -155.6** 83.17 -3.354 
 
(62.76) (78.44) (67.27) (95.29) 
LT interest elasticity -310.4*** 173.1 -157.6 -79.47 
 
(95.91) (119.9) (102.8) (145.6) 
Land elasticity -37.41** -2.647 -24.98 -59.63** 
 
(15.75) (19.68) (16.88) (23.91) 
Constant 233.2*** 0.446 67.56 -192.7*** 
 
(38.69) (48.36) (41.47) (58.74) 
     Observations 18 18 18 18 
R-squared 0.993 0.885 0.987 0.992 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix P.4 Regression Estimates for the change in lending after 1987 
  Dependent Variables 
 
Debt in real 
estate FCS 
Debt in real estate 
FSA 
Debt in non-real 
estate FCS 
Debt in non-real 
estate FSA Independent 
Variables 
      
Farm Income 4.87e-05** 5.25e-06 6.42e-06 -7.71e-06 
 
(2.21e-05) (8.69e-06) (2.58e-05) (1.08e-05) 
GDP -1.387*** -1.829*** 2.766*** -2.210*** 
 
(0.515) (0.203) (0.602) (0.253) 
Interest -0.168 0.119** -0.491*** 0.235*** 
 
(0.154) (0.0606) (0.180) (0.0757) 
Population -0.0151* -0.00210 -0.0218** 0.00668 
 
(0.00894) (0.00352) (0.0104) (0.00439) 
Failures 0.00219** 0.00114*** -2.83e-05 0.00290*** 
 
(0.000959) (0.000377) (0.00112) (0.000470) 
Number of Farms 0.0449*** 0.000925 0.00251 0.00954** 
 
(0.00912) (0.00359) (0.0106) (0.00448) 
ST interest elasticity -75.82 55.69** -61.35 105.4*** 
 
(61.83) (24.32) (72.18) (30.34) 
LT interest elasticity 183.0 -128.3** -32.36 -276.5*** 
 
(141.3) (55.59) (165.0) (69.36) 
Land elasticity 24.99 -5.833 42.45 0.579 
 
(33.08) (13.01) (38.62) (16.23) 
Constant -130.6 98.71** 71.29 161.7*** 
 
(112.9) (44.42) (131.9) (55.42) 
     Observations 25 25 25 25 
R-squared 0.920 0.992 0.972 0.994 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
 
 
 
 
